I
“The Ideal,” as a substantive, does not appear in
French or in German earlier than the eighteenth cen-
tury, and appears in Italian, in Spanish, and in English
still later (probably not before the late eighteenth
century). The adjective, “ideal,” is of course much
more ancient (Latin: idealis); “the Ideal” derives, as
a substantivized adjective, from some of its uses.
The history of the notion of ideal as an adjective
mainly belongs to that of the substantive it derives
from, “Idea”; among its various meanings, as
“phenomenal” (versus “real”: ideal space or time) or
as “imaginary” (versus “true”), “intelligible” (versus
“sensitive”) is important in this context as the origin
of The Ideal.
This meaning derives from the Platonic tradition in
general, sponsoring the view that an exemplar or
archetype of the world is thought by God, and may,
on certain conditions, be partly apprehended by man,
although not empirically. This exemplar reveals part
of the true structure of the existing world, as opposed
to the distorted representation of it which man gains
through the senses; and in another aspect (as a norma-
tive exemplar) it represents a maximum of perfection
which should be pursued, but can hardly ever be
reached within the existing world.
In the first sense it is used in metaphysics (e.g.,
Norris, 1701-04), in the second chiefly in aesthetics
(particularly in art theory) and in ethics. It is in this
second (normative) sense that “ideal,” as ideal 
beauty 
or goodness, gave birth to a substantive, the Ideal of
beauty or of goodness, as a more specific synonym of
that Idea lying at the foundation of that beauty or
goodness (in order to distinguish it from empirical
ideas). As such, the term “ideal” at first was used
indiscriminately as synonymous with the “Idea of
Beauty ,” and later tended to supplant it; in a few cases
both were used, but a more sophisticated distinction
was introduced between them. The doctrine of ideal
beauty leading to the ideal of beauty is a late develop-
ment of aesthetic Neo-Platonism, advanced in Italy
chiefly by G. P. Bellori in 1664. Reacting against both
mannerism and Caravaggio's naturalism in painting,
Bellori asserts that true beauty can be reached neither
by abstract intuition nor by illumination (as most of
the earlier Platonists assumed), nor through the simple
imitation of natural objects. Beauty requires a perfec-
tion which cannot be found in nature, but which can
be reached through the study of nature only: beauties
perceived in different natural objects should be selected
according to a mental standard of perfection, and
combined into an imaginary representation or Idea
more perfect than any natural thing, as an exemplar
for the work of art. The tale of Zeuxis, combining the
charms of five different real virgins in order to create
his image of Helen of Troy becomes again, as of old,
the symbol of an artistic theory. Thus, ideal beauty
is considered to have, against the older Platonic tradi-
tion, a kind of empirical foundation; nevertheless, the
mind creates on this foundation something supra-
natural, according to an interior (nonempirical) stand-
ard of perfection. Similar natural-selective doctrines
were propagated by Bernini, Félibien, Du Fresnoy,
Fréart de Chambray (Panofsky, 1926; Bredvold, 1934).
The Idea of goodness, again, is part and parcel of
the Platonic tradition as a nonempirical representation
of perfect goodness; with this generic meaning, this
term was used also by other philosophical schools
(Micraelius, 1662). Bayle mentioned a bonté idéale
intended as sovereign goodness—in God (Bayle, 1720
ed.); the expression, however, was rather ambiguous,
so that Crousaz, criticizing Bayle, could misinterpret
it as “imaginary” goodness (Crousaz, 1733).
