University of Virginia Library

CHAPTER V

NATIONAL POLITICS IN VIRGINIA, 1860-1861

As a result of Lincoln's election the action so long delayed
took place as the logical result of the economic, social and
political situation. The estrangement between the North and
South was complete. The enmities of French and Germans
paled before the enmities existing in the United States. South
Carolina seceded and was soon joined by all the other cotton
states, who formed a new union among themselves and called
it "The Confederate States of America."

In support of their action the Southern States had two
strong arguments. There was, first, the constitutional justification
of secession from a voluntary partnership. The tenth
amendment explicitly declared that all powers not granted
were reserved to the states respectively or the people thereof,
and the right of secession having never been granted, modified,
limited or surrendered in any way, must have been a reserved
power. But apart from the constitutional argument, there
was the overwhelming argument of nature expressed in the
doctrine of self-government and self-determination. The cotton
states occupied a country more extensive than France,
Germany and Italy combined, and they had established an
organized government over a people practically united in its
favor. It was argued that under a separate government the
South would have laws suited to her own conditions alone,
and fear of the Republic to the North would keep the South
united.

Neither did an independent South mean the perpetuation
of slavery. Brought in direct relations with the world at
large, slavery would have felt the general condemnation more

acutely, and in McCormick's reaper was an agency already
at work promising to displace slavery. This invention proved
a stimulus for the development of all kinds of agricultural
implements, diminishing greatly the need of hand labor. Yet
the Southern States' right to a government of their own was
not recognized by Mr. Buchanan or Congress, and conditions
were not such as to promise peace very long.

On the 8th of December, 1860, four of the congressmen of
South Carolina had an interview with President Buchanan,
and submitted him a paper by which they pledged South Carolina
not to disturb the status quo at Charleston previous to
the action of the South Carolina Convention called to meet
December 17, or until an accredited agent for adjusting all
matters between the Federal Government and South Carolina
could arrive. Buchanan, avowing pacific purposes, would not
make any pledges in return but one—and that was that before
ordering any reinforcements to the fort he would return the
paper to the congressmen or one of them.

John B. Floyd,[67] the Secretary of War, pursuant to
Buchanan's intention, issued "instructions" to Major Anderson,
in which he said: "You are carefully to avoid every act
which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression, and for
that reason, you are not without necessity to take up any
position which could be construed into the assumption of an
hostile act, but you are to hold possession of the forts in this
harbor, and if you are attacked you are to defend yourself to
the last extremity."

On the 17th of December, the convention of South Carolina
met and on the 20th it passed an ordinance of secession. On
the 22nd they appointed a commission of three with power and
authority to proceed to Washington and negotiate with the
United States Government for the peaceful return of the forts

to the state and a full and fair money settlement of the difference
between the value of the property received by South
Carolina from the Union and of the interest in that retained
by the Federal Government. These gentlemen hastened to
fulfill their grave mission, but hardly had they arrived in
Washington and made known their purposes, when an event
occurred which came near bringing on war then and there.

The South Carolina authorities, relying perhaps too much
on Mr. Buchanan's pacific intentions, were scrupulous in preventing
any act tending on their part to a breach of the peace.
No efforts were made to stop the collection of the customs or
to take possession of any property belonging to the Federal
Government. Major Anderson was treated in a friendly
manner, and on Christmas day dined with the authorities of
Charleston when the utmost good humor prevailed. But on
the night of the next day, Major Anderson evacuated Fort
Moultrie and took possession of Fort Sumter, a much stronger
situation.

On delicate questions of honor there is a possibility for
much difference. The weight, however, on this matter of constructive
guilt seems to be against Buchanan. Undoubtedly
the status quo had been disturbed by the change from one fort
to the other with the attendant circumstances of spiking guns,
burning the carriages, and dismounting the mortars. John
B. Floyd thought that the President should order back the
troops, and when Buchanan refused, making Anderson's act
his own, Floyd resigned his office as secretary of war.
Major Anderson maintained that his action was justified by
the too extensive erection of batteries which were taking
place around him, but no proof of this was ever advanced by
him.

Instead of returning the troops, Mr. Buchanan notified
the South Carolina commissioners that he would not do so,
and they thereupon returned home. Further, he sent the
Star-of-the-West with provisions and troops to Charleston,
where she was fired on and compelled to return. This was

unquestionably a departure from the pacific course of policy
which Mr. Buchanan had hitherto pursued and was doubtless
decided on by him in consequence of the gust of enthusiasm
occasioned in the North by what was termed Major Anderson's
"chivalric" performance.

The firing on the Star-of-the-West roused Major Anderson
in Fort Sumter, who threatened to fire on every ship
within range if the act was not disclaimed, but Governor
Pickens of South Carolina would disclaim nothing, and in
return made a demand on Major Anderson for the surrender
of Fort Sumter. Finally a truce was patched up by which
the whole subject was referred to the government at Washington.
Lieutenant J. Norman Hall was dispatched to represent
Major Anderson, while Governor Pickens sent
Col. I. W. Hayne to look after the interests of South
Carolina.

