University of Virginia Library

Saturday June 16. in Committee of the Whole

on Resolutions proposd. by Mr. P. & Mr. R

Mr. Lansing called for the reading of the 1st: resolution
of each plan, which he considered as involving
principles directly in contrast; that of Mr. Patterson
says he sustains the sovereignty of the respective
States, that of Mr. Randolph destroys it: the
latter requires a negative on all the laws of the particular
States; the former, only certain general
powers for the general good. The plan of Mr. R. in
short absorbs all power except what may be exercised
in the little local matters of the States which
are not objects worthy of the supreme cognizance.
He grounded his preference of Mr. P's plan, chiefly
on two objections agst. that of Mr. R. 1. want of
power in the Convention to discuss & propose it.
2 the improbability of its being adopted, 1. He
was decidedly of opinion that the power of the Convention
was restrained to amendments of a federal
nature, and having for their basis the Confederacy
in being. The Act of Congress The tenor of the Acts
of the States, the Com̃issions produced by the several
deputations all proved this. And this limitation of
the power to an amendment of the Confederacy,
marked the opinion of the States, that it was unnecessary
& improper to go farther. He was sure
that this was the case with his State. N. York

would never have concurred in sending deputies to
the Convention, if she had supposed the deliberations
were to turn on a consolidation of the States, and a
National Government.

2. was it probable that the States would adopt
& ratify a scheme, which they had never authorized
us to propose? and which so far exceeded what
they regarded as sufficient? We see by their several
Acts particularly in relation to the plan of revenue
proposed by Cong. in 1783, not authorized by the
Articles of Confederation, what were the ideas they
then entertained. Can so great a change be supposed
to have already taken place. To rely on any
change which is hereafter to take place in the sentiments
of the people would be trusting to too great
an uncertainty. We know only what their present
sentiments are. And it is in vain to propose what
will not accord with these. The States will never
feel a sufficient confidence in a general Government
to give it a negative on their laws. The Scheme is
itself totally novel. There is no parallel to it to be
found. The Authority of Congress is familiar to the
people, and an augmentation of the powers of Congress
will be readily approved by them.

Mr. Patterson, said as he had on a former occasion
given his sentiments on the plan proposed by Mr.
R. he would now avoiding repetition as much as
possible give his reasons in favor of that proposed
by himself. He preferred it because it accorded 1.
with the powers of the Convention, 2 with the sentiments
of the people. If the confederacy was radically

wrong, let us return to our States, and obtain
larger powers, not assume them ourselves. I came
here not to speak my own sentiments, but the sentiments
of those who sent me. Our object is not
such a Governmt. as may be best in itself, but such
a one as our Constituents have authorized us to prepare,
and as they will approve. If we argue the
matter on the supposition that no Confederacy at
present exists, it can not be denied that all the States
stand on the footing of equal sovereignty. All therefore
must concur before any can be bound. If a
proportional representation be right, why do we not
vote so here? If we argue on the fact that a federal
compact actually exists, and consult the articles of
it we still find an equal Sovereignty to be the basis of
it. He reads the 5th. art: of Confederation giving
each State a vote—& the 13th. declaring that no
alteration shall be made without unanimous consent.
This is the nature of all treaties. What is
unanimously done, must be unanimously undone.
It was observed (by Mr. Wilson) that the larger
State gave up the point, not because it was right,
but because the circumstances of the moment urged
the concession. Be it so. Are they for that reason
at liberty to take it back. Can the donor resume
his gift without the consent of the donee. This doctrine
may be convenient, but it is a doctrine that
will sacrifice the lesser States. The larger States
acceded readily to the confederacy. It was the
small ones that came in reluctantly and slowly. N.
Jersey & Maryland were the two last, the former
objecting to the want of power in Congress over
trade: both of them to the want of power to appropriate
the vacant territory to the benefit of the
whole.—If the sovereignty of the States is to be
maintained, the Representatives must be drawn
immediately from the States, not from the people:
and we have no power to vary the idea of equal
sovereignty. The only expedient that will cure the
difficulty, is that of throwing the States into Hotchpot.
To say that this is impracticable, will not
make it so. Let it be tried, and we shall see whether
the Citizens of Massts. Pena. & Va. accede to it. It will
be objected that Coercion will be impracticable. But
will it be more so in one plan than the other? Its
efficacy will depend on the quantum of power collected,
not on its being drawn from the States, or
from the individuals; and according to his plan it
may be exerted on individuals as well as according
that of Mr. R. A distinct executive & Judiciary
also were equally provided by his plan. It is urged
that two branches in the Legislature are necessary.
Why? for the purpose of a check. But the reason
of the precaution is not applicable to this case.
Within a particular State, where party heats prevail,
such a check may be necessary. In such a body as
Congress it is less necessary, and besides, the delegations
of the different States are checks on each
other. Do the people at large complain of Congs.?
No, what they wish is that Congs. may have more
power. If the power now proposed be not eno',
the people hereafter will make additions to it. With
proper powers Congs. will act with more energy &
wisdom than the proposed Natl. Legislature; being
fewer in number, and more secreted & refined by
the mode of election. The plan of Mr. R. will also
be enormously expensive. Allowing Georgia & Del.
two representatives each in the popular branch the
aggregate number of that branch will be 180. Add
to it half as many for the other branch and you have
270, coming once at least a year from the most distant
as well as the most central parts of the republic.
In the present deranged State of our finances can so
expensive a System be seriously thought of? By
enlarging the powers of Congs. the greatest part of
this expence will be saved, and all purposes will be
answered. At least a trial ought to be made.

