7.1. 1. Of Luxury.
Luxury is ever in proportion to the inequality of fortunes. If the
riches of a state are equally divided there will be no luxury; for it is
founded merely on the conveniences acquired by the labour of others.
In order to have this equal distribution of riches, the law ought to
give to each man only what is necessary for nature. If they exceed these
bounds, some will spend, and others will acquire, by which means an
inequality will be established.
Supposing what is necessary for the support of nature to be equal to
a given sum, the luxury of those who have only what is barely necessary
will be equal to a cipher: if a person happens to have double that sum,
his luxury will be equal to one; he that has double the latter's
substance will have a luxury equal to three; if this be still doubled,
there will be a luxury equal to seven; so that the property of the
subsequent individual being always supposed double to that of the
preceding, the luxury will increase double, and a unit be always added,
in this progression, 0, 1, 3, 7, 15, 31, 63, 127
In Plato's republic,
[1]
luxury might have been exactly calculated.
There were four sorts of censuses or rates of estates. The first was
exactly the term beyond poverty, the second was double, the third
triple, the fourth quadruple to the first. In the first census, luxury
was equal to a cipher; in the second to one, in the third to two, in the
fourth to three: and thus it followed in an arithmetical proportion.
Considering the luxury of different nations with respect to one
another, it is in each state a compound proportion to the inequality of
fortunes among the subjects, and to the inequality of wealth in
different states. In Poland, for example, there is an extreme
inequality of fortunes, but the poverty of the whole binders them from
having so much luxury as in a more opulent government.
Luxury is also in proportion to the populousness of the towns, and
especially of the capital; so that it is in a compound proportion to the
riches of the state, to the inequality of private fortunes, and to the
number of people settled in particular places.
In proportion to the populousness of towns, the inhabitants are
filled with notions of vanity, and actuated by an ambition of
distinguishing themselves by trifles.
[2]
If they are very numerous, and
most of them strangers to one another, their vanity redoubles, because
there are greater hopes of success. As luxury inspires these hopes, each
man assumes the marks of a superior condition. But by endeavouring thus
at distinction, every one becomes equal, and distinction ceases; as all
are desirous of respect, nobody is regarded.
Hence arises a general inconvenience. Those who excel in a
profession set what value they please on their labour; this example is
followed by people of inferior abilities, and then there is an end of
all proportion between our wants and the means of satisfying them. When
I am forced to go to law, I must be able to fee counsel; when I am sick,
I must have it in my power to fee a physician.
It is the opinion of several that the assemblage of so great a
multitude of people in capital cities is an obstruction to commerce,
because the inhabitants are no longer at a proper distance from each
other. But I cannot think so; for men have more desires, more wants,
more fancies, when they live together.
Footnotes
[1]
The first census was the hereditary share in land, and Plato
would not allow them to have, in other effects, above a triple of the
hereditary share. See his "Laws," v.
[2]
"In large and populous cities," says the author of the "Fable of
the Bees," i, p. 133, "they wear clothes above their rank, and,
consequently, have the pleasure of being esteemed by a vast majority,
not as what they are, but what they appear to be. They have the
satisfaction of imagining that they appear what they would be: which, to
weak minds, is a pleasure almost as substantial as they could reap from
the very accomplishment of their wishes."
