10. At this stage the Greek situation becomes prac-
tically identical with the Roman situation, and to Rome
we may turn to clarify antecedents and to explain what
happened in the Roman Empire.
Republican Rome was an aristocratic society in
which patricians and plebeians, patrons and clients,
rich (adsidui) and poor (proletarii) were kept apart by
law and custom. But patricians, patrons, and rich men
were not necessarily the same persons. Different insti-
tutions took different notice of the various categories
of citizens. Up to the end of the republic, patricians
formed a group of their own in the Senate, though
of decreasing importance. On the other hand, patri-
cians were never allowed into the influential assembly
of the plebeians (
comitia plebis tributa). In the assembly
of the
centuriae (
comitia centuriata), the main legis-
lative and electoral assembly, wealth was the main
criterion for the classification. Wealth counted in the
general assembly of the tribes (
comitia tributa), but less
conspicuously.
The Roman army remained organized according to
principles of wealth until the end of the second century
B.C. Later it became an army of proletarians. Patronage
was recognized in civil law, especially in relation to
freed men, who were ipso facto clients of their ex-
masters. Patronage operated unofficially in lawsuits,
elections, services, etc. Legal regulations and customs
affecting freedom of speech in the Roman society of
the Republic have to be interpreted against the back-
ground of this complex net of relations. According to
the most plausible interpretation, one of the laws of
the Twelve Tables (fifth Century B.C.) punished slander
by death. Aristocrats were likely to derive most advan-
tage from such a provision which can be paralleled
in other societies (Anglo-Saxons punished slander by
the excision of the tongue). At the end of the third
century B.C., the poet Naevius seems to have been
prosecuted in accordance with this law when he
attacked the powerful Metelli in a theatrical perform-
ance (the details are extremely obscure). Later this law
fell into desuetude, and slander was prosecuted as
iniuria which was stretched to cover attacks in theaters
against individuals. At least since the time of Augustus
(if not of Sulla) offensive words against persons in
authority came under the law of maiestas: here again
details are by no means clear. Foreign philosophers
and rhetoricians were thrown out of Rome more than
once in the second and first centuries B.C. under the
ordinary coercive powers of the magistrates, who had
the support of the Senate. This amounted to implicit
interference with education.
In the political assemblies (comitia) as such there was
no place for discussion. Citizens were there to vote.
But there was opportunity for discussions in the more
informal meetings (contiones) which normally preceded
the formal comitia. The magistrate who presided over
the contiones had considerable discretionary powers.
It seems that he could either throw open the discussion
or invite carefully selected individuals to speak. For-
eign ambassadors were admitted to speak in such
gatherings, and women are known to have spoken in
them. In the Senate freedom of speech was complete,
but senators were asked to speak in order of rank
(which meant that the most influential members, the
ex-censors, the ex-consuls, and the consuls-designate
spoke first).
The general impression one receives for the last
century of the Republic is that in both political and
intellectual life tongues moved freely. But this was a
period of crisis, and even in this period the beneficiaries
must have been a restricted privileged group. Men like
Cicero felt that there was less freedom of speech in
Rome than in Athens. This admission did not imply
any regret. It is typical of Republican Rome that free-
dom of speech was never directly and precisely con-
nected with the more general notion of libertas. The
very terminology of freedom of speech, however,
pointed to a relationship between freedom in general
and freedom of speech in particular: we hear of libera
lingua, óratio libera. It goes without saying that by the
first century B.C. Roman terminology was influenced
by Greek usage. Yet parrhesia never had an exact
equivalent in Rome; when it was translated by licentia,
contumacia, an element of criticism was often implied.
The general attitude seems to have been that only
persons in authority had a right to speak freely: one
senses that freedom of speech belongs to the sphere
of auctoritas just as much as to the sphere of libertas.
