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QUONlAM IGITUR QUE SIT. — Prosa 10
"For as moche thanne as thow hast seyn whiche is the fourme of good that nys nat parfit, and whiche is the forme of good that is parfit, now trowe I that it were good to schewe in what this perfeccioun of blisfulnesse is set. And in this thing I trowe that we schulde first enquere for to witen, yf that any swich maner good as thilke good that thow hast dyffinysshed a litel herebyforn (that is to seyn, sovereyn good) may be founde in the nature of thinges, for that veyn ymagynacioun of thought ne desceyve us nat, and put us out of the sothfastnesse of thilke thing that is summytted to us. But it may nat be denyed that thilke good ne is, and that it nys ryght as a welle of alle goodes. For alle thing that is cleped inparfyt is proevid inparfit be the amenusynge of perfeccioun or of thing that is parfit. And herof cometh it that in every thing general, yif that men seen any thing that is inparfit, certes in thilke general ther moot ben som thing that is parfit. For yif so be that perfeccioun is don awey, men may nat thinke ne say fro whennes thilke thing is that is cleped inparfyt. For the nature of thinges ne took nat hir begynnynge of thinges amenused and inparfit, but it procedith of thinges that ben alle hole and absolut, and descendith so doun into uttereste thinges and into thinges
Boece. "This is concluded," quod I, "feermely and soothfastly."
Philosophie. "But considere also," quod sche," in whom this blissefulnes enhabiteth. The comune accordaunce and conceyt of the corages of men proveth and graunteth that God, prince of alle thinges, is good. For, so as nothyng mai hen thought betere than God, it mai nat ben douted thanne that he that no thinge nys betere, that he nys good. Certes resoun scheweth that God is so good that it proeveth by verray force that parfyt good is in hym. For yif God nys swyche, he ne mai nat be prince of alle thinges; for certes somthing possessyng in itself parfyt good schulde be more worthy than God, and it scholde semen that thilke thing were first and eldere than God. For we han schewyd apertely that alle thinges that ben parfyt ben first er thynges that ben inparfit; and forthy, for as moche as that my resoun or my proces ne go nat awey withouten an ende, we owe to graunte that the sovereyn God is ryght ful of sovereyn parfit good. And we han establissched that the sovereyne good is verray blisfulnesse. Thanne moot it nedis be that verray blisfulnesse is set in sovereyn God."
Boece. "This take I wel," quod I, "ne this ne mai nat he withseid in no manere."
"But I preye the," quod sche, "see now how thou mayst proeven holily and withoute corrupcioun this that I have seid, that the sovereyn God is ryght ful of sovereyne good."
"In whiche manere?" quod I.
"Wenestow aught," quod sche, "that this prince of alle thynges have itake thilke sovereyne good anywher out of hymself, of whiche sovereyne good men proeveth that he is ful; ryght as thou myghtest thenken that God, that hath blisfulnesse in hymself, and thilke blisfulnesse that is in hym, were divers in substaunce? For yif thow wene that God have resseyved thilke good out of hymself, thow mayst wene that he that yaf thilke good to God be more worth than is God. But I am beknowe and confesse, and that ryght dignely, that God is ryght worthy aboven alle thinges. And yif so be that this good be in hym by nature, but that it is dyvers from hym by wenynge resoun, syn we speke of God prynce of alle thynges, feyne who so feyne mai who was be that hath conjoyned thise divers thynges togidre. And eek at the laste se wel that a thing that is divers from any thing, that thilke thing nys nat that same thing fro whiche it es undirstonden to be diverse. Thanne folweth it that thilke thing that be his nature is divers from sovereyn good, that that thyng nys nat sovereyn good; but certes it were a felenous cursydnesse to thinken that of hym that no thing nys more worth. For alwey, of alle thinges, the nature of hem ne may nat hen betere thanne hir begynnynge. For whiche I mai concluden by ryght verray resoun that thilke that is begynnynge of alle thinges, thilke same thing is sovereyn good in his substaunce."
Boece. "Thow hast seyd ryghtfully," quod I.
Philosophie. "But we han graunted," quod sche, "that the sovereyn good is blisfulnesse."
"That is sooth," quod I.
"Thanne," quod sche, "moten we nedes granten and onfessen that thilke same sovereyn good be God."
"Certes," quod I, "Y ne may nat denye ne withstonde the resouns purposed; and I se wel that it folweth by strengthe of the premisses."
