QUONlAM IGITUR UTI PAULO ANTE. — Prosa
6
"Therfore thanne, as I have schewed a litel herebyforne
that alle thing that is iwist nis nat knowen by his nature
propre, but by the nature of hem that comprehenden it, lat us
loke now, in as mochil as it is leveful to us (as who seith, lat
us loke now as we mowen) whiche that the estat is of the devyne
substaunce; so that we mowe eek knowen what his science is. The
comune jugement of alle creatures resonables thanne is this: that
God is eterne. Lat us considere thanne what is eternite; for
certes that schal schewen us togidre the devyne nature and the
devyne science. Eternite, thanne, is parfit possessioun and al
togidre
of lif interminable; and that schewethe more cleerly by the
comparysoun or collacioun of temporel thinges. For alle thing
that lyveth in tyme, it is present and procedith fro preteritz
into futures (that is to seyn, fro tyme passed into tyme
comynge), ne ther nis nothing establisshed in tyme that mai
enbrasen togidre al the space of his lif. For certis yit ne hath
it nat taken the tyme of tomorwe, and it hath lost that of
yusterday, and certes in the lif of this dai ye ne lyve namore
but right as in this moevable and transitorie moment. Thanne
thilke thing that suffreth temporel condicioun, althoughe that
it nevere bygan to be, ne thoughe it nevere ne cese for to be,
as Aristotile deemed of the world, and althoughe that the lif of
it be strecchid with infinite of tyme; yit algatis nis it no
swich thing that men mighten trowen by ryght that it is eterne.
For althouhe that it comprehende and embrase the space of lif
infinit, yit algatis ne enbraseth it nat the space of the lif al
togidre; for it ne hath nat the futuris (that ne ben
nat yit), ne it ne hath no lengere the preteritz
(that ben idoon or ipassed). But
thilke thing,
thanne, that hath and comprehendith togidre al the plente of the
lif interminable, to whom ther ne faileth naught of the future,
and to whom ther nis noght of the preteryt escaped nor ipassed,
thilke same is iwitnessed and iproevid by right to ben eterne;
and it byhovith by necessite that thilke thing he alwey present
to hymself and compotent (as who seith, alwey present to hymselve
and so myghty that al be right at his plesaunce), and that he
have al present the infinit of the moevable tyme.
"Wherfore som men trowen wrongfully that, whan thei
heren
that it semede to Plato that this world ne hadde nevere
bygynnynge of tyme, ne that it nevere schal han failynge, thei
wenen in this manere that this world be makid coeterne
with his makere. (As who seith, thei wene
that this
world and God ben makid togidre eterne, and that is a wrongful
wenynge.) For other thing is it to ben ilad by lif
interminable, as Plato grauntide to the world, and oothir is it
to enbrace togidre al the presence of the lif intermynable, the
whiche thing it is cleer and manyfest that it is propre to the
devyne thought. Ne it ne scholde nat semen to us that God is
eldere than thinges that ben imaked by quantite of tyme, but
rathir by the proprete of his simple nature. For this ilke
infinit moevyng of temporel thinges folweth this presentarie
estat of the lif inmoevable; and, so as it ne mai nat contrefetin
it ne feynen it, ne be evene lik to it, [fro] the immoevablete
(that is to sein, that is in the eternite of God) it faileth and
fallith into moevynge, [and] fro the simplicite of the presence
of [God] disencresith into the infinit quantite of future and of
preterit; and so as it ne mai nat han togidre al the plente of
the lif, algates yit, for as moche as it ne ceseth nevere for to
ben in som manere, it semyth somdel to us that it folwith and
resembleth thilke thing that it ne mai nat atayne to ne
fulfillen, and byndeth itself to som maner presence of this litle
and swift moment, the whiche presence of this litle and swifte
moment, for that it bereth a maner ymage or liknesse of the ai
duellynge presence of God, it grauntith to swich manere thinges
as it betydith to that it semeth hem that thise thinges han iben
and ben. And for that the presence of swiche litil moment ne mai
nat duelle, therfore it ravysschide and took the infynit wey of
tyme (that is to seyn, by
successioun). And by
this manere is it idoon for that it sholde contynue the lif in
goinge, of the whiche lif it ne myght nat enbrace the plente in
duellinge. And forthi yif we wollen putten worthi names to
thinges and folwen Plato, lat us seyen thanne sothly that God is
'eterne,' and that the world is
'perpetuel.'
