Book IX.,
Of Laws in the Relation They Bear to a Defensive Force.
9.1. 1. In what Manner Republics provide for their Safety.
If a republic be small, it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it be
large, it is ruined by an internal imperfection.
To this twofold inconvenience democracies and aristocracies are
equally liable, whether they be good or bad. The evil is in the very
thing itself, and no form can redress it.
It is, therefore, very probable that mankind would have been, at
length, obliged to live constantly under the government of a single
person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the
internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of
a monarchical, government. I mean a confederate republic.
This form of government is a convention by which several petty
states agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to
establish. It is a kind of assemblage of societies, that constitute a
new one, capable of increasing by means of further associations, till
they arrive at such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the
security of the whole body.
It was these associations that so long contributed to the prosperity
of Greece. By these the Romans attacked the whole globe, and by these
alone the whole globe withstood them; for when Rome had arrived at her
highest pitch of grandeur, it was the associations beyond the Danube and
the Rhine — associations formed by the terror of her arms — that
enabled the barbarians to resist her.
Hence it proceeds that Holland,
[1]
Germany, and the Swiss cantons
are considered in Europe as perpetual republics.
The associations of cities were formerly more necessary than in our
times. A weak, defenceless town was exposed to greater danger. By
conquest it was deprived not only of the executive and legislative
power, as at present, but moreover of all human property.
[2]
A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may
support itself without any internal corruption; the form of this society
prevents all manner of inconveniences.
If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme power, he
could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the
confederate states. Were he to have too great an influence over one,
this would alarm the rest; were he to subdue a part, that which would
still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those
which he had usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in
his usurpation.
Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate
states, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one
part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be
destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be
dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.
As this government is composed of petty republics, it enjoys the
internal happiness of each; and with regard to its external situation,
by means of the association, it possesses all the advantages of large
monarchies.
Footnotes
[1]
It is composed of about fifty different republics, all different
from one another. — M. Janisson, "State of the United Provinces."
[2]
Civil liberty, goods, wives, children, temples, and even
burying-places.
9.2. 2. That a confederate Government ought to be composed of States
of the same Nature, especially of the republican Kind.
The Canaanites were destroyed by reason that they were petty
monarchies, that had no union or confederacy for their common defence;
and, indeed, a confederacy is not agreeable to the nature of petty
monarchies.
As the confederate republic of Germany consists of free cities, and
of petty states subject to different princes, experience shows us that
it is much more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland.
The spirit of monarchy is war and enlargement of dominion: peace and
moderation are the spirit of a republic. These two kinds of government
cannot naturally subsist in a confederate republic.
Thus we observe, in the Roman history, that when the Veientes had
chosen a king, they were immediately abandoned by all the other petty
republics of Tuscany. Greece was undone as soon as the kings of Macedon
obtained a seat among the Amphyktyons.
The confederate republic of Germany, composed of princes and free
towns, subsists by means of a chief, who is, in some respects, the
magistrate of the union, in others, the monarch.
9.3. 3. Other Requisites in a confederate Republic.
In the republic of Holland one province cannot conclude an alliance
without the consent of the others. This law, which is an excellent one,
and even necessary in a confederate republic, is wanting in the Germanic
constitution, where it would prevent the misfortunes that may happen to
the whole confederacy, through the imprudence, ambition, or avarice of a
single member. A republic united by a political confederacy has given
itself entirely up, and has nothing more to resign.
It is difficult for the united states to be all of equal power and
extent. The Lycian
[3]
republic was an association of twenty-three towns;
the large ones had three votes in the common council, the middling ones
two, and the small towns one. The Dutch republic consists of seven
provinces of different extent of territory, which have each one voice.
The cities of Lycia
[4]
contributed to the expenses of the state,
according to the proportion of suffrages. The provinces of the United
Netherlands cannot follow this proportion; they must be directed by that
of their power.
In Lycia
[5]
the judges and town magistrates were elected by the
common council, and according to the proportion already mentioned. In
the republic of Holland they are not chosen by the common council, but
each town names its magistrates. Were I to give a model of an excellent
confederate republic, I should pitch upon that of Lycia.
Footnotes
9.4. 4. In what Manner despotic Governments provide for their
Security.
As republics provide for their security by uniting, despotic
governments do it by separating, and by keeping themselves, as it were,
single. They sacrifice a part of the country; and by ravaging and
desolating the frontiers they render the heart of the empire
inaccessible.
It is a received axiom in geometry that the greater the extent of
bodies, the more their circumference is relatively small. This practice,
therefore, of laying the frontiers waste is more tolerable in large than
in middling states.
A despotic government does all the mischief to itself that could be
committed by a cruel enemy, whose arms it were unable to resist.
It preserves itself likewise by another kind of separation, which is
by putting the most distant provinces into the hands of a great vassal.
The Mogul, the king of Persia, and the emperors of China have their
feudatories; and the Turks have found their account in putting the
Tartars, the Moldavians, the Wallachians, and formerly the
Transylvanians, between themselves and their enemies.
9.5. 5. In what Manner a Monarchical Government provides for its Security.
