I
Genius is relevant to the history of ideas in the follow-
ing meanings: (1) the designation of superior mental
powers productive of rare superior performances; or
also as the designation of a man possessing these
powers; (2) as the peculiar spiritual character of an
era, of a nation, of a man; (3) as a special talent for
some particular type of performance.
The first designation is basic. Performances con-
sidered as products of genius may also belong to poli-
tics, warfare, exploration, etc., but such achievements
are regarded primarily as original intellectual work,
as discoveries or inventions, and especially as artistic
creations in contrast to imitation. Until the middle of
the eighteenth century, these original activities were
collectively designated by inventio, or equivalents of
this term. Their further differentiation (especially of
discoveries from inventions) is frequently ignored.
During the Renaissance (and later), two different Latin
terms were used for genius: ingenium and genius; they
seem to have first acquired this meaning in Italy, where
corresponding Italian words, ingegno and genio, were
also used. A fundamental trait of genius is that it is
an innate capability, operating with spontaneous fa-
cility, versus talents which may be taught and learned
by diligence; but, nevertheless, it may need dili-
gence for its development and discipline. Whether this
capability depends on a unique mental power, or on
an assemblage (proportion) of powers, or on a kind
of inward revelation, is a further debatable question.
At first, irrational traits attributed to genius are
considered irrelevant; later they are magnified by the
confluence into this idea of the Platonic doctrine of
furor poeticus in poetics. Genius, in this respect, is
sometimes considered as verging on distraction. Also
Platonic is the divine character frequently attributed,
metaphorically or not, to genius, because its original
work is compared both with God's creation, and with
what is considered the result of supernatural inspira-
tion. In fact, while ingenium is intended to mean
“inventive intelligence,” the Latin term genius (Italian
genio) in the Renaissance originally refers, meta-
phorically or not, to a superior spirit inspiring a human
being in the tradition of Socrates' demon or in that
of astrology (astral spirit). Petrarch and Boccaccio had
used ingenium in this sense, but still rather atypically;
but Poliziano and Pico stress the element of originality
when they use it. Pico also refers to genius, as does
Erasmus in 1528. Castiglione (1528) only uses ingegno.
The Portuguese art theorist Hollanda, a pupil of
Michelangelo, stresses (1548) the innate character of
genius (Portuguese engenho, genio). Alberti, Condivi,
and Vasari point out that genius and diligence are
different qualities, but that they may be profitably
united; the same connection between genius and mem-
ory is asserted by Boccaccio, Alberti, Enea Silvio
Piccolomini, Erasmus, Trissino.
Scaliger's doctrine of genius (1561), centering on
poetics, is peculiarly important. Genius (ingenium,
genius) is something divine and innate, associated with
enthusiasm (furor poeticus); it belongs to both arts and
sciences. Cardano identifies genius with a kind of
spiritus familiaris. For Fracastoro and Giovio, genius
only means a talent in some particular field (Zilsel,
1926; Thüme, 1927). The term “genius” is used by
Adriani (Manuale, 1845) as the spirit of a nation.
For Bruno (1585), genius as divine enthusiasm is the
origin of the rules of art (Bruyne, 1951; Thüme, 1927).
But seventeenth-century Italian authors, such as
Galileo, Torricelli, Magalotti, Salvini, exclude from
genio supernatural and enthusiastic traits (Zilsel, 1926).
Pellegrini (1650), Tesauro (1654), and Pagano consider
ingegno in connection with beauty. For Vico, genio
is the source of inventions (Croce, 1946; Pagano, 1650).