"Thanne, syn that every jugement knoweth and
comprehendith
by his owne nature thinges that ben subgect unto hym, ther is
sothly to God alweys an eterne and presentarie estat; and the
science of hym, that overpasseth alle temporel moevement,
duelleth in the simplicite of his presence, and embraceth and
considerith alle the infynit spaces of tymes preteritz and
futures, and lokith in his simple knowynge alle thinges of
preterit ryght as thei weren idoon presently ryght now. Yif thou
wolt thanne thinken and avise the prescience by whiche it knoweth
alle thinges, thou ne schalt naught demen it as prescience of
thinges to comen, but thou schalt demen more ryghtfully that it
is science of presence or of instaunce that nevere ne faileth.
For whiche it nis nat ycleped 'previdence,' but
it sholde rathir ben clepid 'purveaunce,' that
is establisshed ful fer fro ryght lowe thinges, and byholdeth fro
afer alle thingis, right as it were fro the heye heighte of
thinges.
"Why axestow thanne, or whi desputestow thanne, that
thilke thingis ben doon by necessite whiche that ben yseyn and
knowen by the devyne sighte, syn that forsothe men ne maken nat
thilke thinges necessarie whiche that thei seen ben idoon in hir
sighte? For addith thi byholdynge any necessite to thilke thinges
that thou byholdest present?"
"Nay," quod I.
Philosophie. "Certes,
thanne, yif men
myghte maken any digne comparysoun or collacioun of the presence
devyne and of the presence of mankynde, ryght so as ye seen some
thinges in this temporel present, ryght so seeth God alle thinges
by his eterne present.
"Wherfore this devyne prescience ne chaungeth nat the
nature ne the proprete of thinges, but byholdeth swiche thingis
present to hym-ward as thei shollen betyde to yow-ward in tyme
to comen. Ne it ne confowndeth nat the jugementz of thingis; but
by o sight of his thought he knoweth the thinges to comen, as wel
necessarie as nat necessarie. Ryght so as whan ye seen togidre
a man walke on the erthe and the sonne arisen in the hevene,
albeit so that ye seen and byholden the ton and the tothir
togidre, yit natheles ye demen and discerne that the toon is
voluntarie and the tothir is necessarie. Ryght so thanne the
devyne lookynge, byholdynge alle thinges undir hym, ne trowbleth
nat the qualite of thinges that ben certeinly present to hym-ward
but, as to the condicioun of tyme,
forsothe thei ben
futur. For which it folwith that this nis noon opynioun, but
rathir a stidfast knowynge istrengthid by soothnesse that, whan
that God knoweth any thing to be, he ne unwot not that thilke
thing wantith necessite to be. (This is to sein that whan that
God knoweth any thing to betide, be wot wel that it ne hath no
necessite to betyde.)
"And yif thou seist here that thilke thing that God
seeth
to betide, it ne may nat unbytide (as who
seith, it
moot bytide), and thilke thing that ne mai nat unbytide, it
mot bytiden by necessite, and that thou streyne me to this name
of necessite, certes I wol wel confessen and byknowen a thing of
ful sad trouthe. But unnethe schal ther any wight mowe seen it
or come therto, but yif that he be byhold of the devyne thought.
For I wol answeren the thus: that thilke thing that is futur,
whan it is referred to the devyne knowynge, than is it
necessarie; but certis whan it is undirstonden in his owene
kynde, men seen it outrely fre and absolut fro alle necessite.
"For certes ther ben two maneris of necessites: that oon
necessite is symple, as thus: that it byhovith by necessite that
alle men ben mortal or dedly; anothir necessite is condicionel,
as thus: yif thow wost that a man walketh, it byhovith by
necessite that he walke. Thilke thing, thanne, that any wight
hath iknowe to be, it ne mai ben noon oothir weys thanne be
knowith it to he. But this condicion ne draweth nat with hir
thilke necessite simple; for certes this necessite condicionel
—
the propre nature of it ne makith it nat, but the adjeccioun of
the condicioun makith it. For no necessite ne constreyneth a man
to gon that goth by his propre wil, al be it so that whan he goth
that it is necessarie that be goth. Ryght on this same man
thanne, yf that the purveaunce of God seeth any thyng present,
than moot thilke thing ben by necessite, althoghe that it ne have
no necessite of his owne nature. But certes the futures that
bytiden by fredom of arbitrie, God seth hem alle togidre
presentz. Thise thinges thanne, yif thei ben referrid to the
devyne sighte, than ben they maked necessarie by the condicioun
of the devyne knowynge. But certes yif thilke thingis ben
considered by hemself, thei ben absolut of necessite, and ne
forleten nat ne cesen nat of the liberte of hir owne nature.