The immediate consequence of all this was to excite the
people both North and South. The northern press was full of
condemnation of the South and New York and Ohio passed
resolutions offering men and arms to the Federal Government.
On the other hand the Southerners made haste to
occupy Fort Moultrie, the arsenal in Charleston and all the
other possessions of the Federal Government. Mississippi,
Alabama, Florida, Georgia and Texas proceeded to pass ordinances
of secession and to range themselves by the side of
South Carolina.

What part Virginia and the other Border States were to
perform in this rapidly developing tragedy was a matter of
anxious consideration to the people of those states. Assuming
that separation was inevitable and that they were integral
parts of the great Southern Nation, there can be little doubt
that they made a great mistake in not joining as quickly as
possible the cotton states. A distinguished northern scholar
and soldier, Charles Francis Adams, stated it as his opinion[68]
that had Virginia promptly thrown her voice and influence

on the Southern side there could have been no war and no
doubt of Southern Independence. In this event Maryland and
all the other southern border states would have followed her
example and the states of the Union would have confronted
each other at Lincoln's inauguration with two governments,
de facto and de jure. Delay prevented Maryland from getting
into line, and delay enabled the imperialists of the North to
manufacture sentiment sufficient to encourage Lincoln, after
much hesitancy, in moving his armed forces against the South.
As it was, Virginia refused to think the problem of union a
hopeless one, and her statesmen, as in 1833, looked around for
a remedy that might bridge over the present trouble.

This remedy Virginia found in certain peace measures now
to be detailed.

Governor John Letcher, who had succeeded Henry A.
Wise in the executive department of the State had, soon after
the secession of South Carolina, summoned together the
General Assembly. It met in Richmond on January 7, 1861,
and immediately proceeded to its labors by the appointment
of a joint committee on Federal Relations. This committee
did its work quickly by proposing a convention of all the
States, whether slaveholding or non-slaveholding, to agree, if
practicable, upon some suitable adjustment of the question at
issue, effecting a full restoration of the Union.

In approving this report the convention acted upon the
wellknown views of John Tyler, who, however, advocated a
convention of the Border States, six on a side, believing, as it
turned out, that a convention dominated by the Northern
States would result in nothing likely to produce the end in
view.[69] The place of meeting was Washington and the day
of the meeting was February 4, 1861, and John Tyler, James
A. Seddon, Judge John Robertson, William C. Rives, and
George W. Summers were appointed delegates from Virginia.

But this was not all that was done by the Legislature in the
interests of peace and Union.

In imitation of the action of the State in 1833, Mr. Tyler
was also appointed a commissioner to proceed at once to
President Buchanan, and Judge John Robertson a like commissioner,
to the State of South Carolina, and the other
states that had seceded or might secede, with instructions
respectively to request each of the parties, pending the proceedings
contemplated by the proposed Peace Convention to
refrain from any and all acts calculated to produce a collision
between the Confederacy and the government of the United
States.

The resolutions authorizing this action passed the State
Senate on January 19, and quick to act under them Mr. Tyler
arrived in Washington on January 23. He had an interview
with Mr. Buchanan, who declined to give any assurances
either for peace or war, but agreed to send to Congress, with
whom in his opinion, rested the whole responsibility, a
message recommending to them to abstain from all action of
a hostile character until Virginia could have a fair opportunity
to exert all her efforts to restore harmony to the Union. The
promised message was sent, together with the resolutions of
Virginia setting forth the pacific objects of Mr. Tyler's
mission. But neither House of Congress took any notice of
the message from Virginia and, with brutal indifference, the
Republican majority in Congress permitted them to lie upon
the table unrecognized. The President would give no pledges,
but it could be seen that, out of a real desire for reconciliation,
nothing would be done by him to disturb the existing state of
things, and the silence of Congress indicated that it was also
averse to precipitate action at this time. Mr. Hayne was
dissuaded from presenting the ultimatum of South Carolina
for the withdrawal of the troops, and Mr. Robertson had so
far succeeded in his mission as to obtain from South Carolina
and other Southern States assurances that no further steps
provocative of ill feeling would be taken.

When the Peace Convention met at Washington, February
4, John Tyler was elected its President. In this body the

Virginia delegation planted themselves upon the resolutions
proposed by John Jay Crittenden in the United States Senate
December 18, 1860.
The first and most important of these
proposed to recognize the existence of slavery in all the
territory "now held or hereafter acquired lying south of the
old Missouri Compromise line of 36° 30′." The provision
gained nothing for the South beyond the express recognition
of the relation of master and slave in the Constitution, since
the territory beneath this line of 36° 30′ was unfit for the
development of slavery, and nature precluded its establishment.
But it was soon found that most of the northern states
were present with no feeling of compromise, and this was especially
true of the fierce and turbulent state of Massachusetts,
who seemed to think that her day of revenge had arrived.
After two weeks, the committee to whom the Crittenden resolutions
were referred reported them back so changed that
they appeared but a mockery of their former selves. They
were at first rejected by a majority of the states represented
in the convention, but upon a reconsideration the next day,
they were adopted by a majority of nine to eight states, the
majority which passed them being a minority of the states
represented. Mr. Tyler, who opposed them in the convention,
gave them his official approval as President, and on February
27th transmitted them to Congress.

