Treitschke, his doctrine of German destiny and of international relations : together with a study of his life and work |
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THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN PRUSSIA
AND RUSSIA. |
 | THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN PRUSSIA
AND RUSSIA. Treitschke, his doctrine of German destiny and of international relations : |  |
THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN PRUSSIA
AND RUSSIA.
IN the summer of 1813, August Wilhelm Schlegel
wrote to Schleiermacher: "Is it to be wondered
at that this nation, on whose shoulders the weight
of the balance of power in Europe has been laid
for one and a half centuries, should go with a
bent back?" In these words he indicated both
the cause of the long-continued feebleness of our
country and also the ground of the constant mistrust
with which all the Great Powers saw Germany
recovering strength. Even a cautious and unprejudiced
German historian will find it hard to keep from
bitterness, and will easily appear to foreigners as a
Chauvinist, when he portrays in detail in how much
more just and friendly a way the public opinion of
Europe regarded the national movements of the
Italians, the Greeks, and the Southern Slavs, than
the Germans' struggle for unity. It needs even a
certain degree of self-denial in order to recognize that
the whole formation of the old system of States,
the way of looking at things of the old diplomacy,
depended on the divided state of Germany, and
consequently in our revolution we could expect
nothing better from the neighbouring Powers than,
at most, neutrality and silent non-interference.
A proud German will be glad of the fact that we
owe all that we are really to ourselves; he will
willingly forget past unfairness in practical politics
and simply ask what is the attitude of the neighbouring
Powers to the present interests of our
Empire? But he who only sees in history an
arsenal from which to draw weapons to pursue the
varying aims of the politics of the day, will, with a
moderate amount of learning and some sophistry,
be able to prove, just as it happens to suit him,
that France or Austria, Russia or England, is our
hereditary foe. A book of such a sort, thoroughly
partisan in spirit and unhistorical, is the work
Berlin and Petersburg; Prussian contributions
to the history of the Relations between Russia and
Germany, which an anonymous author has lately
published with the unconcealed purpose of arousing
attention and of preparing the minds of
credulous readers for a reckoning with Russia.
The book is entitled "Prussian Contributions,"
and the preface is dated from Berlin. I am quite
willing to believe that the author, when he wrote
his preface, may have happened to be passing a
few days in Berlin. But everyone who knows our
political literature must at once discern that the
author of the work is the same publicist who has
issued the little book, Russia, Before and After
the War, Pictures of Petersburg Society, and a
number of other instructive works dealing with
Russo-German relations. And this publicist is,
as is well known, no Prussian but an inhabitant
claimed to concern himself with Prussian politics,
but has always, with great talent and restless
energy, represented the interests of his Baltic
home as he understood them. Among the political
authors of Germany he takes a position similar to
that which Louis Schneider once occupied on the
other side. Just as the latter, assuredly in his
way an honest Prussian patriot, regarded the
alliance with Holy Russia as a dogma, so does our
author view hostility to the Czar's Empire; only,
he is incomparably abler and quite free from that
deprecatory manner which makes Schneider's
writings so unpleasant. The restoration of Poland
and the conquest of the Baltic provinces, these
are the visions which, more or less disguised,
hover in the background of all his books. In his
view the Prussian monarchy has really no other
raison d'être than the suppression of the Slavs;
it misses its vocation till it has engaged in hostilities
against the Muscovites. All the problems of
German politics are gauged by this one measure;
no inference is so startling as to alarm our author.
In 1871 he opposed the conquest of Alsace and
Lorraine, for the liberation of our western territories
threatened to postpone the longed-for war
with Russia; nor could a patriot of the Baltic
provinces allow that Alsace with its Gallicized
higher classes was a German province, while on
the other hand, the German nationality of Livland
and Kurland was rooted exclusively in the nobility
of sentiment towards one object compels
the respect, even of an opponent. So long as our
author fought with an open visor, one could pardon
his warm local patriotism when he at times spoke
somewhat contemptuously of Prussia, and held
up the wonderful political instinct of the Baltic
nobility as a shining example to our native narrow-mindedness.
But when, as at present, he assumes
the mask of a deeply-initiated Prussian statesman,
when he pares and trims our glorious history to
suit the aims of the Baltic malcontents, and wishes
to make us believe that Prussia has been for fifty
years the plaything of a foreign power, then it is
quite permissible to examine more closely whether
the cargo of this little Baltic ship is worth more
than the false flag which it flies at its masthead.