Thanne certes withoute doute alle the thinges shollen ben
doon whiche that God woot byforn that thei ben to comen. But some
of hem comen and bytiden of fre arbitrie or of fre wil, that, al
be it so that thei bytiden, yit algates ne lese thei nat hir
propre nature in beinge, by the whiche, first or that thei weren
idon, thei hadden power noght to han bytyd."
Boece. "What is
this to seyn
thanne," quod I, "that thinges ne ben nat necessarie by
hir propre nature, so as thei comen in alle maneris in the
liknesse of necessite by the condicioun of the devyne
science?"
Philosophie. "This is the
difference," quod sche, "that tho thinges that I
purposide the a litil herbyforn — that is to seyn, the sonne
arysynge and the man walkynge — that ther-whiles that thilke
thinges ben idoon, they ne myghte nat ben undoon; natheles that
oon of hem, or it was idoon, it byhovide by necessite that it was
idoon, but nat that oothir. Ryght so is it here, that the thinges
that God hath present, withoute doute thei shollen ben. But some
of hem descendith of the nature of thinges (as the sonne
arysynge); and some descendith of the power of the doeris (as the
man walkynge). Thanne seide I no wrong that, yif that thise
thinges ben referred to the devyne knowynge, thanne ben thei
necessarie; and yif thei ben considered by hemself, than ben thei
absolut fro the boond of necessite. Right so as alle thingis that
apiereth or scheweth to the wittes, yif thou referre it to
resoun, it is universel; and yif thou loke it or referre it to
itself, than is it singuler.
"But now yif thou seist thus: that, 'If it be in
my power to chaunge my purpos, than schal I voiden the purveaunce
of God, whan paraventure I schal han chaungid the thingis that
he knoweth byforn,' thanne schal I answeren the thus:
'Certes thou maist wel chaungen thi purpos; but for as
mochil as the present sothnesse of the devyne purveaunce
byholdeth that thou maist chaunge thi purpos, and whethir thou
wolt chaunge it or no, and whider-ward that thou torne it, thou
ne
maist nat eschuen the devyne prescience, ryght as
thou ne maist nat fleen the sighte of the present eye, althoghe
that thou torne thiself by thi fre wil into diverse
acciouns.' But thou maist sein ayein: 'How
schal it thanne be — schal nat the devyne science ben
chaunged by
my disposicioun whan that I wol o thing now and now anothir? And
thilke prescience — ne semeth it nat to entrechaunge stoundis
of
knowynge?'" (As who seith, ne schal it nat seme to
us that the devyne prescience entrechaungith hise diverse
stoundes of knowynge, so that it knowe somtyme o thing, and
somtyme the contrarie?)
"No, forsothe," quod she, "for the devyne sighte
renneth toforn and seeth alle futures, and clepith hem ayen and
retorneth hem to the presence of his propre knowynge; ne he ne
entrechaungith nat, so as thou wenest, the stoundes of
foreknowynge, as now this, now that; but he ay duellynge cometh
byforn, and enbraseth at o strook alle thi mutaciouns. And this
presence to comprehenden and to seen alle thingis — God ne
hath
nat taken it of the bytidynge of thinges to come, but of his
propre symplicite. And herby is assoiled thilke thing that thou
puttest a litel herebyforn; that is to seyn, that it is unworthy
thing to seyn that our futures yeven cause of the science of God.
For certis this strengthe of the devyne science, whiche that
embraseth alle thinges by his presentarie knowynge, establissheth
man to alle thinges, and it ne oweth nawht to lattere thinges.
"And syn that thise thinges ben thus (that is to seyn,
syn
that necessite nis nat in thinges by the devyne
prescience), thanne is ther fredom of arbitrie, that duelleth hool and
unwemmed to mortal men; ne the lawes ne purposen nat wikkidly
medes and peynes to the willynges of men that ben unbownden and
quyt of alle necessite; and God, byholdere and forwytere of alle
thingis, duelleth above, and the present eternite of his sighte
renneth alwey with the diverse qualite of our dedes, dispensynge
and ordeynynge medes to gode men and tormentz to wikkide men. Ne
in ydel ne in veyn ne ben ther put in God hope and preyeris that
ne mowen nat ben unspedful ne withouten effect whan they been
ryghtful.
"Withstond thanne and eschue thou vices; worschipe and
love thou vertues; areise thi corage to ryghtful hopes; yilde
thou humble preieres an heyhe. Gret necessite of prowesse and
vertu is encharged and comaunded to yow, yif ye nil nat
dissimulen; syn that ye worken and don (that is to
seyn, your dedes or your werkes) byforn the eyen of the juge
that seeth and demeth alle thinges."
Explicit liber Boecii.
