25. The will determined by something without it.
Since then it is plain that, in most cases, a man is not at liberty,
whether he will or no, (for, when an action in his power is proposed to his thoughts, he cannot forbear volition; he
must determine one way or the other); the next thing demanded is,--Whether a man be at liberty to will which of
the two he pleases, motion or rest? This question carries the absurdity of it so manifestly in itself, that one might
thereby sufficiently be convinced that liberty concerns not the will. For, to ask whether a man be at liberty to will
either motion or rest, speaking or silence, which he pleases, is to ask whether a man can will what he wills, or be
pleased with what he is pleased with? A question which, I think, needs no answer: and they who can make a
question of it must suppose one will to determine the acts of another, and another to determine that, and so on in
infinitum.