The old proverb, "Qui a compagnon, a maître,"
is especially true of political alliances. Hardenberg
made a mistake when he once said regarding Austria
and Prussia, "leurs intérets se confondent."
A community of interests between independent
Powers can only be a conditional one, and limited
by time; in every alliance which lasts long, sometimes
one of the contracting parties and sometimes
the other will consider itself overreached. Thus
our State at the commencement of the eighteenth
century made enormous sacrifices to aid the objects
of the two sea-Powers, but did not finally
gain any further advantage from this long alliance
than the right of her head to use the kingly title,
seventy-seven year-long friendship between Prussia
and Russia—the longest alliance which has
ever existed between two great Powers—presents
many such phenomena. There were times when
German patriots were fully justified in regarding
the friendship of Russia as oppressive, nay, as
disgraceful, just as on the other hand in recent
years the great majority of educated Russians
firmly believed that their country was injured by
the Prussian alliance. But when one sums up the
results, and compares the relative position in
respect of power of the two States in 1802, when
their alliance was formed, with that in 1879, when
it was dissolved, it cannot be honestly asserted that
Prussia fared badly in this alliance.
The Russo-Prussian alliance was, as is well
known, entirely the personal work of the two
monarchs, and everyone knows how much it was
helped forward by the honest and frank friendship
which the King Frederick William III displayed
towards the versatile Czar. But these
personal feelings of the King never overpowered
his sound political intelligence and his strong sense
of duty. Every new advance of historical investigation
only reconfirms the fact that the King was
altogether right when, unseduced by the proposals
of so many cleverer men than himself, he was only
willing to venture on the attempt at rising against
Napoleon in alliance with Russia. Without the
help of the Czar Alexander, the capture of Paris,
would have been impossible. Any one who doubts
this should peruse the recently published Memoris
of Metternich regarding the real objects of the
Vienna Court at the time—i.e., not the Memoirs
themselves with their intolerable self-glorification,
but the appended authentic official documents,
which, for the most part, plainly contradict the
vain self-eulogy of the author. At the Congress of
Vienna the two courts still continued to have a
community of interests: the Czar was obliged to
support Prussia's demands for an indemnity, if
he wished to secure for himself the possession of
Poland.
At the second Peace of Paris, on the other hand,
the interests of the two Powers came into violent
collision. The Czar had indeed favoured the
restoration of the State of Prussia, so that Russia
should be rendered impregnable through this
rampart on its most vulnerable side, but he as little
wished the rise of a completely independent self-sufficing
German power as the courts of Paris,
Vienna, and London did. Therefore, the restoration
of our old western frontier, which Prussia
demanded, was defeated by the united opposition
of all the Great Powers. All the courts without
exception observed with anxiety what an unsuspected
wealth of military power little Prussia had
developed during the War of Liberation; therefore
they all eagerly vied with one another in burying
Prussia's merits in oblivion. Whether one reads
officers, the letters of Schwarzenberg, Metternich,
and Gentz, the semi-official writings of the Russian
military authors of that period, it is difficult to
say which of the three allies had most quickly
and completely forgotten the deeds of their Prussian
comrades-in-arms. Nevertheless, the alliance
with Russia and Austria was a necessity for Prussia
for it still remained the most important task of our
European policy to prevent another declaration of
war on the part of France, and the Great Alliance
actually achieved this, its first purpose. When
Austria, in 1817, rendered anxious by Alexander's
grandiose schemes, proposed to the King of Prussia
a secret offensive and defensive alliance, which in
case of need might be also directed against Russia,
Hardenberg, who in those days was thoroughly
Austrian in his sympathies, was eager to accept the
proposal. But the King acted as a Prussian, and
absolutely refused, for only the union of all three
Eastern Powers could secure to his State the safety
which he especially needed after the immense
sacrifices of the war. Yet our Baltic anonymous
author is quite wrong in so representing things
as though, in Frederick William III's view, the
alliance with Russia had been the only possible
one. The King knew, more thoroughly than his
present-day critic, the incalculable vicissitudes of
international relations and always kept cautiously
in view the possibility of a war against Russia.
