The Cavalier daily. Wednesday, March 5, 1969 | ||
The points that Mr. Keith Bunch
has made with regard to the Honor
System raise substantially valid
questions which merit response.
Earlier, Mr. O.Y. Lewis proposed a
revision of the Honor System that
limited its scope to matters closer
to the university community that
under the present system, but still
purporting to protect fundamental
student interests. Mr. Bunch asked
whether there could be any compromise
at all for lying, cheating and
stealing without sacrificing the
basic spirit of the system. I submit
that while Mr. Bunch's criticisms
are well taken generally, they do
not reflect either the ideal or the
real situation at Virginia. Two
points will help clarify my position.
The first point is that the system
as applied is not as broad and
absolute as Mr. Bunch suggests it
might be, nor should it be so broad.
There is and should be room for
interpretation and change according
to contemporary student standards.
Nonetheless, honor is honor wherever
one is, and lying is lying both
in Washington State and Charlottesville.
One who lies or steals in
Washington State impugns his integrity
just as much as one who lies
or steals on the Grounds. In both
cases, the spirit that one should feel
to give the system meaning is
absent.
In other, closer cases, the spirit
demanded of a student under the
system is altered and shaped by
prevailing student attitudes. At
present, for example, the consensus
is that the lying provisions do not
apply to lies to women, nor often
to the "locked-in" lie. While a lie to
a woman arguably is just as much a
lie as one to a man, the spirit of the
Honor System here teaches that
such a lie is not always a lie. I do
not quarrel with this. A strong
system should carve out certain
well-defined exceptions that the
students believe should not be
encompassed by the system. The
point is that such exceptions do
exist in the Virginia system.
The second point is that quite
possibly the Honor System is too
broad to withstand judicial attack.
Law students are often criticized
for bringing legal considerations to
bear on the honor system issue, and
I will be no exception. Nevertheless,
such considerations are relevant.
In short, the student must
conform to the regulations of his
university that are "reasonably"
imposed and which are relevant to
its function as an educational
institution. If the conduct sought
to be restrained does not reasonably
relate to the university's
function, then the connection may
be too attenuated to bring the
conduct within the disciplinary
authority of the institution. The
real question here is not whether
lying is dishonorable in Washington
State (most students would agree
that it is), but whether the
university students have a legitimate,
reasonable institution-related
interest in imposing expulsion on
one who so transgresses.
I have attempted to show, first,
that the system inherently and
consciously recognized many of
these limitations by the exceptions,
lack of enforcement standards, and
policy of the committee to "bend
over backward;" and second, that
such limitations should and must be
made a part of the system. The
logical question now is: with all
these built-in safeguards, why not
leave the system as it is on its face
and rely on the safeguards in the
way it is applied to protect student
interests. I can think of three
reasons.
First, a student should have
relatively specific notice of what is
and is not forbidden. Second, the
confidential nature of the proceedings
so far have precluded using
former fact situations as precedent
so that in effect each case establishes
new standards. This means
that unfairness could result with
different results in two substantially
similar cases. Third, it is
better to admit the limitations and
strengths of the system openly than
to hold the system out as something
that it is not, cannot, and
should not be.
Thus I agree with Mr. Bunch
that honor is honor wherever one is
and that there can never be a
satisfactory substitute for complete
integrity. But I also agree with Mr.
Lewis that the students' interest
does not now, should not in the
future, and legally cannot hold
itself out to encompass the whole
area of a man's honorable dealings.
Law 3
The Cavalier daily. Wednesday, March 5, 1969 | ||