Mr. Wilson entered into a contrast of the principal
points of the two plans so far he said as there had
been time to examine the one last proposed. These
points were 1. in the Virga. plan there are 2 & in some
degree 3 branches in the Legislature: in the plan
from N. J. there is to be a single legislature only—
2. Representation of the people at large is the basis
of one: the State Legislatures, the pillars of the
other—3. proportional representation prevails in
one;—equality of suffrage in the other—4. A single
Executive Magistrate is at the head of the one:—a
plurality is held out in the other.—5. in the one
the majority of the people of the U. S. must prevail:
—in the other a minority may prevail. 6. the
Natl. Legislature is to make laws in all cases to which
the separate States are incompetent &:—in place of

this Congs. are to have additional power in a few
cases only—7. A negative on the laws of the States:
—in place of this coertion to be substituted—8.
The Executive to be removable on impeachment &
conviction;—in one plan: in the other to be removable
at the instance of a majority of the Executives
of the States—9. Revision of the laws provided for
in one:—no such check in the other—10. inferior
national tribunals in one:—none such in the other.
11. In one ye. jurisdiction of Natl. tribunals to extend
&c—; an appellate jurisdiction only allowed in
the other. 12. Here the jurisdiction is to extend to
all cases affecting the Nationl. peace & harmony;
there a few cases only are marked out. 13. finally
ye. ratification is in this to be by the people themselves:
—in that by the legislative authorities according
to the 13 art: of the Confederation.

With regard to the power of the Convention, he
conceived himself authorized to conclude nothing, but
to be at liberty to propose any thing. In this particular
he felt himself perfectly indifferent to the
two plans.

With regard to the sentiments of the people, he conceived
it difficult to know precisely what they are.
Those of the particular circle in which one moved,
were commonly mistaken for the general voice. He
could not persuade himself that the State Govts. &
Sovereignties were so much the idols of the people,
nor a Natl. Govt. so obnoxious to them, as some supposed.
Why sd. a Natl. Govt. be unpopular? Has
it less dignity? will each Citizen enjoy under it less

liberty or protection? Will a Citizen of Deleware be
degraded by becoming a Citizen of the United
States? Where do the people look at present for
relief from the evils of which they complain? Is it
from an internal reform of their Govts. no, Sir. It
is from the Natl. Councils that relief is expected. For
these reasons he did not fear, that the people would
not follow us into a National Govt. and it will be a
further recommendation of Mr. R's. plan that it is to
be submitted to them, and not to the Legislatures, for
ratification.

Proceeding now to the 1st. point on which he had
contrasted the two plans, he observed that anxious
as he was for some augmentation of the federal
powers, it would be with extreme reluctance indeed
that he could ever consent to give powers to Congs.
he had two reasons either of wch. was sufficient, 1.
Congs. as a Legislative body does not stand on the
people. 2. it is a single body. 1. He would not repeat
the remarks he had formerly made on the principles
of Representation, he would only say that an
inequality in it, has ever been a poison contaminating
every branch of Govt. In G. Britain where this poison
has had a full operation, the security of private
rights is owing entirely to the purity of her tribunals
of Justice, the Judges of which are neither appointed
nor paid, by a venal Parliament. The political liberty
of that Nation, owing to the inequality of representation
is at the mercy of its rulers. He means
not to insinuate that there is any parallel between
the situation of that Country & ours at present. But

it is a lesson we ought not to disregard, that the
smallest bodies in G. B. are notoriously the most corrupt.
Every other source of influence must also be
stronger in small that large bodies of men. When
Lord Chesterfield had told us that one of the Dutch
provinces had been seduced into the views of France,
he need not have added, that it was not Holland, but
one of the smallest of them. There are facts among
ourselves which are known to all. Passing over
others, he will only remark that the Impost, so
anxiously wished for by the public was defeated not
by any of the larger States in the Union. 2. Congress
is a single Legislature. Despotism comes on
Mankind in different Shapes, sometimes in an Executive,
sometimes in a Military, one. Is there no
danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice
both proclaim it. If the Legislative authority
be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor
stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing
it within itself, into distinct and independent
branches. In a single House there is no check, but
the inadequate one, of the virtue & good sense of
those who compose it.

