II. THEODICY IN HISTORICAL RELIGIONS
In the narrow and proper sense of the term,
theodicies can arise only in traditions of ethical theism.
The problem presupposes the existence of one God
with a moral character engaged in the order of the
world, although a polytheism in which the gods are
themselves bound by a superior moral fate, or one in
which the religious loyalty of the individual or the
group is restricted to one god (henotheism) also may
raise the question of justice in the face of persistent
evil. However, polytheism, the pantheism of a monistic
absolute, and the dualism which assigns the evil to a
god or demon apart from the good provide ways of
avoiding the problem of theodicy altogether.
Nevertheless, complaints about the actions of the
religious being or beings upon whom the values of life
depend but who have permitted evil occur wherever
man has faced his life with self-consciousness. In the
first chapter of his book on prayer (1932) Friedrich
Heiler has pointed out complaints, protests, and
attempts to coerce, in the face of undeserved sufferings,
in the traditions of many ancient or tribal cultures. In
ancient China the question of the cause of suffering
was addressed to Shang Ti, the Highest Lord. The
mystical pantheism of the Vedanta in India evaded
the problem through identity with the One, but in the
more personalistic mysticism of the Bhagavad-Gita the
dialogue between Krishna and Arguna includes a
reproach for the evil in the world which is answered
by the god. Although the Buddha was skeptical about
the gods, the content of his enlightenment concerned
the fact of evil, its subjective cause, and its resolution.
Though polytheistic, the religions of the Mesopotamian
river civilizations anticipate a doctrine that is firmly
entrenched in the history of the Hebrews, and still
prevails in the orthodox theistic faiths historically de-
rivative from this—the conviction that there is a
divinely appointed equation of suffering with sin and
of reward with loyalty. As Saint Augustine expressed
it, “There are two kinds of evil—sin and the penalty
for sin” (Against Fortunatus, 15; in Earlier Writings).
It deserves notice, however, that the Hebrew scriptures
also contain the great poetic refutation of this theory
of evil as retribution—the book of Job, which also
makes the point that the only resolution of the problem
is in the realm of personal commitment or faith. Also
reflected in later books of the Hebrew canon, as well
as in early Christian heresies, is the dualism of gods—
good and evil—adhered to in the religion of Iran.
In Greece the highly individualized natures of the
gods render the problem of theodicy meaningless, for
the society of gods is almost at one with the society
of men, and human responses must be adjusted to
them very much as they must be adjusted to other,
admittedly more powerful, humans. But in the great
myths, particularly as they are treated in Greek trag-
edy, the gods fade into insignificance in the face of
the awesome powers and harsh sufferings common to
the human situation, and the treatment of themes such
as pride and retribution achieves a universal human
significance.
Thus there have arisen in all religious considerations
of evil, both moral and natural, certain lines of thought
demanding a theodicy or suggesting ways of avoiding
one: by rendering evil subjective, to be overcome by
the discipline of thought and will; by a dualism or
pluralism of good and evil forces; by making suffering
a retribution for sin; by overcoming the distinction
between good and evil through mystical identification
with God, so that what is, is good; or by a nonunder-
standing commitment of faith to the goodness of God
and to justification in a life after death. The ground
is thus prepared for a philosophical theodicy.
