SECT. IV.
Of the Modern Philosophy.
But here it may be objected, that the imagination, according to my own confession, being the ultimate judge of all systems
of philosophy, I am unjust in blaming the antient philosophers for making use of that faculty, and allowing themselves to be
entirely guided by it in their reasonings. In order to justify myself, I must distinguish in the imagination betwixt the principles
which are permanent, irresistible, and universal; such as the customary transition from causes to effects, and from effects to
causes: And the principles, which are changeable, weak, and irregular; such as those I have just now taken notice of. The
former are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions, so that upon their removal human nature must immediately perish
and go to ruin. The latter are neither unavoidable to mankind, nor necessary, or so much as useful in the conduct of life; but
on the contrary are observ'd only to take place in weak minds, and being opposite to the other principles of custom and
reasoning, may easily be subverted by a due contrast and opposition. For this reason the former are received by philosophy,
and the latter rejected. One who concludes somebody to be near him, when he hears an articulate voice in the dark, reasons
justly and naturally; tho' that conclusion be deriv'd from nothing but custom, which infixes and inlivens the idea of a human
creature, on account of his usual conjunction with the present impression. But one, who is tormented he knows not why,
with the apprehension of spectres in the dark, may, perhaps, be said to reason, and to reason naturally too: But then it must
be in the same sense, that a malady is said to be natural; as arising from natural causes, tho' it be contrary to health, the most
agreeable and most natural situation of man.
The opinions of the antient philosophers, their fictions of substance and accident, and their reasonings concerning
substantial forms and occult qualities, are like the spectres in the dark, and are deriv'd from principles, which, however
common, are neither universal nor unavoidable in human nature. The modern philosophy pretends to be entirely free from
this defect, and to arise only from the solid, permanent, and consistent principles of the imagination. Upon what grounds this
pretension is founded must now be the subject of our enquiry.
The fundamental principle of that philosophy is the opinion concerning colours, sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold; which
it asserts to be nothing but impressions in the mind, deriv'd from the operation of external objects, and without any
resemblance to the qualities of the objects. Upon examination, I find only one of the reasons commonly produc'd for this
opinion to be satisfactory, viz. that deriv'd from the variations of those impressions, even while the external object, to all
appearance, continues the same. These variations depend upon several circumstances. Upon the different situations of our
health: A man in a malady feels a disagreeable taste in meats, which before pleas'd him the most. Upon the different
complexions and constitutions of men That seems bitter to one, which is sweet to another. Upon the difference of their
external situation and position: Colours reflected from the clouds change according to the distance of the clouds, and
according to the angle they make with the eye and luminous body. Fire. also communicates the sensation of pleasure at one
distance, and that of pain at another. Instances of this kind are very numerous and frequent.
The conclusion drawn from them, is likewise as satisfactory as can possibly be imagin'd. 'Tis certain, that when different
impressions of the same sense arise from any object, every one of these impressions has not a resembling quality existent in
the object. For as the same object cannot, at the same time, be endow'd with different qualities of the same sense, and as the
same quality cannot resemble impressions entirely different; it evidently follows, that many of our impressions have no
external model or archetype. Now from like effects we presume like causes. Many of the impressions of colour, sound, &c.
are confest to be nothing but internal existences, and to arise from causes, which no ways resemble them. These impressions
are in appearance nothing different from the other impressions of colour, sound, &c. We conclude, therefore, that they are,
all of them, deriv'd from a like origin.
This principle being once admitted, all the other doctrines of that philosophy seem to follow by an easy consequence. For
upon the removal of sounds, colours, beat, cold, and other sensible qualities, from the rank of continu'd independent
existences, we are reduc'd merely to what are called primary qualities, as the only real ones., of which we have any adequate
notion. These primary qualities are extension and solidity, with their different mixtures and modifications; figure, motion,
gravity, and cohesion. The generation, encrease, decay, and corruption of animals and vegetables, are nothing but changes of
figure and motion; as also the operations of all bodies on each other; of fire, of light, water, air, earth, and of all the elements
and powers of nature. One figure and motion produces another figure and motion; nor does there remain in. the material
universe any other principle, either active or passive, of which we can form the most distant idea.
I believe many objections might be made to this system But at present I shall confine myself to one, which is in my opinion
very decisive. I assert, that instead of explaining the operations of external objects by its means, we utterly annihilate all
these objects, and reduce ourselves to the opinions of the most extravagant scepticism concerning them. If colours, sounds,
tastes, and smells be merely perceptions, nothing we can conceive is possest of a real, continu'd, and independent existence;
not even motion, extension and solidity, which are the primary qualities chiefly insisted on.'
To begin with the examination of motion; 'tis evident this is a quality altogether inconceivable alone, and without a
reference to some other object. The idea of motion necessarily supposes that of a body moving. Now what is our idea of the
moving body, without which motion is incomprehensible? It must resolve itself into the idea of extension or of solidity; and
consequently the reality of motion depends upon that of these other qualities.