In 1818 he surprised the Vienna Court by the
East and West Prussia, in the German Confederation,
because in case of a Russian attack, he
wanted to be absolutely sure of the help of Germany.
Frederick William held obstinately to this
idea although Hardenberg and Humboldt spoke
against it, and he did not give it up till Austria
opposed it, and thus every prospect of carrying
the proposal through in the Diet of the Confederation
disappeared.
It is equally untrue that the King, as our anonymous
author condescendingly expresses it, had
modestly renounced all wishes of bringing about
a union of the German States. His policy was
peaceful, as it was obliged to be; it shunned a
decisive contest for which at that time all the
preliminary conditions were lacking, but as soon
as affairs in the new provinces were, to some extent,
settled, he began at once to work for the commercial
and political unifying of Germany. In
this difficult task, which in very truth laid the
foundation for the new German Empire, Prussia encountered
at every step the opposition of Austria,
England, and France. Russia alone among all the
Great Powers preserved a friendly neutrality.
This one fact is sufficient to justify the King in
attaching great importance to Russia's friendship.
This partiality of his, however, was by no means
blind, for nothing is more absurd than the author's
assertion that Prussia, by the mediation which
brought about the Peace of Adrianople, had merely
When the war of 1828 broke out, the King had
openly told the Czar that he disapproved of his
declaration of war. The next year, at the commencement
of the second campaign, the European
situation assumed a very threatening aspect.
The Vienna Cabinet, alarmed in the highest degree
by the progress of the Russian arms, exerted itself
in conjunction with England to bring about a great
alliance against Russia; on the other hand the
King knew from his son-in-law's mouth (the Czar's
autograph note is still preserved in the Berlin state
archives) that there was a secret understanding
between Nicholas and Charles X of France. If
matters were allowed to go their course, there was
danger of a European war, which might oblige
Prussia to fight simultaneously against Russia
and France, and that about a question remote from
our interests. In order to avert this danger, and
thus acting for the best for his own country, the
King resolved to act as a mediator, and brought
about a peace which, as matters then were, was
acceptable to both contending parties.
Prince Metternich was certainly alarmed at this
success of Prussian policy, and the reactionary
party in Berlin, Duke Karl of Mecklenburg,
Ancillon, Schuckmann, Knesebeck, who were all
staunch adherents of the Vienna diplomat, were
alarmed; but the ablest men at the Court, Bernstoff,
Witzleven, Eichhorn, and above all the
younger Prince William, approved the King's
King was obviously connected with the brilliant
successes which his finance minister, Motz, had
won at the same time in the struggles of German
commercial policy. To the calm historical judgment
the years 1828 and 1829 appear as a fortunate
turning point in the history of that uneventful
period; it was the time when Prussia again began
to take up a completely independent position in
relation to the Austrian Court. Among the
liberals, indeed, who had lately been admiring the
Greeks, and now were suddenly enthusiastic for
the Turks, there arose a supplementary party-legend,
that Prussia had only undertaken the office
of mediator in order to save the Russian army from
certain destruction. This discovery, however, is
already contradicted by the calendar. On August
19th, Diebitch's army appeared before Adrianople;
and it was here that the victor's embarrassments
first began, and here, first, it was evident how much
his fighting power had been reduced by sickness,
and the wear and tear of the campaign. But
Prussia had commenced acting as mediator as
early as July; when General Muffling received his
instructions, the Russian army was victorious
everywhere.
Later on, also, the sober-mindedness of King
Frederick William never favoured the Czar's designs
against the Porte; he rather did his best
to strengthen the resisting power of the Ottoman
Empire. The only partly effective reform which
through—the reconstitution of its army—was,
as is well known, the work of Prussian officers.
All the reports which the embittered scandal-seeking
opposition party of that time circulated,
regarding the influence of Russia in the domestic
concerns of Prussia, are mere inventions. The
King alone deserves blame or praise for the course
of domestic policy; his son-in-law never refused to
pay him filial reverence. Even the eccentricities
of the Berlin Court at that period, the love for
parades, the bestowing of military decorations,
which were stigmatized by the liberals as "Russian
manners," were simply due to the personal predilection
of the King, and it is difficult to decide
whether Russia has learnt more in this respect
from Germany, or vice versa. During the anxious
days of the July revolution the King exhibited
again, with all his modesty, an independent and
genuinely Prussian attitude. Frederick William
resisted the legitimist outbursts of his son-in-law,
and hindered the crusade against France which
had been planned in St. Petersburg. The next
year he resisted with equal common sense the
foolish enthusiasm of the liberals for the Poles,
and by occupying the eastern frontier, assisted
in the suppression of that Polish insurrection
which was as dangerous for our Posen as for
Russian Poland. The Baltic anonymous author
conceals his vexation at this intelligent policy of
self-assertion, behind the thoughtful remark that
assistance with the valuable life of Gneisenau."
