If a republic be small, it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it be
large, it is ruined by an internal imperfection.
To this twofold inconvenience democracies and aristocracies are
equally liable, whether they be good or bad. The evil is in the very
thing itself, and no form can redress it.
It is, therefore, very probable that mankind would have been, at
length, obliged to live constantly under the government of a single
person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the
internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of
a monarchical, government. I mean a confederate republic.
This form of government is a convention by which several petty
states agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to
establish. It is a kind of assemblage of societies, that constitute a
new one, capable of increasing by means of further associations, till
they arrive at such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the
security of the whole body.
It was these associations that so long contributed to the prosperity
of Greece. By these the Romans attacked the whole globe, and by these
alone the whole globe withstood them; for when Rome had arrived at her
highest pitch of grandeur, it was the associations beyond the Danube and
the Rhine — associations formed by the terror of her arms — that
enabled the barbarians to resist her.
Hence it proceeds that Holland,
[1]
Germany, and the Swiss cantons
are considered in Europe as perpetual republics.
The associations of cities were formerly more necessary than in our
times. A weak, defenceless town was exposed to greater danger. By
conquest it was deprived not only of the executive and legislative
power, as at present, but moreover of all human property.
[2]
A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may
support itself without any internal corruption; the form of this society
prevents all manner of inconveniences.
If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme power, he
could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the
confederate states. Were he to have too great an influence over one,
this would alarm the rest; were he to subdue a part, that which would
still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those
which he had usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in
his usurpation.
Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate
states, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one
part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be
destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be
dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.
As this government is composed of petty republics, it enjoys the
internal happiness of each; and with regard to its external situation,
by means of the association, it possesses all the advantages of large
monarchies.