Here they were opposed in the Senate as wholly unsatisfactory
by James M. Mason and R. M. T. Hunter, the two
senators from Virginia, but accepted by Mr. Crittenden. On
March 2nd they were brought to a vote in the Senate and
rejected by twenty-eight to seven. The vote then occurring on
Mr. Crittenden's resolutions they received the vote of the
southern senators, and were only rejected by a narrow
majority of one—the vote standing twenty to nineteen. In
the House of Representatives, where the Republicans had
largely the majority, the propositions of the Peace Convention
were not even given a hearing. The speaker himself was
refused leave to present them. Congress adjourned on the

4th of March, 1861, having deliberately refused all compromise
and resolutely refusing at the same time any strengthening
of the arm of the executive, as had been done for General
Jackson in 1833.

In the meantime, a convention of the people of Virginia
had been in session in Richmond since February 13. A large
return by the electorate had been made of men opposed to
secession except in the event of an attempted coercion of
South Carolina on the part of the Federal Government. On
this point the General Assembly itself had taken a determined
stand in January before the meeting of the state convention.

In the convention the small corps of secessionists were
led by Henry A. Wise, Lewis E. Harvie and James P. Holcombe.
On March 1 they were strengthened by the accession
of John Tyler fresh from the abortive Peace Convention. He
was a strong Union man but his experience there had been
sufficient to disillusion him of all hopes of compromise, and
he had come now to see clearly the danger of further delay.
He tried to make the convention understand this in his speech
on the Peace Convention propositions March 12, but the old
traditionary love of Union blinded them to the peril, and,
when on April 4th Mr. Harvie moved that the Committee on
Federal Relations should be instructed to report an ordinance
of secession, the vote stood against it ninety to forty-five.

In the State at large, however, the people saw and felt
the danger far more acutely than the majority of the members
whom they had elected a few weeks before. While the
convention continued to ponder and hesitate, the people were
everywhere in action, organizing into military companies,
drilling and petitioning the convention for an early ordinance
of secession.

But the end was drawing nigh. Telegrams received in
Richmond on the morning of April 6th announced that the
Lincoln Government was preparing a formidable armament
of naval and land forces for the purpose of reinforcing Fort

Sumter. The convention took action immediately but was
still pacific. On Monday, April 8th, the convention appointed
a commission consisting of William Ballard Preston, George
W. Randolph and Alexander H. H. Stuart to go to Washington
and ask of President Lincoln what policy he intended to
pursue regarding the seceding states. They left Richmond
the next day, April 9th.

Now this brings us to the point where a review should
be made of what was going on in Washington since the arrival
there of Mr. Lincoln on February 23rd. His policy turned
largely on Virginia, and it is no extravagance to say that never
did the State, not even in Revolutionary days, loom up before
the country in a character of greater potentiality. Virginia
was the star that fixed the attention of the country, both North
and South, as it was recognized that her determination one
way or another would influence the action of all the other
border slave states, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, North
Carolina, Arkansas and Tennessee.

The Congress of the Confederate states assembled at
Montgomery on the 4th of February, 1861, and on February
15th Congress passed a resolution authorizing President Davis
to appoint a commission of three persons to be sent to Washington
for the purpose of negotiating friendly relations and
settling all questions of disagreement with the United States,
and after appointment the commission consisted of John Forsyth,
of Alabama, Martin J. Crawford, of Georgia, and A. B.
Roman, of Louisiana. On March 12th they addressed a communication
to William H. Seward, the newly appointed secretary
of state, upon the subject of their mission.

Seward prepared an answer, dated March 15th, which was
filed in the Department of State the same day. It stated
that he had no authority to recognize them as diplomatic
agents and that he saw in "the events which have recently
occurred not a rightful and accomplished revolution and an
independent nation, with an established government, but
rather a perversion of a temporary and partisan excitement

to the inconsiderate purposes of an unjustifiable aggression
upon the rights and authority vested in the Federal Government."
If this letter had been delivered at once, there could
be no question as to the uncompromising attitude of the Federal
Government, but it was not so delivered. On March 15th,
the date the note was prepared, Justice John A. Campbell of
the Supreme Court was informed by his associate Judge Nelson
of Mr. Seward's strong disposition for peace and of his
anxiety to avoid making a reply at that time, if possible. On
this intimation Judge Campbell on the evening of the same
day had a personal interview with Mr. Seward, as a result of
which he sought out the Confederate commissioners and gave
them the following statement:

"I feel entire confidence that Fort Sumter will be evacuated
in the next five days. And this measure is felt as imposing
great responsibility on the administration. I feel entire confidence
that no measure changing the existing status, prejudicially
to the southern states, is at present contemplated.
I feel an entire confidence that an immediate demand for an
answer to the communication of the commissioners will be
productive of evil and not of good. I do not believe that it
ought, at this time, to be pressed."

