Book VII.
Consequences of the Different Principles of the Three Governments
with Respect to Sumptuary Laws, Luxury, and the Condition of Women.
7.1. 1. Of Luxury.
Luxury is ever in proportion to the inequality of fortunes. If the
riches of a state are equally divided there will be no luxury; for it is
founded merely on the conveniences acquired by the labour of others.
In order to have this equal distribution of riches, the law ought to
give to each man only what is necessary for nature. If they exceed these
bounds, some will spend, and others will acquire, by which means an
inequality will be established.
Supposing what is necessary for the support of nature to be equal to
a given sum, the luxury of those who have only what is barely necessary
will be equal to a cipher: if a person happens to have double that sum,
his luxury will be equal to one; he that has double the latter's
substance will have a luxury equal to three; if this be still doubled,
there will be a luxury equal to seven; so that the property of the
subsequent individual being always supposed double to that of the
preceding, the luxury will increase double, and a unit be always added,
in this progression, 0, 1, 3, 7, 15, 31, 63, 127
In Plato's republic,
[1]
luxury might have been exactly calculated.
There were four sorts of censuses or rates of estates. The first was
exactly the term beyond poverty, the second was double, the third
triple, the fourth quadruple to the first. In the first census, luxury
was equal to a cipher; in the second to one, in the third to two, in the
fourth to three: and thus it followed in an arithmetical proportion.
Considering the luxury of different nations with respect to one
another, it is in each state a compound proportion to the inequality of
fortunes among the subjects, and to the inequality of wealth in
different states. In Poland, for example, there is an extreme
inequality of fortunes, but the poverty of the whole binders them from
having so much luxury as in a more opulent government.
Luxury is also in proportion to the populousness of the towns, and
especially of the capital; so that it is in a compound proportion to the
riches of the state, to the inequality of private fortunes, and to the
number of people settled in particular places.
In proportion to the populousness of towns, the inhabitants are
filled with notions of vanity, and actuated by an ambition of
distinguishing themselves by trifles.
[2]
If they are very numerous, and
most of them strangers to one another, their vanity redoubles, because
there are greater hopes of success. As luxury inspires these hopes, each
man assumes the marks of a superior condition. But by endeavouring thus
at distinction, every one becomes equal, and distinction ceases; as all
are desirous of respect, nobody is regarded.
Hence arises a general inconvenience. Those who excel in a
profession set what value they please on their labour; this example is
followed by people of inferior abilities, and then there is an end of
all proportion between our wants and the means of satisfying them. When
I am forced to go to law, I must be able to fee counsel; when I am sick,
I must have it in my power to fee a physician.
It is the opinion of several that the assemblage of so great a
multitude of people in capital cities is an obstruction to commerce,
because the inhabitants are no longer at a proper distance from each
other. But I cannot think so; for men have more desires, more wants,
more fancies, when they live together.
Footnotes
[1]
The first census was the hereditary share in land, and Plato
would not allow them to have, in other effects, above a triple of the
hereditary share. See his "Laws," v.
[2]
"In large and populous cities," says the author of the "Fable of
the Bees," i, p. 133, "they wear clothes above their rank, and,
consequently, have the pleasure of being esteemed by a vast majority,
not as what they are, but what they appear to be. They have the
satisfaction of imagining that they appear what they would be: which, to
weak minds, is a pleasure almost as substantial as they could reap from
the very accomplishment of their wishes."
7.2. 2. Of sumptuary Laws in a Democracy.
We have observed that in a republic, where riches are equally
divided, there can be no such thing as luxury; and as we have shown in
the 5th Book
[3]
that this equal distribution constitutes the excellence
of a republican government; hence it follows, that the less luxury there
is in a republic, the more it is perfect. There was none among the old
Romans, none among the Lacedmonians; and in republics where this
equality is not quite lost, the spirit of commerce, industry, and virtue
renders every man able and willing to live on his own property, and
consequently prevents the growth of luxury.
The laws concerning the new division of lands, insisted upon so
eagerly in some republics, were of the most salutary nature. They are
dangerous, only as they are sudden. By reducing instantly the wealth of
some, and increasing that of others, they form a revolution in each
family, and must produce a general one in the state.
In proportion as luxury gains ground in a republic, the minds of the
people are turned towards their particular interests. Those who are
allowed only what is necessary have nothing but their own reputation and
their country's glory in view. But a soul depraved by luxury has many
other desires, and soon becomes an enemy to the laws that confine it.
The luxury in which the garrison of Rhegio began to live was the cause
of their massacring the inhabitants.
No sooner were the Romans corrupted than their desires became
boundless and immense. Of this we may judge by the price they set on
things. A pitcher of Falernian wine
[4]
was sold for a hundred Roman
denarii; a barrel of salt meat from the kingdom of Pontus cost four
hundred; a good cook four talents; and for boys, no price was reckoned
too great. When the whole world, impelled by the force of corruption, is
immersed in voluptuousness
[5]
what must then become of virtue?
