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Important Questions

Three important questions
arise: What kind of conflict
pattern can be expected to
develop out of the cease-fire
accord? What are the incentives
of the contending parties to
accept this pattern of conflict
in reaching their divergent and
conflicting aims? And what are
the long-run prospects that the
conflict process defined in
Paris, which generally reflects
the present military capabilities
and will of the parties, will be
equal to the task of bringing
about a final political
News Analysis
settlement? None can be
answered with certainty, but
some guesses can be hazarded.

It is easier to guess what
kind of conflict will not
emerge in the immediate future
than to predict what kind will
develop. Large-scale
conventional attacks, like the
one mounted by North
Vietnam across the
demilitarized zone last spring,
would appear to be ruled out.
The legal strictures of the
accord conspire happily with
the presence of political
incentives and the absence of
adequate military means in the
hands of the Vietnamese
parties to assure a lowering of
the military conflict in the
immediate future.

The accord not only
prohibits a military
confrontation but also places
significant legal limits on troop
and material reinforcements
needed for a major military
operation. The demilitarized
zone is reconstituted. Laos and
Cambodia are declared
off-grounds as supply routes
and staging areas. There is an
international control and
supervisory commission,
sufficient in size (1,160
members) and adequately
equipped with communications
and transportation facilities, to
report, if not preclude, the
build-up of troop
concentrations.