Mr. Seward was immediately informed by Judge Campbell
of what he had communicated to the commissioners. On this
assurance the commissioners relied, and ceased to urge a
formal reply to their communication.[70] At the end of the five
days, Judge Campbell, in company with Judge Nelson, had
another interview with Seward. They found him much occupied,
and he could only reply to the question why Fort Sumter
had not been evacuated that "everything was all right." The
next day (March 21st) they had another and much freer conversation
with Seward, who said that "the failure to evacuate
Fort Sumter was not the result of bad faith, but was attributable
to causes consistent with the intention to fulfill the
engagement and that as regarded Fort Pickens in Florida,

notice would be given of any design to alter the existing status
there."[71]

This renewed assurance was communicated to the commissioners,
and by them communicated to President Davis and
by him to General Beauregard, who had been put in command
at Charleston.

On April 1st Judge Campbell saw Seward again, and when
he asked what he should report on the subject of the evacuation
of Fort Sumter, Seward obtained an interview with the
President, and returning wrote the following: "I am satisfied
the Government will not undertake to supply Fort Sumter
without giving notice to Governor Pickens." There was a
departure here from the pledges of the previous interviews,
but the verbal explanation that Seward gave that "he did
not believe that any such attempt would be made and there was
no design to reinforce Fort Sumter" quieted Campbell's
apprehensions.

By the 7th of April there were so many indications in the
papers that hostile measures were on foot that Campbell
addressed a letter to Seward and asked if the assurances
Campbell had given the Confederate commissioners "were
well or ill founded," and in respect to Sumter he received in
reply, "faith as to Fort Sumter fully kept—wait and see."
In the morning's paper Campbell read: "An authorized messenger
from President Lincoln informed Pickens and General
Beauregard that provisions will be sent to Fort Sumter
—peaceably or otherwise by force." This was the 8th of
April and on the evening of that day the first part of the relief
squadron left New York. This was not a notice in any honorable
sense.

There can be no doubt as to the truth of Campbell's statements,
and two of Lincoln's cabinet, Welles and Blair, fully
support him in their account. They go further and allege
that the determination to relieve Fort Sumter was opposed

by Seward and that after the relief squadron was decided on,
so resolved was Seward to render it abortive that on April
4th he telegraphed Governor Pickens through Mr. Harvey,
afterwards made by Mr. Seward minister to Portugal, that
an attempt was to be made to reinforce Sumter, and he got
the President to dispatch the Powhatan on a special relief mission
to Fort Pickens disestablishing its captain, Samuel Mercer,
and placing Lieut. D. D. Porter in command. As this
ship was the flag ship of the squadron to Fort Sumter, the
entire squadron, when it arrived off Charleston, was "destitute
of a naval commander, flag ship and instructions."
Welles thinks in this way Seward sought to redeem the words
sent to Judge Campbell: "Faith as to Fort Sumter fully
kept; wait and see."[72]

Seward, however, said nothing on April 7th when catechised
by Campbell, regarding Fort Pickens, and though the
case against the Federal Government in this connection was
even stronger than in the matter of Fort Sumter there was
not a pretence of notice given to anybody, though notice had
been promised to Campbell by Seward in their interview of
March 21st. Here as early as January 29, 1861, a written
agreement had been entered into binding the Government not
to reinforce the fort, unless it was attacked or reinforced by
the Confederates. Nevertheless, an order went from General
Scott, with the approval of Gideon Welles, secretary of the
navy, directing as early as March 12th Captain Vogdes to land
his company, then on the Brooklyn at Pensacola, and reinforce
the fort. Captain Adams, commanding the naval forces there,
refused to place his boats and other means for landing at the
disposal of Vogdes, and in his report to Welles, April 1, 1861,
Adams, who appears to have been an honorable man, called
attention to the terms of the armistice, which he declared both
sides "had faithfully observed," and said that the landing of
troops would be considered not only a declaration of war but
an act of war and would be resisted to the utmost. Upon the
receipt of this information Welles, regardless of the existing

armistice, ordered him on April 6th to comply with the request
of Captain Vogdes, "it being the intention of the Navy
Department to cooperate with the War Department in that
object."[73] Obedient to order, on April 11th at 9 A. M. the
Brooklyn got under way, and during the night landed troops
and marines at the fort. This was the night before Fort Sumter
was fired on, and no notice of any kind was given.

In fairness to Seward, he cannot be held responsible for
the action of Welles, though Lincoln knew all about it, and it
is possible that Seward knew nothing of General Scott's order
when he made the answer to Judge Campbell on March 21st
of giving notice, if conditions at Fort Pickens were changed.

But this cannot be said of another expedition ordered
April 1st by Lincoln. This was the detachment, already
referred to, from the squadron to reenforce Fort Sumter, of
the Steamer Powhatan. By this order, made on Seward's
recommendation, Lieut. D. D. Porter was placed in command
of the ship, displacing Capt. Samuel Mercer, and the Commandant
of the Navy Yard at New York was expressly warned
that no communication of the matter should be made to the
Navy Department![74] The Powhatan was to go to Pensacola,
and "at any cost or risk" prevent an expedition (of Confeder
ates) from the mainland reaching Fort Pickens.

