3. Imitation and Social Psychology.
—We have already noted the defects of a psychology of learning
which places the individual mind naked, as it were, in contact with
physical objects, and which believes that knowledge, ideas, and beliefs
accrue from their interaction. Only comparatively recently has the
predominating influence of association with fellow beings in the
formation of mental and moral disposition been perceived. Even now it
is usually treated as a kind of adjunct to an alleged method of learning
by direct contact with things, and as merely supplementing knowledge of
the physical world with knowledge of persons. The purport of our discussion
is that such a view makes an absurd and impossible separation between
persons and things. Interaction with things may form habits of external
adjustment. But it leads to activity having a meaning and conscious intent
only when things are used to produce a result. And the only way one person
can modify the mind of another is by using physical conditions, crude or
artificial, so as to evoke some answering activity from him. Such are our
two main conclusions. It is desirable to amplify and enforce them by placing
them in contrast with the theory which uses a psychology of supposed
direct relationships of human beings to one another as an adjunct to the
psychology of the supposed direct relation of an individual to physical
objects. In substance, this so-called social psychology has been built
upon the notion of imitation. Consequently, we shall discuss the nature
and rôle of imitation in the formation of mental
disposition.
According to this theory, social control of individuals rests upon the
instinctive tendency of individuals to imitate or copy the actions of
others. The latter serve as models. The imitative instinct is so
strong that the young devote themselves to conforming to the patterns
set by others and reproducing them in their own scheme of behavior.
According to our theory, what is here called imitation is a misleading
name for partaking with others in a use of things which leads to
consequences of common interest.
The basic error in the current notion of imitation is that it puts the
cart before the horse. It takes an effect for the cause of the effect.
There can be no doubt that individuals in forming a social group are
like-minded; they understand one another. They tend to act with the
same controlling ideas, beliefs, and intentions, given similar
circumstances. Looked at from without, they might be said to be engaged
in "imitating" one another. In the sense that they are doing much the
same sort of thing in much the same sort of way, this would be true
enough. But "imitation" throws no light upon why they so act; it
repeats the fact as an explanation of itself. It is an explanation of
the same order as the famous saying that opium puts men to sleep because
of its dormitive power.
Objective likeness of acts and the mental satisfaction found in being in
conformity with others are baptized by the name imitation. This social
fact is then taken for a psychological force, which produced the
likeness. A considerable portion of what is called imitation is simply
the fact that persons being alike in structure respond in the same way
to like stimuli. Quite independently of imitation, men on being
insulted get angry and attack the insulter. This statement may be met
by citing the undoubted fact that response to an insult takes place in
different ways in groups having different customs. In one group, it may
be met by recourse to fisticuffs, in another by a challenge to a duel,
in a third by an exhibition of contemptuous disregard. This happens, so
it is said, because the model set for imitation is different. But there
is no need to appeal to imitation. The mere fact that customs are
different means that the actual stimuli to behavior are different.
Conscious instruction plays a part; prior approvals and disapprovals
have a large influence. Still more effective is the fact that unless an
individual acts in the way current in his group, he is literally out of
it. He can associate with others on intimate and equal terms only by
behaving in the way in which they behave. The pressure that comes from
the fact that one is let into the group action by acting in one way and
shut out by acting in another way is unremitting. What is called the
effect of imitation is mainly the product of conscious instruction and
of the selective influence exercised by the unconscious confirmations
and ratifications of those with whom one associates.
Suppose that some one rolls a ball to a child; he catches it and rolls
it back, and the game goes on. Here the stimulus is not just the sight
of the ball, or the sight of the other rolling it. It is the situation
—the game which is playing. The response is not merely rolling
the ball back; it is rolling it back so that the other one may catch and
return it,—that the game may continue. The "pattern" or model is
not the action of the other person.
The whole situation requires that each should adapt his action in view
of what the other person has done and is to do. Imitation may come in
but its role is subordinate. The child has an interest on his own
account; he wants to keep it going. He may then note how the other
person catches and holds the ball in order to improve his own acts. He
imitates the means of doing, not the end or thing to be done. And he
imitates the means because he wishes, on his own behalf, as part of his
own initiative, to take an effective part in the game. One has only to
consider how completely the child is dependent from his earliest days
for successful execution of his purposes upon fitting his acts into
those of others to see what a premium is put upon behaving as others
behave, and of developing an understanding of them in order that he may
so behave. The pressure for likemindedness in action from this source
is so great that it is quite superfluous to appeal to
imitation.
As matter of fact, imitation of ends, as distinct from imitation of
means which help to reach ends, is a superficial and transitory affair
which leaves little effect upon disposition. Idiots are especially apt
at this kind of imitation; it affects outward acts but not the meaning
of their performance. When we find children engaging in this sort of
mimicry, instead of encouraging them (as we would do if it were an
important means of social control) we are more likely to rebuke them as
apes, monkeys, parrots, or copy cats. Imitation of means of
accomplishment is, on the other hand, an intelligent act. It involves
close observation, and judicious selection of what will enable one to do
better something which he already is trying to do. Used for a purpose,
the imitative instinct may, like any other instinct, become a factor in
the development of effective action.
This excursus should, accordingly, have the effect of reënforcing the
conclusion that genuine social control means the formation of a certain
mental disposition; a way of understanding objects, events, and acts
which enables one to participate effectively in associated activities.
Only the friction engendered by meeting resistance from others leads to
the view that it takes place by forcing a line of action contrary to
natural inclinations. Only failure to take account of the situations in
which persons are mutually concerned ( or interested in acting
responsively to one another) leads to treating imitation as the chief
agent in promoting social control.