Footnotes
[4]
Fragment of the 36th book of Diodorus, quoted by Constantine
Porphyrogenitus, in his Extract of Virtues and Vices.
[5]
Cum maximus omnium impetus ad luxuriant esset. — Ibid.
7.3. 3. Of sumptuary Laws in an Aristocracy.
There is this inconvenience in an ill-constituted aristocracy, that
the wealth centres in the nobility, and yet they are not allowed to
spend; for as luxury is contrary to the spirit of moderation, it must be
banished thence. This government comprehends, therefore, only people who
are extremely poor and cannot acquire, and people who are vastly rich
and cannot spend.
In Venice, they are compelled by the laws to moderation. They are so
habituated to parsimony that none but courtesans can make them part with
their money. Such is the method made use of for the support of industry;
the most contemptible of women may be profuse without danger, whilst
those who contribute to their extravagance consume their days in the
greatest obscurity.
Admirable in this respect were the institutions of the principal
republics of Greece. The rich employed their money in festivals, musical
choruses, chariots, horse-races, and chargeable offices. Wealth was,
therefore, as burdensome there as poverty.
7.4. 4. Of sumptuary Laws in a Monarchy.
Tacitus says
[6]
that the Suiones, a German nation, has a particular
respect for riches; for which reason they live under the government of
one person. This shows that luxury is extremely proper for monarchies,
and that under this government there must be no sumptuary laws.
As riches, by the very constitution of monarchies, are unequally
divided, there is an absolute necessity for luxury. Were the rich not to
be lavish, the poor would starve. It is even necessary here that the
expenses of the opulent should be in proportion to the inequality of
fortunes, and that luxury, as we have already observed, should increase
in this proportion. The augmentation of private wealth is owing to its
having deprived one part of the citizens of their necessary support;
this must therefore be restored to them.
Hence it is that for the preservation of a monarchical state, luxury
ought continually to increase, and to grow more extensive, as it rises
from the labourer to the artificer, to the merchant, to the magistrate,
to the nobility, to the great officers of state, up to the very prince;
otherwise the nation will be undone.
In the reign of Augustus, a proposal was made in the Roman senate,
which was composed of grave magistrates, learned civilians, and of men
whose heads were filled with the notion of the primitive times, to
reform the manners and luxury of women. It is curious to see in Dio,
[7]
with what art this prince eluded the importunate solicitations of those
senators. This was because he was founding a monarchy, and dissolving a
republic.
Under Tiberius, the diles proposed in the senate the
re-establishment of the ancient sumptuary laws.
[8]
This prince, who did not want sense, opposed it. "The state," said he, "could not possibly
subsist in the present situation of things. How could Rome, how could
the provinces, live? We were frugal, while we were only masters of one
city; now we consume the riches of the whole globe, and employ both the
masters and their slaves in our service." He plainly saw that sumptuary
laws would not suit the present form of government.
When a proposal was made under the same emperor to the senate, to
prohibit the governors from carrying their wives with them into the
provinces, because of the dissoluteness and irregularity which followed
those ladies, the proposal was rejected. It was said that the examples
of ancient austerity had been changed into a more agreeable method of
living.
[9]
They found there was a necessity for different manners.
Luxury is therefore absolutely necessary in monarchies; as it is
also in despotic states. In the former, it is the use of liberty; in the
latter, it is the abuse of servitude. A slave appointed by his master to
tyrannise over other wretches of the same condition, uncertain of
enjoying tomorrow the blessings of to-day, has no other felicity than
that of glutting the pride, the passions, and voluptuousness of the
present moment.
Hence arises a very natural reflection. Republics end with luxury;
monarchies with poverty.
[10]
Footnotes
[6]
"De Moribus Germanorum," 44.
[7]
Dio Cassius, liv. 16.
[8]
Tacitus, "Annals," iii. 34.
[9]
"Multa duritiei veterum melius et læstius mutata" -- Tacitus, "Annals,"
iii. 34.
[10]
"Opulentia paritura mox egestatem." -- Florus, iii. 12.
7.5. 5. In what Cases sumptuary Laws are useful in a Monarchy.
Whether it was from a republican spirit, or from. some other
particular circumstance, sumptuary laws were made in Aragon, in the
middle of the thirteenth century. James the First ordained that neither
the king nor any of his subjects should have above two sorts of dishes
at a meal, and that each dish should be dressed only one way, except it
were game of their own killing.
[11]
In our days, sumptuary laws have been also enacted in Sweden; but
with a different view from those of Aragon.
A government may make sumptuary laws with a view to absolute
frugality; this is the spirit of sumptuary laws in republics; and the
very nature of the thing shows that such was the design of those of
Aragon.
Sumptuary laws may likewise be established with a design to promote
a relative frugality: when a government, perceiving that foreign
merchandise, being at too high a price, will require such an exportation
of home manufactures as to deprive them of more advantages by the loss
of the latter than they can receive from the possession of the former,
they will forbid their being introduced. And this is the spirit of the
laws which in our days have been passed in Sweden.
