III
The fundamental case for academic freedom has
always been that while it
confers desired benefits upon
the professors who enjoy it, it is defensible
mainly on
the ground that the unhampered search for the truth
is for
the benefit of society as a whole. A basic premiss
is that final truth in
all branches of human knowledge
has not yet been achieved, and that new
truths will
emerge only as ideas clash with ideas in an unrestricted
marketplace of ideas. In the words of Cardinal New-
man (1872), a true university or college is a place “in
which the intellect may safely range and speculate,
sure to
find its equal in some antagonistic activity, and
its judge in the tribunal
of truth. It is a place where
inquiry is pushed forward, and discoveries
verified and
perfected, and rashness rendered innocuous, and error
exposed, by the collision of mind with mind, and
knowledge with
knowledge” (“What is a University?,”
Historical Sketches [1872], I, 16). Thus it has been
asserted that academic freedom exists “in order that
society may
have the benefit of honest judgment and
independent criticism which
otherwise might be with-
held because of fear
of offending a dominant group
or transient social attitude”
(Clark Byse and Louis
Joughin, Tenure in American Higher
Education [1959],
p. 4).
The eminent scholars (including the distinguished
historian of ideas, Arthur
O. Lovejoy) who founded the
American Association of University Professors
in 1915
published a Declaration of Principles which
stated the
rationale for academic freedom that has been generally
accepted by the American academic community. They
pointed out that while
professors are the appointees
of the university's trustees, they are not in
any proper
sense the trustees' employees, just as federal judges are
appointed by the President without becoming, as a
consequence, the Chief
Executive's employees. “For,
once appointed,” they
declared, “the scholar has pro-
fessional functions to perform in which the appointing
authorities have neither competency nor moral right
to
intervene.” And they added: “A university is a great
and indispensable organ of the higher life of a civilized
community, in the
work of which the trustees hold an
essential and highly honorable place,
but in which the
faculties hold an independent place, with quite equal
responsibilities—and in relation to purely scientific and
educational questions, the primary responsibility.”
Stressing
the nature of the academic calling, they wrote
that “if
education is the cornerstone of the structure
of society, and if progress
in scientific knowledge is
essential to civilization, few things can be
more impor-
tant than to enhance the dignity
of the scholar's pro-
fession, with a view to
attracting to its ranks men of
the highest ability, of sound learning, and
of strong
and independent character.”
A similar conception of the nature of academic
freedom has, in recent years,
been adopted by the
United States Supreme Court. Speaking for the
Court
in 1957, Chief Justice Warren declared:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underes-
timate the vital role in a
democracy that is played by those
who guide and train our youth. To
impose any strait jacket
upon the intellectual leaders in our
colleges and universities
would imperil the future of our Nation.
No field of education
is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new
discoveries
cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true in the
social
sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as
absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of
suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always
remain
free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain
new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization
will stagnate and die
(Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 250).
Similarly, in a concurring opinion filed in this case,
Justice Frankfurter
wrote:
These pages need not be burdened with proof, based on
the testimony
of a cloud of impressive witnesses, of the
dependence of a free
society on free universities. This means
the exclusion of
governmental intervention in the intellec-
tual life of a university. It matters little whether
such
intervention occurs avowedly or through action that in-
evitably tends to check the ardor
and fearlessness of
scholars, qualities at once so fragile and so
indispensable
for fruitful academic labor
(ibid., 354 U.S. 262).
More recently, again speaking for the Supreme
Court, Justice Brennan
observed:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and
not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is
therefore a special concern of
the First Amendment, which
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall
of orthodoxy over
the classroom. “The vigilant
protection of constitutional
freedom is nowhere more vital than in
the community of
American schools.”... The classroom is
peculiarly the
“marketplace of ideas.” The
Nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure
to that robust ex-
change of ideas
which discovers truth “out of a multitude
of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection”
(Keyishian v. Board of
Regents of New York, 385
U.S. 589, 603 [1967]).
Thus, by the late 1960's, the concept of academic
freedom had been accepted
by the United States Su-
preme Court as an
integral part of the civil liberties
law of the country. This concept was
by then also
regarded by the academic community as an essential
element of the American system of intellectual free-
dom. It was widely believed that the schools play an
indispensable role in the progress of civilization, that
the colleges and
universities were the country's most
important instruments for the
generation and testing
of new ideas and the advancement of scientific knowl-
edge, and for the training of new
leadership in govern-
ment, in the
professions, and in the economy. Since
leaders in a rapidly changing world
should not be slaves
to routine, but must, on the contrary, be able to
take
the initiative, handle new ideas, solve new problems,
evaluate
evidence, think rationally, and act purpose-
fully, it was felt that only a free educational system
can produce such leadership. In a broader sense, it was
widely
understood that in a fluid, open, democratic
society, in which the legally
protected right to dissent
inevitably creates an atmosphere of controversy,
the
schools cannot insulate their students from controversy,
since
this would leave them unprepared to take their
rightful places in a society
in which controversy is a
daily and indispensable condition. Furthermore,
a
democratic, self-governing society cannot afford the
risk of having
an ignorant and unenlightened citizenry.
Self-government means that the
citizen must be able
to govern himself, that is to say, to control his
emotions,
to use his reason, and to be concerned with the public
interest. To this end the schools, functioning in an
atmosphere of academic
freedom, make a weighty
contribution. It follows that the freedom of
teachers
to teach and of students to learn is essential to democ-
racy, to progress, to the security of a
way of life com-
mitted to the maximizing of
human freedom.
