III
The French Renaissance, aware of the problem of
originality and inspiration in poetry (Thüme, 1927),
seems, however, to ignore this twofold meaning of the
French term génie; ingenium is translated into French
as esprit (Zilsel, 1926), a word having a much wider
range of meanings. Descartes employs the term
ingenium to mean both an unusual capability to dis-
cover the truth (viz., new truths) and a special talent
(Laporte, 1950). Génie appears in seventeenth-century
psychology as a kind of inventive instinct which must
be ruled by reason and taste; or, as the natural spon-
taneity of an author, in contrast to science and art.
Mairet (1637) calls it fureur divine (Zumthor-Sommer,
1950); for Jean-Louis Guez de Balzac (1640) it is a
secret force coming from heaven, bestowing greatness
and majesty (Bray, 1927). Saint-Evremond regards
poetical genius as incompatible with common sense
(bon sens): sometimes it verges on madness. For Dacier
(1681), on the contrary, judgment governs genius but
is concealed under inspiration and apparent disorder
(Thüme, 1927). Rapin (1686) calls genius feu céleste
(Bray, 1927), and Bouhours finds it opposed to, but not
incompatible with common sense. Boileau contrasts
genius with art and its rules. For Perrault (1693) genius
(feu sacré, sainte fureur) discovers the eternal ideas of
beauty (Zumthor-Sommer, 1950). Dubos (1719) takes
“genius” to stand for an instinctive and natural capa-
bility for original creation, above and sometimes
against the rules; it should not be overwhelmed by
enthusiasm; genius results from an assemblage of
psychophysical powers (Wolf, 1923; Grappin, 1952;
Fubini, 1965). For André (1741), genius (feu de l'esprit)
may infringe the rules of art, but only within certain
limits (André, 1843). Vauvenargues (1746) considers
genius as depending on the passions, and resulting from
an assemblage of powers; its originality does not ex-
clude imitation (Vauvenargues, 1857). Condillac (1746)
opposes genius to talent: both are powers of invention,
combining ideas received through the senses; but talent
does not go beyond natural combinations, while genius
is provided with an esprit créateur (Condillac, 1803).
In Batteux's opinion (1747), genius should not con-
flict with natural laws; in fact, it discovers, it does not
create. Therefore, it is a superior form of reason imi-
tating nature, and promoted by enthusiasm (Wolf,
1923; Grappin, 1952). Diderot considers genius as a
mystery of nature, going beyond imagination and
judgment by the force of enthusiasm; this brings about
creation, as an idea drawn from experience through
an original process (Dieckmann, 1941; Belaval, 1950).
For d'Alembert (1751) genius, the power of original
invention in science and art, cannot be taught
(d'Alembert, 1930). Cahusac (1757) applies genius to
emotion and feeling, as a faculty receptive to and
reproductive of impressions. J. F. de Saint-Lambert
(1757) opposes genius to taste; genius creates inde-
pendently of the rules; in philosophy, Shaftesbury is
a genius, he has créé, construit, édifié—Locke is not,
because we owe him only de grandes vérités froidement
aperçues, méthodiquement suivies, froidement an-
noncées. Helvétius (1758) gives a mechanical explana-
tion of genius: genius invents by combination, not by
creation, and it is a rational power (Wolf, 1923).
Voltaire identifies genius with “active imagination”; it
ought to be matched by memory and judgment
(Encyclopédie, 1765). Voltaire, as many others in his
time, uses génie also to mean the character of an era
or of a nation (Tonelli, 1955) as was usual in France,
at least after Corneille and Racine (Corneille, 1640-41;
Racine, 1669). In this sense, esprit is a synonym of
génie.
