SECT. VI.
Of the Idea of Existence, and of External Existence.
It may not be amiss, before we leave this subject, to explain the ideas of existence and of external existence; which have
their difficulties, as well as the ideas of space and time. By this means we shall be the better prepar'd for the examination of
knowledge and probability, when we understand perfectly all those particular ideas, which may enter into our reasoning.
There is no impression nor idea of any kind, of which we have any consciousness or memory, that is not conceiv'd as
existent; and 'tis evident, that from this consciousness the most perfect idea and assurance of being is deriv'd. From hence we
may form a dilemma, the most clear and conclusive that can be imagin'd, viz. that since we never remember any idea or
impression without attributing existence to it, the idea of existence must either be deriv'd from a distinct impression,
conjoin'd with every perception or object of our thought, or must be the very same with the idea of the perception or object.
As this dilemma is an evident consequence of the principle, that every idea arises from a similar impression, so our decision
betwixt the propositions of the dilemma is no more doubtful. go far from there being any distinct impression, attending every
impression and every idea, that I do not think there are any two distinct impressions, which are inseparably conjoin'd. Tho'
certain sensations may at one time be united, we quickly find they admit of a separation, and may be presented apart. And
thus, tho' every impression and idea we remember be considered as existent, the idea of existence is not deriv'd from any
particular impression.
The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent. To reflect on any thing
simply, and to reflect on it as existent, are nothing different from each other. That idea, when conjoin'd with the idea of any
object, makes no addition to it. Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent. Any idea we please to form is the idea of
a being; and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form.'
Whoever opposes this, must necessarily point out that distinct impression, from which the idea of entity is deriv'd, and must
prove, that this impression is inseparable from every perception we believe to be existent. This we may without hesitation
conclude to be impossible.
Our foregoing
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reasoning concerning the distinction of ideas without any real difference will not here serve us in any
stead. That kind of distinction is founded on the different resemblances, which the same simple idea may have to several
different ideas. But no object can be presented resembling some object with respect to its existence, and different from
others in the same particular; since every object, that is presented, must necessarily be existent.
A like reasoning will account for the idea of external existence. We may observe, that 'tis universally allow'd by
philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or
impressions and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion. To hate, to
love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing but to perceive.
Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are deriv'd from something antecedently
present to the mind; it follows, that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically
different. from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us chase our
imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can
conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appear'd in that narrow compass. This is the universe of
the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there produc'd.
The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when suppos'd specifically different from our perceptions,
is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects. Generally speaking we do not
suppose them specifically different; but only attribute to them different relations, connections and durations. But of this more
fully hereafter.
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