The strange part of all this is that Welles, the secretary
of the navy, being purposely kept ignorant of the secret order
to the Powhatan, added that vessel as the flagship to the
Fort Sumter expedition. When Porter refused to obey,
alleging the authority of the President, Welles flew to the
President and complained. Lincoln was submissive enough
and excused himself on the ground that, while he had approved
the expedition, he did not know that the Powhatan was the
flagship of the Sumter expedition, and he then ordered Seward
to recall Porter and the vessel. Seward pretended to comply,
but as the recall was signed by "Seward," Porter claimed to

be under Presidential orders and went on to Fort Pickens, but
owing to storms and defective machinery he did not show up at
the fort till after the capture of Fort Sumter.[75] Here was a
plain case of Lincoln and Seward combining to snub and
deceive their own colleague in the cabinet—Gideon Welles.

Seward was a cunning diplomat, and he guarded against
contingencies. When on April 9th the Confederate commissioners,
considering themselves deceived, as they had a right
to think, demanded a reply to their letter of March 12th,
Seward caused to be handed to them his memorandum of
March 15th, which had been on file in the State Department
ever since its date. This letter seemed to offer no compromise,
and of course breathed not a word of his efforts during
twenty-three days to effectuate the evacuation of Fort Sumter.
On the contrary, an endorsement made on it put the
blame on the Confederate commissioners for the non-delivery
of the memorandum earlier.

The charge against Seward of a breach of faith appears,
therefore, fully sustained, but Seward was a subordinate officer
and the real responsibility rested with Abraham Lincoln.
Welles, who hated Seward, says that Lincoln knew nothing
of Seward's assurances, but this can hardly be. Mr. James
Schouler is an example of an extreme partisan, having little
sympathy with the South, but even he is bothered with a conscience,
and in his "History of the United States" he has the
manhood to say that in his opinion Lincoln was privy to all
the assurances of Seward. Were it otherwise, why should
the President on April 1st, he pertinently asks, have instructed
Seward to inform Campbell that he would not provision Sumter
without notice? That Lincoln allowed this to be communicated
to Campbell is not only directly proved by the account
which Campbell gives of his interview with Seward, but is
attested by Lincoln's private secretary, J. G. Nicolay, in a
personal memorandum.[76] Then besides the improbability of

Seward undertaking to assume such high responsibility with
out the consent of the President, Welles' own "Diary"
asserts and proves that Lincoln during this time was under
the domination of Seward.

Not only is this shown by the affair of the Powhatan but
by Lincoln's actually signing an order, without reading it, for
the reorganization of Welles' department instigated by Seward.
When taken to task by Welles, Lincoln apologized and
said: "If I can't trust the secretary of state, I know not
whom I can trust." Welles says: "The secretary of state
spent much of each day at the Executive Mansion and was
vigilant to possess himself of every act, move and intention
of the President, and of each of his associates."

So the attitude of Lincoln's mind towards Fort Sumter,
being similar to that of Seward, renders it additionally probable
that he endorsed and sanctioned Seward's assurances
to Judge Campbell. But this is to be always kept in mind,
Lincoln advocated the peace program not for the sake of peace
but for the sake of policy.

During the closing hours of Buchanan's administration,
Seward, who was looked upon as the coming premier of the
new administration, had told Gov. C. S. Morehead, in the
presence of Mr. Taylor of Washington and Messrs. Rives and
Summers of Virginia, that "if this whole matter is not satisfactorily
settled within sixty days after I am seated in the
saddle and hold the reins firmly in my hand, I will give you
my head for a football."[77] Similarly Lincoln, in his speeches
on his journey to the capital, made light of the troubles in
the country, and we are told that his remarks had a most
depressing effect upon Major Anderson and his men at Fort
Sumter. After his arrival in Washington, February 23rd, his
mind was so turned towards peace for policy sake that he
sought to make a bargain with the Virginia Convention for
the withdrawal of the troops from Sumter, if the Convention
would adjourn and go home. By this measure Lincoln doubtless

hoped to isolate the cotton states and prevent the secession
of the border slave states.

Governor C. S. Morehead, of Kentucky, says[78] that on
Mr. Lincoln's arrival in Washington he waited upon him, in
company with Mr. Rives, of Virginia, Mr. Doniphan, of Missouri,
and Mr. Guthrie, of Kentucky, members of the Peace
Convention, and that in answer to the earnest solicitations
of these gentlemen he promised to withdraw the troops from
Fort Sumter, "if Virginia would stay in the Union." This
is undoubtedly the interview to which Lincoln alluded[79] as
reported by John Hay in his "Diary" under date of October
22, 1861, as taking place between himself and "certain
southern pseudo-Unionists before the inauguration, at which
time, as he said, he promised to evacuate Fort Sumter if they
would break up their Convention without any row or nonsense.
They demurred." When in London a year or two
later, Morehead reiterated his statement, which was published
in the London Times. Schleiden, the German minister
at Washington, reported[80] that Lincoln had said to the peace
commissioners of Virginia: "If you will guarantee me the
State of Virginia, I will remove the troops. A state for a fort
is not a bad business." Schleiden, doubtless, referred to the
interview mentioned by Morehead, as there is no positive
record of any other with the peace commissioners.