This opinion, which is universally acknowledg'd concerning motion, I have prov'd to be true with regard to extension; and
have shewn that 'tis impossible to conceive extension, but as compos'd of parts, endow'd with colour or solidity. The idea of
extension is a compound idea; but as it is not compounded of an infinite number of parts or inferior ideas, it must at last
resolve itself into such as are perfectly simple and indivisible. These simple and indivisible parts, not being ideas of extension,
must be non entities, unless conceiv'd as colour'd or solid. Colour is excluded from any real existence. The reality, therefore,
of our idea of extension depends upon the reality of that of solidity, nor can the former be just while the latter is chimerical.
Let us, then, lend our attention to the examination of the idea of solidity.
The idea of solidity is that of two objects, which being impell'd by the utmost force, cannot penetrate each other; but still
maintain a separate and distinct existence. Solidity, therefore, is perfectly incomprehensible alone, and without the
conception of some bodies, which are solid, and maintain this separate and distinct existence. Now what idea have we of
these bodies? The ideas of colours, sounds, and other secondary qualities are excluded. The idea of motion depends on that
of extension, and the idea of extension on that of solidity. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that the idea of solidity can depend on
either of them. For that wou'd be to run in a circle, and make one idea depend on another, while at the same time the latter
depends on the former. Our modern philosophy, therefore, leaves us no just nor satisfactory idea of solidity; nor
consequently of matter.
This argument will appear entirely conclusive to every one that comprehends it; but because it may seem abstruse and
intricate to the generality of readers, I hope to be excus'd, if I endeavour to render it more obvious by some variation of the
expression. In order to form an idea of solidity, we must conceive two bodies pressing on each other without any
penetration; and 'tis impossible to arrive at this idea, when we confine ourselves to one object, much more without
conceiving any. Two non-entities cannot exclude each other from their places; because they -never possess any place, nor
can be endow'd with any quality. Now I ask, what idea do we form of these bodies or objects, to which we suppose solidity
to belong? To say, that we conceive them merely as solid, is to run on in infinitum. To affirm, that we paint them out to
ourselves as extended, either resolves all into a false idea, or returns in a circle. Extension must necessarily be considered
either as colour'd, which is a false idea; I or as solid, which brings us back to the first question. We may make the same
observation concerning mobility and figure; and upon the whole must conclude, that after the exclusion of colours, sounds,
heat and cold from the rank of external existences, there remains nothing, which can afford us a just and constituent idea of
body.
Add to this, that, properly speaking, solidity or impenetrability is nothing, but an impossibility of annihilation, as
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has been already observ'd: For which reason 'tis the more necessary for us to form some distinct idea of that object, whose
annihilation we suppose impossible. An impossibility of being annihilated cannot exist, and can never be conceived to exist,
by itself: but necessarily requires some object or real existence, to which it may belong. Now the difficulty still remains, how
to form an idea of this object or existence, without having recourse to the secondary and sensible qualities.
Nor must we omit on this occasion our accustomed method of examining ideas by considering those impressions, from
which they are deriv'd. The impressions, which enter by the sight and hearing, the smell and taste, are affirm'd by modern
philosophy to be without any resembling objects; and consequently the idea of solidity, which is suppos'd to be real, can
never be deriv'd from any of these senses. There remains, therefore, the feeling as the only sense, that can convey the
impression, which is original to the idea of solidity; and indeed we naturally imagine, that we feel the solidity of bodies, and
need but touch any object in order to perceive this quality. But this method of thinking is more popular than philosophical;
as will appear from the following reflections.
First, 'Tis easy to observe, that tho' bodies are felt by means of their solidity, yet the feeling is a quite different thing from
the solidity; and that they have not the least resemblance to each other. A man, who has the palsey in one hand, has as
perfect an idea of impenetrability, when he observes that hand to be supported by the table, as when he feels the same table
with the other hand. An object, that presses upon any of our members, meets with resistance; and that resistance, by the
motion it gives to the nerves and animal spirits, conveys a certain sensation to the mind; but it does not follow, that the
sensation, motion, and resistance are any ways resembling.
Secondly, The impressions of touch are simple impressions, except when considered with regard to their extension; which
makes nothing to the present purpose: And from this simplicity I infer, that they neither represent solidity, nor any real
object. For let us put two cases, viz. that of a man, who presses a stone, or any solid body, with his hand, and that of two
stones, which press each other; 'twill readily be allow'd, that these two cases are not in every respect alike, but that in the
former there is conjoin'd with the solidity, a feeling or sensation, of which there is no appearance in the latter. In order,
therefore, to make these two cases alike, 'tis necessary to remove some part of the impression, which the man feels by his
hand, or organ of sensation; and that being impossible in a simple impression, obliges us to remove the whole, and proves
that this whole impression has no archetype or model in external objects. To which we may add, that solidity necessarily
supposes two bodies, along with contiguity and impulse; which being a compound object, can never be represented by a
simple impression. Not to mention, that tho' solidity continues always invariably the same, the impressions of touch change
every moment upon us; which is a clear proof that the latter are not representations of the former.
Thus there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses; or more properly speaking, betwixt those
conclusions we form from cause and effect, and those that persuade us of the continu'd and independent existence of body.
When we reason from cause and effect, we conclude, that neither colour, sound, taste, nor smell have a continu'd and
independent existence. When we exclude these sensible qualities there remains nothing in the universe, which has such an
existence.