38. Because all who allow the joys of heaven possible, pursue them not.
Were the will determined by the views of
good, as it appears in contemplation greater or less to the understanding, which is the state of all absent good, and
that which, in the received opinion, the will is supposed to move to, and to be moved by,--I do not see how it
could ever get loose from the infinite eternal joys of heaven, once proposed and considered as possible. For, all
absent good, by which alone, barely proposed, and coming in view, the will is thought to be determined, and so to
set us on action, being only possible, but not infallibly certain, it is unavoidable that the infinitely greater possible
good should regularly and constantly determine the will in all the successive actions it directs; and then we should
keep constantly and steadily in our course towards heaven, without ever standing still, or directing our actions to
any other end: the eternal condition of a future state infinitely outweighing the expectation of riches, or honour, or
any other worldly pleasure which we can propose to ourselves, though we should grant these the more probable to
be obtained: for nothing future is yet in possession, and so the expectation even of these may deceive us. If it were
so that the greater good in view determines the will, so great a good, once proposed, could not but seize the will,
and hold it fast to the pursuit of this infinitely greatest good, without ever letting it go again: for the will having a
power over, and directing the thoughts, as well as other actions, would, if it were so, hold the contemplation of the
mind fixed to that good.