After the inauguration there is a certainty that Lincoln
had concluded to withdraw the troops without any condition.
According to Montgomery Blair, "the cabinet generally had
been convinced that Fort Sumter was untenable and acquiesced
in its surrender, submitting to the inevitable."[81] On March
15th, only one man in the cabinet, and that was Blair himself,
was absolutely in favor of reinforcing Fort Sumter. That

day, it will be remembered, Seward gave Campbell the assurance
of the limit of five days within which the withdrawal
would take place. When six days passed and the withdrawal
did not take place, Seward declared[82] that "the resolution
had been passed and its execution committed to the President."
In strong corroboration is a paper published by Governor
Francis Pickens, in August, 1861. Pickens says that he
had the intelligence from "one very near the most intimate
counsels of the President" that this paper was designed as a
proof sheet for some prominent newspaper, was submitted to
the President and cabinet, approved, and a proclamation in
conformity with its general views was to be issued. The proof
sheet was in the nature of a defense of Mr. Lincoln for signing
an order of evacuation, and put the blame on the treasonable
conduct of Mr. Buchanan, which rendered the surrender necessary.[83] No other person conformed so closely to Pickens'
description as "one very near the most intimate counsels of the
President" as Seward, the Secretary of State.

There is any amount of additional evidence that Lincoln
and his advisers in the month of March contemplated the surrender
of Fort Sumter.[84]

Lincoln, however, delayed in executing the order, and in
course of two weeks changed his policy altogether. Welles
ascribes[85] the change to Montgomery Blair. He observes that
"the President, with the acquiescence of the cabinet, was about
adopting the Seward and Scott policy, and Blair wrote his
resignation determined not to continue in the cabinet if no
attempt was made to relieve Fort Sumter. Before handing in
his resignation a delay was made at the request of his father.
The elder Blair sought an interview with the President, to
whom he entered his protest against non-action, which he

denounced as the offspring of intrigue. His earnestness and
indignation aroused and electrified the President." Blair, on
the other hand, seems to ascribe[86] the change to the advice of
Seward and General Scott that Fort Pickens as well as Fort
Sumter be abandoned. In this he says, "they overshot the
mark with Lincoln. Fort Pickens was well supplied and was
actually impregnable, while the Federal Government commanded
the sea." But a more intelligible explanation is to be
had in another direction.

The change from a chaotic condition in which peace was
a large figure to a settled determination on the part of Lincoln
to employ arms began about March 29, when certain
radical influences got to work and made themselves felt. On
March 15th only one man (Blair) in the cabinet was absolutely
in favor of reinforcing Fort Sumter, and on March 29th the
cabinet was nearly evenly divided. The determining influence
appears to have been the tariff.

On March 16th, Stanton, who had been a member of
Buchanan's cabinet, and had not yet taken sides with the
Republicans, wrote to the ex-President that "the Republicans
are beginning to think that a monstrous blunder was made in
the tariff bill" (the Morill tariff passed after the senators
from the cotton states had left their seats—with rates from
50 to 80 per cent), that "it will cut off the trade of New York,
build up New Orleans and the southern ports, and leave the
Government no revenue." There was a Confederate tariff
from 10 to 20 per cent, and fears of its favorable operation
to the South were excited in the bosoms of Lincoln and his
cabinet. It appeared as if the southern milch cow might
escape the northern milking altogether.

Now, this was not to be thought of, and the governors of
many of the northern states, which were especially under the
control of the tariff interests, came to Washington and were
there before March 29, and several days after it, when Lincoln

began to amend his stand. They offered him men and
arms.[87]

The proof of their agency is as follows. While Lincoln
was busy on April 1st giving secret orders for at least three
expeditions to go to Fort Pickens and was getting ready the
expedition to relieve Fort Sumter,[88] he was prevailed upon by
Seward to try the old alternative of bargaining the withdrawal
of the troops from Fort Sumter in return for an adjournment
of the Virginia Convention. He set on foot new negotiations,
which are referred to in the latter part of the paragraph in
Hay's "Diary," reporting Mr. Lincoln at Seward's house
on October 22, 1861: "Subsequently (i. e., subsequent to
the interview with Morehead and others of the Peace Convention
before the inauguration) he renewed the proposition
to Summers but without any result. The President was most
anxious to prevent bloodshed."