On another great point, the contrast was equally
favorable to the plan reported by the Committee of
the whole. It vested the Executive powers in a
single Magistrate. The plan of N. Jersey, vested
them in a plurality. In order to controul the Legislative
authority, you must divide it. In order to
controul the Executive you must unite it. One man
will be more responsible than three. Three will contend

among themselves till one becomes the master
of his colleagues. In the triumvirates of Rome first
Cæsar, then Augustus, are witnesses of this truth.
The Kings of Sparta, & the Consuls of Rome prove
also the factious consequences of dividing the Executive
Magistracy. Having already taken up so
much time he wd. not he sd., proceed to any of the
other points. Those on which he had dwelt, are
sufficient of themselves; and on the decision of
them, the fate of the others will depend.

Mr. Pinkney,[80] the whole comes to this, as he conceived.
Give N. Jersey an equal vote, and she will
dismiss her scruples, and concur in the Natl. system.
He thought the Convention authorized to go any
length in recommending, which they found necessary
to remedy the evils which produced this Convention.

Mr. Elseworth proposed as a more distinctive
form of collecting the mind of the Committee on the
subject, "that the Legislative power of the U. S.
should remain in Congs." This was not seconded,
though it seemed better calculated for the purpose
than the 1st. proposition of Mr. Patterson in place of
which Mr. E. wished to substitute it.

Mr. Randolph, was not scrupulous on the point of
power. When the Salvation of the Republic was at
stake, it would be treason to our trust, not to propose
what we found necessary. He painted in
strong colours, the imbecility of the existing Confederacy,
& the danger of delaying a substantial

reform. In answer to the objection drawn from the
sense of our Constituents as denoted by their acts
relating to the Convention and the objects of their
deliberation, he observed that as each State acted
separately in the case, it would have been indecent
for it to have charged the existing Constitution with
all the vices which it might have perceived in it.
The first State that set on foot this experiment would
not have been justified in going so far, ignorant as it
was of the opinion of others, and sensible as it must
have been of the uncertainty of a successful issue
to the experiment. There are certainly reasons of
a peculiar nature where the ordinary cautions must
be dispensed with; and this is certainly one of them.
He wd. not as far as depended on him leave any thing
that seemed necessary, undone. The present moment
is favorable, and is probably the last that will
offer.

The true question is whether we shall adhere to
the federal plan, or introduce the national plan.
The insufficiency of the former has been fully displayed
by the trial already made. There are but
two modes, by which the end of a Genl. Govt. can be
attained: the 1st. is by coercion as proposed by Mr.
P's plan 2. by real legislation as propd. by the other
plan. Coercion he pronounced to be impracticable,
expensive, cruel to individuals. It tended also to habituate
the instruments of it to shed the blood &
not in the Spoils of their fellow Citizens, and consequently
trained them up for the service of Ambition.
We must resort therefore to a National Legislation

over individuals, for which Congs. are unfit. To vest
such power in them, would be blending the Legislative
with the Executive, contrary to the recd. maxim
on this subject: If the Union of these powers heretofore
in Congs. has been safe, it has been owing to
the general impotency of that body. Congs. are
moreover not elected by the people, but by the Legislatures
who retain even a power of recall. They
have therefore no will of their own, they are a mere
diplomatic body, and are always obsequious to the
views of the States, who are always encroaching on
the authority of the U. States. A provision for
harmony among the States, as in trade, naturalization
&.—for crushing rebellion whenever it may rear
its crest—and for certain other general benefits, must
be made. The powers for these purposes can never
be given to a body, inadequate as Congress are in
point of representation, elected in the mode in which
they are, and possessing no more confidence than
they do: for notwithstanding what has been said to
the contrary, his own experience satisfied him that
a rooted distrust of Congress pretty generally prevailed.
A Natl. Govt. alone, properly constituted,
will answer the purpose; and he begged it to be considered
that the present is the last moment for establ̃ing
one. After this select experiment, the people
will yield to despair.

The Committee rose & the House adjourned.