"Loke now," quod sche, "yif this be proevid yet more fermely thus, that there ne mowen not ben two sovereyn goodis that ben divers among hemself. For certes the goodis that ben divers among hemself, the toon is nat that that the tothir is; thanne ne mowen neither of hem ben parfit, so as eyther of hem lakketh to othir. But that that nys nat parfit, men mai seen apertely that it nys not sovereyn. The thinges thanne that hen sovereynly gode ne mowe by no weie be divers. But I have wel concluded that blisfulnesse and God ben the sovereyn good; for whiche it mote nedes be that sovereyne blisfulnesse is sovereyn devynite."
"No thing," quod I, "nys more sothfaste than this, ne more ferme by resoun, ne a more worthy thing than God mai not ben concluded."
Philosophie. "Upon thise thynges thanne," quod sche, "ryght as thise geometriens whan thei han schewed her proposicions ben wont to bryngen yn thinges that thei clepen porismes or declaracions of forseide thinges, right so wol I yeve the here as a corolarie or a meede of coroune. Forwhy, for as moche as by the getynge of blisfulnesse men ben makid blisful, and blisfulnesse is dyvinite, than is it manifest and opene that by the getynge of dyvinite men ben makid blisful. Right as by the getynge of justise [men ben maked just], and be the getynge of sapience thei ben maked wise, ryght so nedes by the semblable resoun, whan they han geten dyvinite thei ben maked goddes. Thanne is every blisful man God. But certes by nature ther nys but o God; but by the participacioun of dyvinite ther ne let ne distourbeth nothyng that ther ne ben many goddis."
"This ys," quod I, "a fair thing and a precious, clepe it as thou wilt, be it corolarie, or porisme, or mede of coroune, or declarynges."
"Certes," quod sche, "nothing nys fairere than is the thing that by resoun schulde ben addide to thise forseide thinges."
"What thing?" quod I.
"So," quod sche, "as it semeth that blisfulnesse conteneth many thinges, it weere for to witen whether that alle thise thinges maken or conjoynen as a maner body of blisfulnesse by diversite of parties or membres, or elles yif ony of alle thilke thinges be swich that it acomplise by hymself the substaunce of blisfulnesse, so that alle thise othere thynges ben referrid and brought to blisfulnesse (that is to seyn, as to the cheef of hem)."
"I wolde," quod I, "that thow madest me clerly to undirstonde what thou seist, and that thou recordidest me the forseide thinges."
"Have I not jugged," quod sche, "that blisfulnesse is good?"
"Yys for sothe," quod I, "and that sovereyn good."
"Adde thanne," quod sche, "thilke good that is maked blisfulnesse to alle the forseide thinges. For thilke same blisfulnesse [is] demed to ben sovereyn suffisaunce, thilke selve is sovereyn power, sovereyn reverence, sovereyn clernesse or noblesse, and sovereyn delyt. What seistow thanne of alle thise thinges, that is to seyn, suffisaunce, power, and thise othere thinges, — ben thei thanne as membris of blisfulnesse, or ben they reffered and brought to sovereyne good ryght as alle thinges [ben] brought to the cheef of hem?"
Boece. "I undirstonde wel," quod I, "what thou purposest to seke, but I desire for to herkne that thow schew it me."
Philosophie. "Tak now thus the discrecioun of this questioun," quod sche; "yif alle thise thinges," quod sche, "weren membris to felicite, thanne weren thei dyverse that on fro that othir. And swich is the nature of parties or of membres, that diverse membris compounen a body."
"Certes," quod I, "it hath wel ben schewyd herebyforn that alle thise thinges ben al o thyng."
"Thanne ben thei none membres," quod sche, "for elles it schulde seme that blisfulnesse were conjoyned al of o membre allone; but that is a thing that mai not ben don."
"This thing," quod I, "nys not doutous; but I abide to herknen the remenaunt of the question."
"This is opene and cler," quod sche, "that alle othere thinges ben referrid and brought to good. For therfore is suffisaunce requerid, for it is demyd to ben good; and forthy is power requirid, for men trowen also that it be good; and this same thing mowen we thinken and conjecten of reverence, and of noblesse, and of delyt. Thanne is sovereyn good the somme and the cause of al that oughte ben desired; forwhy thilke thing that withholdeth no good in itselve, ne semblance of good, it ne mai not wel in no manere be desired ne requerid. And the contrarie; for thoughe that thinges by here nature ne ben not gode, algates yif men wene that thei ben gode, yet ben thei desired as theigh that thei were verrayliche gode; and therefore is it that men oughte to wene by ryghte that bounte be the sovereyn fyn and the cause of alle the thinges that ben to requiren. But certes thilke that is cause for whiche men
I se nat," quod I, "wherfore that men myghten discorden in this."
"And we han schewed that God and verray blisfulnesse is al o thing."
"That is sooth," quod I.
"Thanne mowen we concluden sykerly, that the substaunce of God is set in thilke same good, and in noon other place.
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