University of Virginia Library

Epistle XX. To Cornelius Tacitus.

by the Same. [Mr. Henley.]

I Have often enter'd into a Dispute with a certain Person of Skill and Learning, who is the most highly pleas'd with a concise manner of Pleading. I agree to this if the Subject allows it; otherwise it is a Prevarication to pass over what ought to be express'd; or lightly to glance upon what is to be inculcated, press'd home, and repeated. For some Matters gain a certain Force and Weight by a longer stay upon them: Like the stroke of a Sword upon the Body. Upon this he fights me with Authority, and shows, among the Greeks the Orations of Lysias; among our Countrymen, those of the Gracchi, and

of Cato, most of which are Remarkable for shortness.

I oppose to Lysias, Demosthenes, Æschines, Hyperides, and many others; to the Gracchi, and Cato, I oppose Pollio, Cæsar, Celius, and especially Marcus Tullius, whose best Oration is esteemed to be the largest. And really, a good Piece is like other good things, the larger the better. You are sensible that Statues, Figures, Pictures, Forms of Men, and other Animals, even of Trees, if they be Handsome, are recommended by nothing more then their Size. It is the same in Orations, and even a Volume it self takes a certain Grandeur and Beauty from the Bulk of it.

These, and several other Arguments of mine to the same purpose, as he is very slippery, and hard to be seiz'd, he so eludes, as to insist, that these very Masters of Pleading I build upon, spake less than they publish'd, I am of another Opinion. Witness many Orations by several Hands, and that of Cicero for Murena, and for Varenus; in which the Title only has a short and naked Account of some Crimes in the Charge. By this it appears, that he omitted in the Publication a good deal that was deliver'd in the Pleading. In his Oration for Cluentius, he tells us, That he Pleaded the whole Cause by himself, according to the antient Institution, and enlarg'd that of Cornelius to four Days. Which is an Assurance, that what he utter'd

more extensively in many Days, as Occasion requir'd, after that was retrench'd, and narrow'd into one Book; tho' pretty Bulky. But a good Pleading is one thing, and an Oration another.

Some, I know, are of this Sense; but I (indeed I may be mistaken) am persuaded, it is possible, a Pleading may be good, and not make a good Oration: But a good Oration must be a good Pleading. For the Oration is the true Model and original Plea of the other. And therefore in the best of them we find a Thousand different manners of Speaking, that are unstudied. And in those, which we only know to be Published, as in those against Verres, the following Words — An Artist who? Well admonished, they reported it was Polycletus — Therefore it follows, that a Pleading is most compleat, which bears the nearest Resemblance to the Oration, if it has a just Time. But if that be denied, it is no Fault in the Oration, but a very great one in the Judge. The Laws second my Opinion, which indulge the longest Space of Time to the Speaker, and do not prescribe a Brevity, but a Copiousness of Speaking, that is, Study and Care: Which is not answer'd by Brevity, except in the shortest Causes. I will add, that I am taught by Practice, an excellent Master; I have often bore the Function of Advocate, Judge, and Council. Men are

differently mov'd, and the smallest things often draw on the greatest. The Judgments, and Tastes of Men are various; so that many in hearing the same Cause, go often into a different, and sometimes into the same Opinion, by divers Motions of the Mind. Besides, each favours his own Invention, and embraces that as the strongest, which he himself foresaw, when it is said by another.

Therefore all must have something offer'd, to receive, and acknowledge, for their own; Regulus told me once, when we were together in Court, that I thought the whole extent of Matters belonging to the Cause, was to be taken in; now I presently see the Stress of it, and there I fix (he does indeed fix on the Point he chuses, but often errs in the Choice of it) I reply'd, what he call'd the Stress, or the Neck of the Cause, might be some other Part, the Knee, the Leg, the Ankle of it, by way of Comparison: But I, who cannot discover that, attempt all, and turn every stone. And as in Agriculture, I do not only cultivate the Vineyards, but the Underwood, and the Fields; and there, not only the Bread-Corn, or the fine Wheat, but the Barley, Beans, and other kinds of Pulse. So in Pleading, I do as it were cast a variety of Seeds widely, that I may get in the entire Produce of the whole.

For the Tempers of the Judges are as unknown, uncertain, and Deceitful, as those of the Seasons and of Soils. Nor am I Ignorant that Pericles the great Orator, is thus applauded by Eupolis the Comic Poet.

Perswasive softness hung upon his Lips;
That gently cast a sting into the Hearer.

But then this same Pericles would not have been Master of that Charm, and that Softness, by his Brevity, or Swiftness, or both, (for they are different, ) without the greatest Faculty of Speaking. For to delight, and to persuade, requires a Copiousness, and a compass of Speaking: But to leave a Sting in the Mind of the Hearer belongs to him, that does not only give a Poignancy, but the deepest Impression. Add, what another Comic Poet has said of the same Pericles.

His Thunder Struck, his Lightning Fir'd the Greeks.

For it is not a Copy'd and a maim'd Expression, but one that is Ample, Magnificent, Lofty, which carries that force of Thunder and Lightning, as to bear down and astonish the Audience at Will. But Moderation is the best; who denies it? And yet that Law is broken, as well by him that Speaks too little, as too much; by a too close, as well as too

Diffusive a Style. So that you often hear it Remarked, such a thing was Immoderate, and Redundant; such a thing was Jejune, and Feeble. One is said to have exceeded his Matter, another not to have fill'd it. Both equally offend, but one by Infirmity, the other, by Force: Which certainly is a Mark, tho' not of a more Correct, yet of a greater Wit. Not that upon this Head, I approve the excessive Speaker in Homer, but he who is Represented to let fall,

His Copious Language like the Winter Snow.

And yet I am extreamly pleas'd with him, in the same Author,

Whose words were few but Marvellously sweet.

Yet if I was to chuse, I should pitch upon that kind of Speech, that resembles the Winter Snow; that is, frequent, pressing, large, and in short, Divine and Heavenly. But you will object, a short Pleading is more grateful to many. It is so; but only to the Supine, whose affected Nicety and Indolence of Humour, it is Ridiculous to call a Judgment. For if you advise with them, you must not only Speak briefly, but not at all.

This is so far my Opinion, which I will alter, if you disagree with it. But I would desire you to explain upon the Reason. For

tho' I ought to yield to your Authority, yet I think it is more just, in so great a Subject, to be subdu'd by Reason, than Authority. And therefore, if I be not mistaken, let me know it in a Letter, however short you will make it: For that will confirm my Judgment; if otherwise let me have an Epistolary return, as long as possible.

I have not Corrupted you, in imposing the Tie of a short Letter upon you, supposing you come into my Opinion, and of a very long one, if you should dissent from me.