Law and Religion.
Causation is a leading motif in
most religions: the ways in which the
world comes into
existence and is sustained, and the modes by which
man may discharge religious obligation. Each notion
involves a theory of
causation. A religion's cosmology
issues in its science, primitive or
advanced; the obliga-
tions imposed on man
by his religion are his first law.
All the ramifications of the idea of
causation in religious
history have this dual character. Causation is
either
physical or purposive, according as its referent is na-
ture or human conduct. Causation in law retains
the
two strands, though its concern is much more with
human action
than with the order of physical events.
In the history of Western religion, God is said to
have caused the world to
come into existence and to
govern it through his laws (note the legal
reference).
In the Bible, the cosmogonic account of the origin of
the
universe is scant and primitive; the laws governing
man are detailed and
sophisticated, so much so that
the original document comes to be known as
the Book
of the Law (Torah, in Hebrew). There was an early
development
of a widespread casuistic activity which
has never ceased to occupy the
Hebraic religions.
Religious law concerns itself with the limits of
human
obligation or responsibility, and inherent in all such
legislation or decision is a notion of causation. It is
usually assumed
that a man is responsible for the state
of affairs which he has caused. The
extent to which
he may be held responsible for events he has not
caused
is a matter of deep and continuing perplexity.
Out of this religious practice grew one major strand
of the idea of
causation in law. And since law becomes
separated from religion, if at all,
only in the late matu-
rity of religion, it is
easy to see how important religious
beliefs in the matter of causation are
to legal develop-
ment. In brief, religion
bequeaths to law the notion
of moral responsibility for man's interventions
in the
regular course of nature and for impositions of his will
upon
nature and society. It may or may not hold him
responsible for what he does
in a state of divine mad-
ness, atē, karma, or fate. “Not I was the
cause of this
act,” said Agamemnon, “but Zeus and the
Erinys who
walks in darkness: they it was who in the assembly
put wild
atē in my understanding, on that day when
I arbitrarily took
Achilles' prize” (Dodds, 1957). A
modern pleader might say,
“Not guilty because of
temporary
insanity.”
