57. Power to suspend volition explains responsibility for ill choice.
These things, duly weighed, will give us, as I
think, a clear view into the state of human liberty. Liberty, it is plain, consists in a power to do, or not to do; to do,
or forbear doing, as we will. This cannot be denied. But this seeming to comprehend only the actions of a man
consecutive to volition, it is further inquired,--Whether he be at liberty to will or no? And to this it has been
answered, that, in most cases, a man is not at liberty to forbear the act of volition: he must exert an act of his will,
whereby the action proposed is made to exist or not to exist. But yet there is a case wherein a man is at liberty in
respect of willing; and that is the choosing of a remote good as an end to be pursued. Here a man may suspend the
act of his choice from being determined for or against the thing proposed, till he has examined whether it be really
of a nature, in itself and consequences, to make him happy or not. For, when he has once chosen it, and thereby it
is become a part of his happiness, it raises desire, and that proportionably gives him uneasiness; which determines
his will, and sets him at work in pursuit of his choice on all occasions that offer. And here we may see how it
comes to pass that a man may justly incur punishment, though it be certain that, in all the particular actions that he
wills, he does, and necessarily does, will that which he then judges to be good. For, though his will be always
determined by that which is judged good by his understanding, yet it excuses him not; because, by a too hasty
choice of his own making, he has imposed on himself wrong measures of good and evil; which, however false and
fallacious, have the same influence on all his future conduct, as if they were true and right. He has vitiated his
own palate, and must be answerable to himself for the sickness and death that follows from it. The eternal law and
nature of things must not be altered to comply with his ill-ordered choice. If the neglect or abuse of the liberty he
had, to examine what would really and truly make for his happiness, misleads him, the miscarriages that follow on
it must be imputed to his own election. He had a power to suspend his determination; it was given him, that he
might examine, and take care of his own happiness, and look that he were not deceived. And he could never
judge, that it was better to be deceived than not, in a matter of so great and near concernment.
