In an aristocracy the supreme power is lodged in the hands of a
certain number of persons. These are invested both with the legislative
and executive authority; and the rest of the people are, in respect to
them, the same as the subjects of a monarchy in regard to the sovereign.
They do not vote here by lot, for this would be productive of
inconveniences only. And indeed, in a government where the most
mortifying distinctions are already established, though they were to be
chosen by lot, still they would not cease to be odious; it is the
nobleman they envy, and not the magistrate.
When the nobility are numerous, there must be a senate to regulate
the affairs which the body of the nobles are incapable of deciding, and
to prepare others for their decision. In this case it may be said that
the aristocracy is in some measure in the senate, the democracy in the
body of the nobles, and the people are a cipher.
It would be a very happy thing in an aristocracy if the people, in
some measure, could be raised from their state of annihilation. Thus at
Genoa, the bank of St. George being administered by the people
[19]
gives them a certain influence in the government, whence their whole
prosperity is derived.
The senators ought by no means to have the right of naming their own
members; for this would be the only way to perpetuate abuses. At Rome,
which in its early years was a kind of aristocracy, the senate did not
fill up the vacant places in their own body; the new members were
nominated by the censors.
[20]
In a republic, the sudden rise of a private citizen to exorbitant
power produces monarchy, or something more than monarchy. In the latter
the laws have provided for, or in some measure adapted themselves to,
the constitution; and the principle of government checks the monarch:
but in a republic, where a private citizen has obtained an exorbitant
power,
[21]
the abuse of this power is much greater, because the laws
foresaw it not, and consequently made no provision against it.
There is an exception to this rule, when the constitution is such as
to have immediate need of a magistrate invested with extraordinary
power. Such was Rome with her dictators, such is Venice with her state
inquisitors; these are formidable magistrates, who restore, as it were
by violence, the state to its liberty. But how comes it that these
magistracies are so very different in these two republics? It is because
Rome supported the remains of her aristocracy against the people;
whereas Venice employs her state inquisitors to maintain her aristocracy
against the nobles. The consequence was that at Rome the dictatorship
could be only of short duration, as the people acted through passion and
not with design. It was necessary that a magistracy of this kind should
be exercised with lustre and pomp, the business being to intimidate, and
not to punish, the multitude. It was also proper that the dictator
should be created only for some particular affair, and for this only
should have an unlimited authority, as he was always created upon some
sudden emergency. On the contrary, at Venice they have occasion for a
permanent magistracy; for here it is that schemes may be set on foot,
continued, suspended, and resumed; that the ambition of a single person
becomes that of a family, and the ambition of one family that of many.
They have occasion for a secret magistracy, the crimes they punish being
hatched in secrecy and silence. This magistracy must have a general
inquisition, for their business is not to remedy known disorders, but to
prevent the unknown. In a word, the latter is designed to punish
suspected crimes; whereas the former used rather menaces than punishment
even for crimes that were openly avowed.
In all magistracies, the greatness of the power must be compensated
by the brevity of the duration. This most legislators have fixed to a
year; a longer space would be dangerous, and a shorter would be contrary
to the nature of government. For who is it that in the management even
of his domestic affairs would be thus confined? At Ragusa
[22]
the chief magistrate of the republic is changed every month, the other officers
every week, and the governor of the castle every day. But this can take
place only in a small republic environed
[23]
by formidable powers, who might easily corrupt such petty and insignificant
magistrates.
The best aristocracy is that in which those who have no share in the
legislature are so few and inconsiderable that the governing party have
no interest in oppressing them. Thus when
[24]
Antipater made a law at Athens that whosoever was not worth two thousand
drachmas should have no power to vote, he formed by this method the best
aristocracy possible; because this was so small a sum as to exclude very few,
and not one of any rank or consideration in the city.
Aristocratic families ought therefore, as much as possible, to level
themselves in appearance with the people. The more an aristocracy
borders on democracy, the nearer it approaches perfection: and, in
proportion as it draws towards monarchy, the more is it imperfect.
But the most imperfect of all is that in which the part of the
people that obeys is in a state of civil servitude to those who command,
as the aristocracy of Poland, where the peasants are slaves to the
nobility.
