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Change Sensitivity

On the other hand, sensitive to charges of
hegemonic politics, this country has in recent
years called upon Western Europe to take the
initiative - thus ignoring the fragility of the
Western European consensus. In this sense, the
United States is too little engaged. The difference
of perspectives is such in Western
Europe that whatever unity of policy is to be
achieved will come through American leadership
- a leadership, however, which must be
sensitive to the differing perspectives and aspirations
of the various groups. And a key element
of this leadership must be a dynamic policy
which offers some hope for the union of
Europe. However committed the Soviet Union
is to its position in Eastern Europe and however
fruitless our gestures may be, this country must
fish in Eastern Europe's troubled waters as the
Soviet Union fishes in Western Europe's troubled
waters. It must be clear to the Europeans
- and the Germans in the first instance - that
the bonus for Europe's division lies with Soviet
Russia. An attitude which indicates satisfaction
with the division of Europe or smacks too
clearly of a policy of spheres of influence (i.e.,
"Whatever you do in Czechoslovakia or East
Germany is regrettable but your business.") will
alienate in time the Germans and make even
more cogent De Gaulle's arguments about the
dual hegemonies. And, indeed, a "European
Europe" may emerge - in a form by no means
compatible with America's interest in a "stable
competition" with the Soviet Union.

Specifically, it can be argued that American
policy toward Czechoslovakia this year has
been less than imaginative. A demand from the
United States of a non-intervention pledge from
the Russians, a clear mobilization of diplomatic
pressures, and perhaps even the allowance of
maneuvers on the German-Czechoslovak border
not by specifically German but by NATO
forces - all of these would have communicated
a dynamism and concern which seemed curiously
lacking. In the words of George Liska,
"Instead of taking calculated risks on a psychological
intercession, the United States gambled
recklessly on the slender chance that the
Czechoslovaks would escape the rigors of military
intervention." (Inter Play, October 1968)

Of course, the basis of our policy was the
belief that too close an alignment with the
Czech cause would have certainly precipitated
Soviet intervention and given substance to
Soviet charges that the events in Czechoslovakia
were being directed by external forces. The
critical fact to recall, however, is the strategically
important position of Czechoslovakia.
Russia had to weight alternatives and set priorities.
The "defection" of Czechoslovakia -
albeit informal - would clearly have called into
question the stability of Russia's entire East
European empire. Only a military invasion
could halt the liberalizing events in Eastern
Europe. On the other hand, Russia had to
calculate what impact such a move might have
on Soviet policy elsewhere. Given the alternatives,
it seems likely in any event that Russia
would have chosen the bird in the hand over
the two in the bushes. If the Czech virus should
spread, it could be seen as nothing but disastrous.
However that may be, it was not necessary
that, while the Soviets were engaged in
weighing the pluses and minuses, our Government
through its actions in effect "assured" the
Russians that Czechoslovakia was indeed in
their sphere of influence and our hands were
tied. Many Western Europeans were inevitably
bound to see our role as one of "objective
collusion" with the Soviet Union in the perpetuation
of a divided Europe.

The realities of 1968 are those of 1948 -
the division of Europe and bipolarity, however
"muted." Whatever the responses and policies
of the various European governments, the
resolution or stalemate of the "European question"
still largely depends on the perceptions,
policies, and creativity of the Superpowers.
And for the American government it must be
clear that American leadership cannot depend
on a simple definition of spheres of influence.
It still rests as in 1948 not only on a vision and
policy for Western Europe but on a conception
and policy toward united Europe.