Should we, then, perhaps enter in our ledger on
the Russian debit side, the cholera, which swept
away our heroes?
During the whole period from 1815 to 1840, I
know only of a single fact which can be alleged to
give real occasion to the reproach that the King,
for the sake of Russia's friendship, neglected an
important interest of his State. In contrast to
the ruthless commercial policy of Russia, Prussia
showed a moderation which bordered on weakness.
But this matter, also, is not so simple as our
anonymous author thinks. He reproaches Russia
with the non-fulfilment of the Vienna Treaty of
May 3, 1815, and overlooks the fact that Prussia
herself hardly wished in earnest the carrying out
of this agreement. It was soon enough proved
that Hardenberg had been overreached at Vienna
by Prince Czartoryski. The apparently harmless
agreements regarding free transit, and free trade
with the products of all formerly Polish territories,
imposed upon our State, through which the transit
took place, only duties, without conferring any
corresponding advantages. In order to carry out
the treaty literally, Prussia would have had to
divide its Polish provinces from its other territories
by a line of custom-houses. But the Poles saw
in the treaty a welcome means of carrying their
national propaganda into our Polish territories by
settlements of commercial agents. Thus it happened
proceeded on her own account; and by the customs
law of 1818 placed her Polish territories on
precisely the same footing as her other eastern
provinces. After this necessary step, Prussia
was no more in the position to appeal successfully
to the Vienna Treaty. And what means did we,
in fact, possess to compel the neighbouring State
to give up a foolish commercial policy, which was
injurious for our own country? Only the two-edged
weapon of retaliatory duties. The relation
of the two countries assumed quite a different
aspect under Frederick William IV. It will always
be one of the most bitter memories of our
history, how lacking in counsel, and wavering in
purposes the clever new King proved, in contrast
to the strong-willed Czar,—how cruelly he experienced,
by countless failures, that in the stern
struggles for power of national life, character is
always superior to talent, and how at last, for
truth will out, he actually feared these narrow
minds. Here our author has good reason for
sharp judgments; and here also he gives us, along
with some questionable anecdotes, some reliable
matter-of-fact information regarding the history
of the confusions of 1848-50. It is quite true that
the Czar Nicholas in the autumn of 1848 asked
General Count Friedrich Dohna whether he would
not be the Prussian General Monk, and march with
the first army corps on Berlin, to restore order
there; the whole Russian army would act as his
Count printed from autograph, confirm the correctness
of this story with the exception of some
trifling details. But even here the author cannot
rise to an unprejudiced historical estimate of the
events in question. He conceals the fact that not
only Russia but all the great Powers were against
the rise of a Prussian-German Empire. The position
which the Powers had assumed with regard
to the question of German unity had not changed
since 1814. He similarly ignores the fact that all
the great Powers opposed the liberation of Schleswig-Holstein;
and it is undeniable that Russia,
according to the traditions of the old diplomacy,
had better grounds to adopt such an attitude than
the other Powers. For all the cabinets believed
then decidedly—although wrongly—that Prussia
wished to use the struggle with Denmark as a
means of possessing herself of the Kiel harbour.
The Russian State, as a Baltic power, could not
welcome this prospect.
Russian policy, in contrast to that of England,
France, and Austria, was also peculiar in this, that
it resisted the Prussian constitutional movement.
The Czar Nicholas did not merely behave as the
head of the cause of royalty in all Europe, but
actually felt himself such; and it was precisely
this which secured him a strong following among
the Prussian conservatives. It is far from my
intention to defend, in any way, the wretched
policy which came to grief at Warsaw and Olmütz;
opponents of this tendency. Meanwhile, after the
lapse of a whole generation, it seems, however, to
be time to appreciate the natural motives which
drove so many valiant patriots into the Russian
camp. It is enough to remember only the King's
ride through mutinous Berlin, the retreat of the
victorious guards before the defeated barricade-fighters,
and all the terrible humiliation which the
weakness of Frederick William IV brought on the
throne of the Hohenzollerns. The old Prussian
royalists felt as though the world were coming to
an end; they saw all that they counted most
venerable, desecrated; and amid the universal
chaos, the Czar Nicholas appeared to them to be
the last stay of monarchy. Therefore, in order to
save royalty in Prussia, they adhered to Russia.