The true story seems to be that Lincoln intended to make
the proposal and took steps accordingly, but changed his
mind and never actually made it. He sent Allan B. Magruder,
a Virginia lawyer, residing in Washington, to invite
George W. Summers, a leading Unionist in the Virginia Convention,
to come to see him. Magruder reached Richmond
April 2d, and as Mr. Summers could not leave Virginia,
John B. Baldwin, another prominent "Union man," went in
his stead. He arrived in Washington on April 4th, and immediately
went to see Mr. Seward, who took him to Lincoln at
the White House. But Lincoln told him he had "come too
late," and when Baldwin earnestly pleaded with him in favor

of letting the South alone, Lincoln vehemently asked, "What
would become of his revenue?"[89]

Considering the enormous interest centering around the
tariff, and the fact that in 1833 the tariff question had actually
pushed the country to the verge of war, the pertinency of Lincoln's
question is obvious and it is not surprising that the
final determination turned upon it. Strong corroboration of
the tariff influence is afforded by A. H. H. Stuart, in his
account[90] of the interview held with Lincoln by the Virginia
delegation on April 12th, and in the account[91] of Lincoln's
interview with Dr. Fuller and the deputations from each of
the five Christian Associations of Baltimore, held on April
22nd. In each interview, when begged to leave the South
alone, Lincoln asked: "And what is to become of my
revenue?"

The very day (April 4th) Baldwin arrived in Washington,
General Winfield Scott issued an order for furnishing
troops for an expedition under Captain Fox, "whose object
is to reinforce Fort Sumter." And on April 6th Lincoln
drafted the instructions for the Fox expedition. As a further
commentary on the tortuous course at Washington, this man
Fox had been, with Lincoln's encouragement, for weeks preparing
the plan of reinforcements. The latter part of March
he had been sent to Charleston by Lincoln with a view to concoct
a scheme, and had obtained access to the fort by representing
to Governor Pickens that he came on "a peaceable
mission." This plan had been adopted by the Government
and was now in process of execution under his supervision.[92]

It is interesting to note in considering these remarkable
proceedings that while John B. Baldwin declared before the
Reconstruction Committee in 1866 that Lincoln made him no
proposal about withdrawing the troops, Lincoln, in the extract

General Winfield Scott

above from John Hay's "Diary" is reported as saying that
such a proposal was made, but "without any result." As
reported by John Minor Botts, detailing several years later
an interview with Lincoln on April 7, the same proposal is
attributed to Lincoln of withdrawing the troops and that
Baldwin scouted the idea of adjourning the convention.[93] But
Botts, proverbially inaccurate, because of his overconfidence,
weakened his declaration by reciting minor details which
could never have occurred as he gives them, and Hay's entry
in the "Diary" is not contemporary with the act and confuses
Baldwin with Summers, who did not go to Washington.

Baldwin could very rightly claim that as specially charged
with the mission to Lincoln, his testimony is of a higher character
than any, and Summers and other friends in the convention
declared that the statement made by Baldwin before
the Reconstruction committee in 1866 was substantially what
he told them on his return from his mission to Washington.
He bore no overtures from Lincoln whatever.[94]

Be that as it may, either story shows Lincoln as far from
the character ascribed to him by most of his admirers, who
love to represent him as pursuing from start to finish one
undeviating course of action. They never tire of abusing
Mr. Buchanan for not at once putting down the Rebellion, but
Mr. Buchanan, despite the perplexities of his situation, never
at any time presented such a picture of contradiction and
weakness as Lincoln. Here Lincoln was almost in the same
moment contriving means to reinforce Fort Sumter and proposing
to take the soldiers away.

The severest criticism of Lincoln comes from Schouler,
one of his greatest admirers: "So reticent, indeed, of his
plans had been the President, while sifting opinions through
the month, that it seemed as though he had no policy, but was
waiting for his cabinet to frame one for him." This is certainly
not the kind of appearance that one would expect in a

President, who is supposed by virtue of his office to be a
leader of men.

In this critical moment, involving the peace of the country,
there never was a time when the presence of Congress was
more necessary or advisable. But Lincoln, having brought
his mind through the mazes of uncertainty to a fixed resolve,
assumed the whole responsibility and deliberately refrained
from calling to his side the great council of the nation. He
could have called it in ten days, but did not do so until July
4th, when the northern heart had been "fired" sufficiently.
Congress, called at an earlier date, might not have approved
his course.

To return to our narrative, Baldwin went back to Richmond,
and it was then that the delegation appointed by the
Convention and consisting of William Ballard Preston, A. H.
H. Stuart and George W. Randolph, set out on their trip to
Washington to ascertain the final intentions of the administration.
Mr. Lincoln appointed Saturday, the 13th day of April,
as the day of receiving them. When that day arrived, the
fleet had sailed, and the bombardment of Fort Sumter had
taken place. The first gun had been fired by a former Virginian,
Edmund Ruffin, who in his zeal for an independent
South had exercised the right of expatriation and removed
from Virginia to become a citizen of South Carolina.

