University of Virginia Library

Mindful of the dangers of
oppressing your readers with legalistic
evaluations, and of somehow
dishonoring the Honor System
itself by aggravating the current
dispute, I too must speak. I do so
only because the issue is of such
great moment to the University and
its national reputation. My aim is a
simple one: to expose the issue in
its most general form. The letters
by Messrs. Lewis (Feb. 23) and
McDonald (March 5), on the one
hand, and Mr. Bunch (Feb. 27), on
the other, manifest divergent conceptions
of the purpose of the
Honor System and consequently of
its appropriate scope.

In Mr. Bunch's view, the Honor
Code establishes thy loftiest of
standards: each student at the
University is required to be an
"honorable man," and the University
itself, through the Honor
Committee, is obligated to expunge
from its midst any student who, at
any time and at any place while a
member of the University, deviates
from this standard. Naturally, such
a broad purpose admits no limitations.
Just as a discriminating
individual selects as his friends only
men of the highest integrity, so the
University should continue student
associations only on the condition
that they maintain high standards
of personal conduct. For, the
University as well as the individual
will be judged by the company it
keeps.

The problem with such an
expansive view is simply that the
University is a major social institution,
not an individual. An institution
of higher learning can ordain
and fairly enforce a "morality of
aspiration" through an honor code
no better than can the State
through the Law. "Thou shalt
neither lie, nor cheat, nor steal" is
only slightly less susceptible to
concrete application than is "do
Good and avoid Evil." Unless these
words are to be given their literal
meaning, the System will inevitably
be characterized by annoying uncertainty.
In fact, despite the
ominous rhetoric, the System at the
University has never operated literally,
and the current controversy
has been engendered in large part
by its unpredictability. Moreover,
as is often the case with lofty,
amorphous standards, little beyond
the obvious is in fact enforced. And
so we come full circle. A community
declaring its preference only
for the most honorable of men
ostracizes only the most dishonorable
of men.

If the Honor System is to be
truly rationalized, then it must be
recognized both for what it is today
and for what it can realistically
attain. The primary purpose of the
System is protective and deterrent,
as was suggested by Messrs. Lewis
and McDonald. It is designed to
protect the reasonable expectations
of the members of the University
community that 1) they will not be
induced to rely on knowingly false
statements; 2) they will not be
disadvantaged in academic pursuits
by unfair methods of competition;
and 3) their personal belongings
will not be misappropriated by
others. If the purpose of the
System is so conceived, its standards
become both definable and
livable. For example, the University
has no direct interest in the
interests of those outside the
"academical village" and its immediate
environs nor in interpersonal
misrepresentations within the Community
which are intended to
induce no action by another.

Affirmation of a deterrent and
protective purpose, it should be
emphasized, is not denial of a
formative purpose. Mr. Bunch
thinks the System ought to be lofty
enough to imbue its participants
with a pervasive sense of honor. So
do we. But we think this purpose is
better served through participation
in a knowable, realistic and fair
system than in one which is
amorphous, impractical and susceptible
to inconsistency. In short,
the Honor System, properly conceived,
has both a body and a soul.
Mr. Bunch's blithe spirit is simply
not enough.

It should be added that this view
of the System's purpose is not a
new one propagated only by
ill-formed law students. In fact,
despite the tenacity with which Mr.
Bunch clings to his idealized version,
the narrower conception is
more consistent with the original
understanding. The System was
initially conceived as an alternative
to proctored examinations and
covered only cheating at the University.

I would like to make one further
point which I have studiously
avoided up to now for fear that
your readers might sigh "another
law student" and turn quickly to
"Peanuts." The fact that the
University is a major social institution
rather than an individual
imposes not only practical limitations
but also legal restraints. The
university functions neither as a
parent nor as a Church. It serves a
limited social role; especially as a
State institution it must exercise
disciplinary action only for reasons
substantially related to its academic
function and probably only
through certain procedures. Compliance
with the law can be secured
only under the narrower purpose
suggested by Messrs. Lewis and
McDonald. I sincerely urge the
Honor Committee to take immediate
steps to implement that purpose
through promulgation of
reasonable standards.