Later Greek Philosophers. The progressive over-
shadowing of city autonomy by monarchical empire
after Alexander provided a soil for Stoicism, a philoso-
phy which both made the individual the captain of
his soul, and at the same time related his strenuous
self-government to the governing mind of the Universe.
It was still the ideal, to let Reason rule; but Reason
was now seen as embodied in the Universal Order, the
recurrent cycle of world-process. Since the cycle must
fulfill its pattern, and universal Reason (of which the
individual's reason is but a function) must prevail, the
new problem is theoretically posed, of the relation
between the individual's exercise of freedom, and the
operation of a universal, rational necessity. The official
solution lay in the doctrine of Relaxation—though it
is the Universal Reason which functions as our rational
mind, it relaxes its operation in us to what is (initially)
the mere rudiment of actual rationality; and from that
starting-point finds its level in us by and as our personal
or free endeavor. So far from feeling himself oppressed
by the World-Reason, the Stoic embraced it con amore
and, by willing in the line of Cosmic Will, enjoyed
that freedom which is escape from all frustration. (For
the spirit of this ethos, see Marcus Aurelius, passim.)
If one asked whether the sinner or fool could resist
Cosmic Destiny, one was put off with such sayings as
that God leads good will by the hand and drags re-
calcitrance by the hair. In practice a man was offered
the choice of being the victim of fate or the partner
of providence; how men could have such a choice was,
no doubt, theoretically insoluble and must always be
so in a strictly pantheist system.
The contemporary rival to Stoicism, the School of
Epicurus, taught an out-and-out libertarian individ-
ualism (Diogenes Laërtius, X. 133-34). The philosopher
shook from his shoulders both the burden of politics
and the burden of cosmic destiny, and pursued an
amiable, cultured life at his own sweet will, under the
leadership of the laudable and tranquil emotions. It
must surprise the modern reader to observe that Epi-
curus supported his doctrine of freedom by a strict
atomic materialism. Everything, including the human
soul, is a chance constellation of atoms. But he does
not conclude “So we do what the atoms make us do.”
He insists, “Our choices are ours to make.” The ex-
planation of the paradox is that the ancients were not
obliged to view the movements of matter as the realm
of inflexible regularity. Reason it was that imposed
order; be rid of Cosmic Reason, leave matter to itself,
and there might be scope for the self-determination
of a soul which atoms had transiently blown together.
Epicureanism proved to be a deviation which was
not followed up. The settlement of world-empire in
the seemingly everlasting Roman dominion and the
infiltration of oriental attitudes toward divine monar-
chy favored a philosophical development building on
Stoic foundations, but tending towards an elevation of
the Supreme Principle into an absolute transcendence
over the world. Neo-Platonism, as this development
is called, reached maturity in the third century A.D.
Insofar as the system viewed the human soul as an
emanation from the universal being rather than as a
part or function of it, it allowed a more intelligible
basis for the substantial distinctness of the human agent
and so for his freedom to determine his own relation
to the Divine. Emanation proceeded in a cascade of
descending steps, and man embraced within his being
an epitome of nature's sinking scale, from spirit above
to mere matter below. He had in his faculty of desire
a corresponding scale of “loves,” each with affinity for
its own objects. His freedom of choice essentially lay
in the power to identify himself with one love or
another, and supremely with love for the Supreme.
