45. Why the greatest good is not always desired.
This, I think, any one may observe in himself and others,--That
the greater visible good does not always raise men's desires in proportion to the greatness it appears, and is
acknowledged, to have: though every little trouble moves us, and sets us on work to get rid of it. The reason
whereof is evident from the nature of our happiness and misery itself. All present pain, whatever it be, makes a
part of our present misery. but all absent good does not at any time make a necessary part of our present
happiness, nor the absence of it make a part of our misery. If it did, we should be constantly and infinitely
miserable; there being infinite degrees of happiness which are not in our possession. All uneasiness therefore
being removed, a moderate portion of good serves at present to content men; and a few degrees of pleasure, in a
succession of ordinary enjoyments, make up a happiness wherein they can be satisfied. If this were not so, there
could be no room for those indifferent and visibly trifling actions, to which our wills are so often determined, and
wherein we voluntarily waste so much of our lives; which remissness could by no means consist with a constant
determination of will or desire to the greatest apparent good. That this is so, I think few people need go far from
home to be convinced. And indeed in this life there are not many whose happiness reaches so far as to afford them
a constant train of moderate mean pleasures, without any mixture of uneasiness; and yet they could be content to
stay here for ever: though they cannot deny, but that it is possible there may be a state of eternal durable joys after
this life, far surpassing all the good that is to be found here. Nay, they cannot but see that it is more possible than
the attainment and continuation of that pittance of honour, riches, or pleasure which they pursue, and for which
they neglect that eternal state. But yet, in full view of this difference, satisfied of the possibility of a perfect,
secure, and lasting happiness in a future state, and under a clear conviction that it is not to be had here,--whilst
they bound their happiness within some little enjoyment or aim of this life, and exclude the joys of heaven from
making any necessary part of it,--their desires are not moved by this greater apparent good, nor their wills
determined to any action, or endeavour for its attainment.