A monarchy never destroys itself like a despotic government. But a
kingdom of a moderate extent is liable to sudden invasions: it must
therefore have fortresses to defend its frontiers; and troops to
garrison those fortresses. The least spot of ground is disputed with
military skill and resolution. Despotic states make incursions against
one another; it is monarchies only that wage war.
Fortresses are proper for monarchies; despotic governments are
afraid of them. They dare not entrust their officers with such a
command, as none of them have any affection for the prince or his
government.
9.6. 6. Of the defensive Force of States in general.
To preserve a state in its due force, it must have such an extent as
to admit of a proportion between the celerity with which it may be
invaded, and that with which it may defeat the invasion. As an invader
may appear on every side, it is requisite that the state should be able
to make on every side its defence; consequently it should be of a
moderate extent, proportioned to the degree of velocity that nature has
given to man, to enable him to move from one place to another.
France and Spain are exactly of a proper extent. They have so easy a
communication for their forces as to be able to convey them immediately
to what part they have a mind; the armies unite and pass with rapidity
from one frontier to another, without any apprehension of such
difficulties as require time to remove.
It is extremely happy for France that the capital stands near to the
different frontiers in proportion to their weakness; and the prince has
a better view of each part of his country according as it is more
exposed.
But when a vast empire, like Persia, is attacked, it is several
months before the troops are assembled in a body; and then they are not
able to make such forced marches, for that space of time, as they could
for fifteen days. Should the army on the frontiers be defeated, it is
soon dispersed, because there is no neighbouring place of retreat. The
victor, meeting with no resistance, advances with all expedition, sits
down before the capital, and lays siege to it, when there is scarcely
time sufficient to summon the governors of the provinces to its relief.
Those who foresee an approaching revolution hasten it by their
disobedience. For men whose fidelity is entirely owing to the danger of
punishment are easily corrupted as soon as it becomes distant; their aim
is their own private interest. The empire is subverted, the capital
taken, and the conqueror disputes the several provinces with the
governors.
The real power of a prince does not consist so much in the facility
he meets with in making conquests as in the difficulty an enemy finds in
attacking him, and, if I may so speak, in the immutability of his
condition. But the increase of territory obliges a government to lay
itself more open to an enemy.
As monarchs therefore ought to be endued with wisdom in order to
increase their power, they ought likewise to have an equal share of
prudence to confine it within bounds. Upon removing the inconveniences
of too small a territory, they should have their eye constantly on the
inconveniences which attend its extent.
9.7. 7. A Reflection.
The enemies of a great prince, whose reign was protracted to an
unusual length, have very often accused him, rather, I believe, from
their own fears than upon any solid foundation, of having formed and
carried on a project of universal monarchy. Had he attained his aim,
nothing would have been more fatal to his subjects, to himself, to his
family, and to all Europe. Heaven, that knows our true interests,
favoured him more by preventing the success of his arms than it could
have done by crowning him with victories. Instead of raising him to be
the only sovereign in Europe, it made him happier by rendering him the
most powerful.
The subjects of this prince, who in travelling abroad are never
affected but with what they have left at home; who on quitting their own
habitations look upon glory as their chief object, and in distant
countries as an obstacle to their return; who disgust you even by their
good qualities, because they are tainted with so much vanity; who are
capable of supporting wounds, perils, and fatigues, but not of foregoing
their pleasures; who are supremely fond of gaiety, and comfort
themselves for the loss of a battle by a song upon the general: those
subjects, I say, would never have the solidity requisite for an
enterprise of this kind, which if defeated in one country would be
unsuccessful everywhere else; and if once unsuccessful, would be so for
ever.
9.8. 8. A particular Case in which the defensive Force of a State is
inferior to the offensive.
It was a saying of the Lord of Coucy to King Charles V that the
English are never weaker, nor more easily overcome, than in their own
country. The same was observed of the Romans; the same of the
Carthaginians; and the same will happen to every power that sends armies
to distant countries, in order to reunite by discipline and military
force those who are divided among themselves by political or civil
interests. The state finds itself weakened by the disorder that still
continues, and more so by the remedy.
The Lord of Coucy's maxim is an exception to the general rule, which
disapproves of wars against distant countries. And this exception
confirms likewise the rule because it takes place only with regard to
those by whom such wars are undertaken.
9.9. 9. Of the relative Force of States.
All grandeur, force, and power are relative. Care therefore must be
taken that in endeavouring to increase the real grandeur, the relative
be not diminished.
During the reign of Louis XIV France was at its highest pitch of
relative grandeur. Germany had not yet produced such powerful princes as
have since appeared in that country. Italy was in the same case. England
and Scotland were not yet formed into one united kingdom. Aragon was not
joined to Castile: the distant branches of the Spanish monarchy were
weakened by it, and weakened it in their turn; and Muscovy was as little
known in Europe as Crim Tartary.
9.10. 10. Of the Weakness of neighbouring States.
Whensoever a state lies contiguous to another that happens to be in
its decline, the former ought to take particular care not to precipitate
the ruin of the latter, because this is the happiest situation
imaginable; nothing being so convenient as for one prince to be near
another, who receives for him all the rebuffs and insults of fortune.
And it seldom happens that by subduing such a state the real power of
the conqueror is as much increased as the relative is diminished.