They made a grievous error, but only blind hatred,
as with our author, can condemn them abruptly
as betrayers of their country. The head of the
pro-Russian party in Berlin was, at the beginning
of the fifties, the same Field Marshal Dohna who
had instantly rejected with Prussian pride the
above-mentioned contemptible proposal of the
Czar; of him, a diplomat said: "So long as this
old standard remains upright, I feel easy."
Strongly conservative in political and ecclesiastical
matters though he was, this son-in-law of Scharnhorst
had never surrendered the ideal of the War
of Liberation, the hope of German unity. What
brought the noble German into the ranks of the
but that hopeless confusion of our affairs which had
brought about such a close connexion between the
great cause of German unity and the follies of
the revolution; the imperial crown of Frankfort
seemed to him as to his King to be a couronne de
pave.
As regards the Crimean War, all unprejudiced
judges believe, nowadays, that Prussia had, as an
exception, and for once in a way undeserved good
fortune. The crushing superiority of Russia was
broken by the western Powers without our interference,
and yet our friendly relations with our
eastern neighbour, which were to be so fruitful in
results for Germany's future, remained unbroken.
Even a less undecided, less inactive government
than Manteuffel's ministry could scarcely have
obtained a more favourable result than this. Our
author himself tepidly acknowledges that it was
not Prussia's duty to side with the western
Powers, and thus help on the schemes of Bonapartism.
A really brilliant statesman perhaps
might, as soon as the military forces of France were
locked up in the east, have suddenly made an
alliance with Russia, and attempted the conquest
of Schleswig-Holstein, and the solution of the
German question, without troubling himself about
mistaken public opinion. But it is obvious how
difficult this was, and how impossible for a personality
like the King's. Instead of quietly appreciating
the difficulty of the circumstances, our author
Prussia's servility. He also again ignores the
fact that Prussia then, unfortunately, had fallen
into a state of being regarded as negligible by the
whole world, and the arrogance of the western
Powers was not less than that of Russia. Everyone
knows the letters of Prince Albert, and Napoleon
III's remark, regarding the deference which
Prussia showed towards Russia; the cold disparaging
contempt displayed in the letters of the Prince
Consort, who was himself a German, and accustomed
to weigh his words carefully, is, in my
opinion, more insulting than the coarse words of
abuse which the harsh despotic Nicholas is said
to have blurted out in moments of sudden anger.
Our author also ignores the fact that the Czar
Nicholas, declared himself ready to purchase
Prussia's help in the field by surrendering Warsaw.
In the camp of the English and French allies they
were willing to pay a price also, but only offered
a slight rectification of the frontier on the left
bank of the Rhine. Which of the offers was the
more favourable?
This whole section of the book is a mixture of
truth and falsehood, of ingenious remarks and
tasteless gossip. We will give one specimen of the
author's manner of relating history. He prints
in spaced letters the following: "In February, 1864,
a Prussian State-secret—the just completed plan
of mobilization—was revealed to the Court of St.
Petersburg." Then he relates how one of our
news of this betrayal, of course in perfect good faith,
to a Berlin lithographic correspondence agency;
and in consequence a secret order was issued for
the writer's arrest. I happen to be exactly
acquainted with the affair, and can confirm the
statement that the order for arrest was certainly
issued—a characteristic occurrence in that time
of petty panics on the part of the police. But
more important than this secondary matter, is
the question whether that piece of information
was reliable, and whether that betrayal really took
place. The author has here again concealed
something. The report was that a brother of the
King had committed the treachery. This remarkable
disclosure, however, did not originate with any
one who was really conversant with affairs, but
with an honourable, though at the same time very
credulous and hot-headed, Liberal deputy of the
Landtag,[1] who had nothing to do with the Court.
