University of Virginia Library

German Commitment

De Gaulle saw the Franco-German agreement
of 1963 as a commitment by Germany to
collaborate with France as a matter of priority
in political, strategic, and weapons policy. The
United States, hostile to De Gaulle and suspicious
of his brand of European cooperation,
put increased pressures on Germany to buy
American military hardware and held out the
prospect of giving Germany greater influence in
NATO policy and strategy, especially nuclear.
Germany drawn in both directions found itself
frustrated and dissatisfied.

The result was two major trends of thought
in Germany - that of Erhard who put greatest
emphasis on an Anglo-American link and that
of Strauss (joined in time by Adenauer now out
of office) who called for the construction of an
independent Europe armed with nuclear weapons.
The Strauss group, like the Gaullists,
doubted the strength of America's commitment
and called for an European Europe. Unlike the
Gaullists, the Strauss group accepted integration
which it was felt would give Germany
greater political leverage than simple contractual
relations with France. Both the Strauss and
Erhard groups, however, maintained the Adenauer
concept of a position of strength. They
saw not merely a thaw in the cast but a
reunification of Germany and the continent
which would be tantamount to the
disintegration of the Soviet empire. They both
held to the philosophy of the Hallstein doctrine
- a doctrine which aimed at isolating East
Germany in the interest of destroying its
political viability. Under the doctrine, Bonn
refused to conduct formal diplomatic relations
with those states, aside from the USSR, which
recognized East Germany. This policy, in effect,
cut Bonn off from intimate relations with
the states of Eastern Europe as well. In any
case, a position of strength in the west and
isolation of the east was the formula by which
Germany was to be reunited.

By the mid-1960's, however, it was reasonably
clear to the Germans that the policy of
strength and isolation had not in fact brought
German or continental unity any closer. Like
past governments, Kissinger still believes that
German policy must be based on two pillars -
German-American intimacy to protect its exposed
position and Franco-German friendship
to prevent diplomatic isolation on the continent.
The Straussian integration scheme,
which still has strong support, is held in
abeyance by De Gaulle's policy on such a
union. Beyond these positions, however, the
Kissinger government has adopted a new policy
of actively courting the eastern states. In line
with both French and American thought, the
Germans came to believe that the unification of
Germany ultimately depended on cordial relations
with the Eastern European states. At the
same time, Germany has sought increased contacts
with Pankew - although still somewhat
intent on isolating that regime, a fact which
could be accomplished in many respects by
drawing the other Eastern European states into
closer economic and diplomatic relation with
Bonn. One in fact should not underestimate the
enormous economic and political attraction
West Germany has for Eastern Europe. If West
German relations with the East could unfold in
such a way as to dampen their fears of a
revanchist Germany, the whole unity of the
Warsaw Pact could be seriously undermined.
And, indeed, the invasion of Czechoslovakia
by Soviet troops may be testimony to the
success of Germany's efforts. Nevertheless, in
view of the Soviet invasion, it cannot be said
that a policy of unification through detente has
ultimately proved any more successful than a
policy of unification through a hard line toward
the East.