Mr. Lincoln read to the Virginia delegates a carefully prepared
paper, in which he expressed his intention of following
the course outlined in his inaugural address, which was to
hold, occupy and possess the property and places belonging to
the government and to collect the duties and imposts. But,
says Mr. Stuart in his account of the interview, "his declarations
were distinctly pacific and he expressly disclaimed all
purpose of war." Now Seward, the secretary of state, and
Mr. Bates, attorney general, gave similar assurances, and yet
the same train which took the commissioners home brought
Mr. Lincoln's proclamation calling for 75,000 men. Neither
Lincoln, nor Seward, nor Bates had ever given a hint to the

delegates that such a paper was in existence. So surprised
was Mr. Stuart when he saw it in the Richmond papers at
breakfast Monday morning, April 15th, that he thought at
first it must be a mischievous hoax.[95]

The same day the delegates made a report of their interview
to the convention. It is hard to believe that Lincoln and
his advisers in the cabinet resorted to all these deceptive
doings in fulfillment of a carefully considered plan of action.
It is more likely they did not know what course it was best
to pursue and, being at their wits' ends, seized on the suggestions
of the moment. In a recent letter to the author, a well-known
writer, and a great admirer of Lincoln, explains his
conduct as "a maneuvre" to make the South appear as the
aggressor. George Lunt of Boston, in his book on the war,
explains the Fort Sumter expedition as "a maneuvre," which
military persons, and sometimes politicians, metaphorically
denominate "stealing a march." No kind of stealing at any
time appears very honest, and the maneuvre, even if it succeeded
in stirring up the North, did not rid Lincoln of the
charge that he was the aggressor in the war. Mr. Hallam in
his Constitutional History of England states that "the
aggressor in a war is not the first who uses force, but the first
who renders force necessary."

If Lincoln's design was to stir the North up, he was not
disappointed. Despite the fact that the attempt to reinforce
Fort Sumter compelled the Confederates to fire on it, the
North responded madly when the flag was thus "insulted."
This had not been the case when the Star-of-the-West was
fired on, and it showed that Buchanan's policy of delay was
the right course if war was intended. The northern newspapers
burst out now in a fury of anathema against the South, and
the northern people responded in a mighty shout of vengeance.

On the other hand, the proclamation of Lincoln calling for
75,000 men to subdue South Carolina aroused the South to an
even greater demonstration of enthusiasm. The border states

had never regarded Lincoln's election under constitutional
forms as a sufficient cause of secession but they were all
unanimous against coercion, and here they were up against
it. It left them no alternative but secession. Then came at
last the rush of the Southern Nation to arms. Nevertheless,
the Virginia convention acted with a coolness not to be
expected at such a time.

On motion of James P. Holcombe, April 16, 1861, the Convention
went into secret session, and on Mr. Tyler's motion
the members were required to take an oath of secrecy. In
secret session Mr. Preston, one of the recent commissioners
to Mr. Lincoln and a gentleman of distinguished abilities, submitted
an ordinance repealing the ratification of the Constitution
of the United States by the State of Virginia, and revoking
all rights and powers granted under said ratification. On
this ordinance the convention voted next day, and it was carried
by a vote of eighty-eight to fifty-five. Immediately after
the question, nine members changed their vote from the negative
to the affirmative, and six who had not previously voted
obtained leave to record their names in favor of the ordinance.
Thus the final vote stood 103 to 46. Most of the
negative votes were from West Virginia, which was largely
settled by people from Pennsylvania, and had little in common
with the old settled parts of the State.

The ordinance was to be submitted to the vote of the people
on May 23, 1861, and in the meantime ordinances were rapidly
passed for calling out volunteers, and organizing an army and
navy. Robert E. Lee, who had resigned from the United
States army, was made commander in chief of the state forces.
The Navy Yard at Norfolk and the arsenal at Harper's Ferry
were seized, but there had been so much delay that the Federals
were enabled to remove or destroy most of the treasures
which they contained in the shape of provisions of war of all
kinds.

On the 24th of April a committee, of which John Tyler was
chairman, reported a treaty made with the Confederate states

for an alliance, offensive and defensive, the same not to have
any legal operation or effect if the people of the Commonwealth
decided on May 23d not to approve the ordinance of
secession. And on the 29th of April the Convention elected
R. M. T. Hunter, William C. Rives, Waller R. Staples, John
W. Brockenbrough and Gideon D. Camden to represent the
state in the Confederate Congress at Montgomery. On the
removal of the capital of the Confederacy to Richmond, John
Tyler was added to the number.

This action was justified under the Constitution of the
United States, which in Article I, Section 10, declares that
"no state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty
of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in times of peace, enter
into any agreement with another state or with a foreign power
or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent
danger as will not admit of delay." The danger to Virginia
in 1861 came from the Federal government itself, which had
called out troops and threatened hostile action against any
state which might adopt secession. This section itself was a
direct recognition of the sovereign power of self protection
through the action of the constituted government in any state,
and the vote of the people which required time could not be
waited for when destruction was imminent.

On the 23d of May the people of Virginia voted upon the
ordinance of secession, referred to them by their convention.
The result was that the ordinance was ratified by a majority
of 92,149 at the polls and 10,515 in the camps, making a total
of nearly 103,000 votes. Even the thirty-seven counties constituting
the present state of West Virginia, settled largely by
non-slaveholders and afterwards railroaded out of Virginia by
a combination of the Federal government and John S. Carlile
and Waitman T. Willey, threw a majority of more than 400
votes in favor of ratifying the ordinance of secession.[96]

The day next after this election the Federal troops crossed
the Potomac and took possession of Alexandria, thus beginning
the invasion of the State.