Is it exaggerated loyalty when we Prussians demand
from the Baltic anonymous author, at
least, some attempt at a proof, before we resolve
to regard one of our royal princes as a traitor to his
country. The story simply belongs to the series
of innumerable scandals, which were only too
gladly believed by the malicious liberalism of the
fifties. It was, we must remember, the time when
Varnhagen von Ense was flourishing. In accordance
with the general tenor of his book, the author
that the policy of Alexander II atoned for many
of the wrongs which the Czar Nicholas had committed
against Germany. He seeks rather, during
this period of Russian history, to hunt up every
trace of movements hostile to Germany. It is,
for instance, a well-known fact, that after the Peace
of Paris, Russia sought for a rapprochement to
France; and it may also be safely assumed that
Prince Gortschakoff, from the commencement of
his political career, regarded an alliance with
France as the most suitable for Russia. But it
is a long way from such general wishes to the acts
of State-policy. For whole decades the great
majority of French statesmen, without distinction
of party, have given a lip-adherence to the Russian
alliance; even Lamartine, the enthusiast for
freedom, spoke of this alliance as a geographical
necessity and the "cry of nature." And yet the
course of the world's history went another way.
Then came the Polish rising of 1863. The
Court of St. Petersburg learned to know thoroughly
the secret intrigues of Bonapartism, and
in Prussia's watchful aid found a proof of the
value of German friendship. Since then, for a
whole decade, its attitude has remained favourable
to our interests, whatever fault the Baltic anonymous
author may find in details. Certainly it
was only the will of one man, which gave this
direction to Russian policy. The Russo-Prussian
alliance has never denied its origin; it has never
While the great majority of Germans regarded
Russian affairs with complete indifference, there
awoke in the educated circles of Russian society,
as soon as the great decisive days of our history
approached, a bitter hatred against Germany,
which increased from year to year. But that one
will, which was friendly to us, governed the German
State;and so long as this condition lasted, the
intelligent German press was bound to treat the
neighbouring Power with forbearance. When the
Baltic author expresses contempt for our press
because of this, and blames it for want of national
pride, he merely shows that he has no comprehension
for the first and most important tasks of
German policy. His thoughts continually revolve
round Reval, Riga, and Mitau.
That the dislocation of the equilibrium among
the Baltic Powers, and the advance of Prussia in
the Cimbric peninsula must have appeared serious
matters to the St. Petersburg Court, is obvious.
But at last it let the old deeply-rooted tradition
drop, and accommodated itself with as good a
grace as possible to the fait accompli. Similarly
it is evident that the formation of the North
German Confederation could not be agreeable
to it. When the war of 1866 broke out, people at
St. Petersburg and all the other capitals of Europe
expected the probable defeat of Prussia, and at first
were seriously alarmed at the brilliant successes
of our troops. But this time also a sense of fairness
new order of things in Germany, as soon as he
ascertained what schemes were cherished by the
Court of the Tuileries against the left bank of the
Rhine. In the next year, 1870, this attitude of
our friend and neighbour underwent its severest
test. Austria, Italy, and Denmark, as is well
known, were on the point of concluding an alliance
against Germany, when the strokes of Wörth and
Spichern intervened. England did not dare to
forbid the French to make the attack, which a
single word from the Queen of the Seas could have
prevented, and afterwards she prolonged the war
by her sale of arms, and by the one-sided manner
in which she maintained her neutrality. The
Czar Alexander, on the other hand, greeted each
victory of his royal uncle with sincere joy. That
was the important point, and not the ill-humour
of Prince Gortschakoff, which our author depicts
with so much satisfaction. Russia was the only
great Power whose head displayed friendly sentiments
towards us during that difficult time. And
if we wish to realize how valuable Russian friendship
was for us also in the following years, we must
compare the present state of things with the past.
As long as the alliance of the three Emperors lasted,
a European war was quite out of the question, for
the notorious war crisis of 1875 has in reality
never existed. Since Russia has separated from
the other two Imperial Powers, we are at any rate
within sight of the possibility of a European war,
on two frontiers simultaneously.
The most welcome task for an author, who
openly preaches war against Russia, was obviously
to show in detail through what circumstances the
old alliance after the peace of San Stefano was
loosened and finally dissolved. I know no more
of these matters than anyone else. I only know
that in Russia there is deep vexation at the course
taken by the Berlin Congress, and that a great
deal of the blame is imputed to the German Empire.
