10. No use made of reasoning in the discovery of these two maxims.
It will here perhaps be said that mathematical
demonstrations, and other truths that are not innate, are not assented to as soon as proposed, wherein they are
distinguished from these maxims and other innate truths. I shall have occasion to speak of assent upon the first
proposing, more particularly by and by. I shall here only, and that very readily, allow, that these maxims and
mathematical demonstrations are in this different: that the one have need of reason, using of proofs, to make them
out and to gain our assent; but the other, as soon as understood, are, without any the least reasoning, embraced and
assented to. But I withal beg leave to observe, that it lays open the weakness of this subterfuge, which requires the
use of reason for the discovery of these general truths: since it must be confessed that in their discovery there is no
use made of reasoning at all. And I think those who give this answer will not be forward to affirm that the
knowledge of this maxim, "That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," is a deduction of our
reason. For this would be to destroy that bounty of nature they seem so fond of, whilst they make the knowledge
of those principles to depend on the labour of our thoughts. For all reasoning is search, and casting about, and
requires pains and application. And how can it with any tolerable sense be supposed, that what was imprinted by
nature, as the foundation and guide of our reason, should need the use of reason to discover it?