I have heard of secret negotiations regarding
a Franco-Russian alliance, and am without
further argument convinced that Prince Bismarck
would not have given German policy its latest
direction without very solid reasons. But I have
no more exact knowledge of the matter. Therefore
it was with easily intelligible curiosity that
I began to read the last section of the book. I
hoped to learn something about the transactions
between Russia and France; I hoped to learn
whether the sentiments of the Czar Alexander
have changed, or whether that monarch does not
now more personally direct the foreign policy
of his kingdom, etc. But our author himself
knows nothing about such matters; he deceives
himself or others when he pretends to be initiated.
He only produces lengthy extracts from the Germanophobe
articles of the Russian press. Every
publicist who is at all an expert knows just as
many fine and pithy passages in Muscovite papers.
who loves historical sources of this kind, might
discover similar outpourings of Russian politicians.
But all that proves very little. The question is
much rather whether the Russian press, which, as
is well known, enjoys only a certain degree of
freedom in the two capitals and remains quite
unknown to the mass of the people, is powerful
enough to influence the course of Russia's foreign
policy. To this question the author gives no
answer.
So we lay the book aside without any information
on the present state of affairs, but not without
a feeling of shame. When two who have been
friends for many years have broken with each
other, it is not only unchivalrous for one to tax
his old companions with sins committed long ago,
but unwise; the reproach always falls back on the
reproacher. The last impression which the reader
carries away from this work is much more unfavourable
for Prussia than for Russia; therefore
even the foreign press greeted it at once with
well-deserved contempt. Anyone who believes
the author, must come to the conclusion that
King Frederick William III and his two successors,
had conducted a Russian and not a Prussian policy.
Happily this view is quite false. But we would
remind the Baltic publicist who, under the disguise
of a Prussian patriot, draws such a flattering
picture of our history, of an old Prussian story,
which still has its application. In the Rhine
inveighing vigorously against King Frederick
William II; but when an Austrian fellow-soldier
chimed in, the Prussian gave him a box on the
ears and said: "I may talk like that, but not you;
for I am a Prussian."
The author's remarks on the future are based
upon the tacit assumption that the European
Powers fall naturally into two groups: Austria,
England, Germany, on the one side; Italy, Russia,
and France, on the other. In the short time since
the book came out, this assumption has already
been made void; the English elections have reminded
the world very forcibly of the instability
of grouping in the system of States. If the author
had commenced his work only four weeks later,
it would probably not have appeared in the book
market at all, or have done so in a very different
shape.
But there is one truth, though certainly no new
one, in the train of thought which is apparent in
this book; it is only too correct that hostility to
everything German is constantly on the increase
in influential Russian society. But we do not
at all believe that an intelligent Russian Government,
not misled by the dreams of Pan-Slavism,
must necessarily cherish such a feeling
towards us. We regard a war against Russia
as a great calamity, for who, now, when the
period of colonizing absolutism lies far behind
us, can seriously wish to encumber our State
of Poles and Jews? But many signs indicate that
the next great European crisis will find the Russians
in the ranks of our enemies. All the more
important therefore is our newly-confirmed friendship
with Austria.
This alliance is, as a matter of course, sure of
the involuntary sympathy of our people; if it
endures, it may have the useful effect of strengthening
the German element in Austria, and finally
checking the melancholy decay of our civilization
in Bohemia and Hungary, in Krain and the Tyrol.
Our interests in the East coincide, for the present,
with those of the Danube Empire. After the
occupation of Bosnia has once taken place, Austria
cannot again surrender the position she has taken
up, without preparing a triumph for our common
enemy, Pan-Slavism. Nevertheless, we cannot
join our Baltic author in prophesying that the
treaty of friendship with Austria will be as lasting
and immovable as the unity of the German Empire.
Germany has plenty of enemies in the
medley of peoples which exist in Austria; all the
Slavs, even the ultramontane Germans hate us;
nay more, the Magyars, our political friends,
suppress German civilization in the Saxon districts
of Transylvania, much more severely than the
Russians ever ventured to do in their Baltic provinces.
It is not in our power to keep these
hostile forces for ever aloof from the guidance of
Russia. The unity of our Empire, on the other
loyalty which we owe to ourselves; therefore it
will last, whatever changes may take place among
the European alliances.
| THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN PRUSSIA
AND RUSSIA. Treitschke, his doctrine of German destiny and of international relations : | |