[12]
Such are the sumptuary laws proper for monarchies.
In general, the poorer a state, the more it is ruined by its
relative luxury; and consequently the more occasion it has for relative
sumptuary laws. The richer a state, the more it thrives by its relative
luxury; for which reason it must take particular care not to make any
relative sumptuary laws. This we shall better explain in the book on commerce;
[13]
here we treat only of absolute luxury.
Footnotes
[11]
Constitution of James I in the year 1234, art. 6, in "Marca Hispanica," p. 1429.
[12]
They have prohibited rich wines and other costly merchandise.
[13]
Lettres persanes, 106. See below, xx. 20.
7.6. 6. Of the Luxury of China.
Sumptuary laws may, in some governments, be necessary for particular
reasons. The people, by the influence of the climate, may grow so
numerous, and the means of subsisting may be so uncertain, as to render
a universal application to agriculture extremely necessary. As luxury in
those countries is dangerous, their sumptuary laws should be very
severe. In order, therefore, to be able to judge whether luxury ought to
be encouraged or proscribed, we should examine first what relation there
is between the number of people and the facility they have of procuring
subsistence. In England the soil produces more grain than is necessary
for the maintenance of such as cultivate the land, and of those who are
employed in the woollen manufactures. This country may be therefore
allowed to have some trifling arts, and consequently luxury. In France,
likewise, there is corn enough for the support of the husbandman and of
the manufacturer. Besides, a foreign trade may bring in so many
necessaries in return for toys that there is no danger to be apprehended
from luxury.
On the contrary, in China, the women are so prolific, and the huma.n
species multiplies so fast, that the lands, though never so much
cultivated, are scarcely sufficient to support the inhabitants. Here,
therefore, luxury is pernicious, and the spirit of industry and economy
is as requisite as in any republic.
[14]
They are obliged to pursue the necessary arts, and to shun those ot luxury and
pleasure.
This is the spirit of the excellent decrees of the Chinese emperors.
"Our ancestors," says an emperor of the family of the Tangs
[15]
"held it as a maxim that if there was a man who did not work, or a woman that was
idle, somebody must suffer cold or hunger in the empire." And on this
principle he ordered a vast number of the monasteries of Bonzes to be
destroyed.
The third emperor of the one-and-twentieth dynasty,
[16]
to whom some precious stones were brought that had been found in a mine, ordered it
to be shut up, not choosing to fatigue his people with working for a
thing that could neither feed nor clothe them.
"So great is our luxury," says Kiayventi,
[17]
"that people adorn with embroidery the shoes of boys and girls, whom they are obliged to
sell." Is employing so many people in making clothes for one person the
way to prevent a great many from wanting clothes? There are ten men who
eat the fruits of the earth to one employed in agriculture; and is this
the means of preserving numbers from wanting nourishment?
Footnotes
[14]
Luxury has been here always prohibited.
[15]
In an ordinance quoted by Father Du Halde, ii, p. 497.
[16]
"History of China, 21st Dynasty," in Father Du Halde's work, i.
[17]
In a discourse cited by Father Du Halde, iii, p. 418.
7.7. 7. Fatal Consequence of Luxury in China.
In the history of China we find it has had twenty-two successive
dynasties, that is, it has experienced twenty-two general, without
mentioning a prodigious number of particular, revolutions. The first
three dynasties lasted a long time, because they were wisely
administered, and the empire had not so great an extent as it afterwards
obtained. But we may observe in general that all those dynasties began
very well. Virtue, attention, and vigilance are necessary in China;
these prevailed in the commencement of the dynasties, and failed in the
end. It was natural that emperors trained up in military toil, who had
compassed the dethroning of a family immersed in pleasure, should adhere
to virtue, which they had found so advantageous, and be afraid of
voluptuousness, which they knew had proved so fatal to the family
dethroned. But after the three or four first princes, corruption,
luxury, indolence, and pleasure possessed their successors; they shut
themselves up in a palace; their understanding was impaired; their life
was shortened; the family declined; the grandees rose up; the eunuchs
gained credit; none but children were set on the throne; the palace was
at variance with the empire; a lazy set of people that dwelt there
ruined the industrious part of the nation; the emperor was killed or
destroyed by a usurper, who founded a family, the third or fourth
successor of which went and shut himself up in the very same palace.
7.8. 8. Of public Continency.
So many are the imperfections that attend the loss of virtue in
women, and so greatly are their minds depraved when this principal guard
is removed, that in a popular state public incontinency may be
considered as the last of miseries, and as a certain forerunner of a
change in the constitution.
Hence it is that the sage legislators of republican states have ever
required of women a particular gravity of manners. They have proscribed
not only vice, but the very appearance of it. They have banished even
all commerce of gallantry — a commerce that produces idleness, that
renders the women corrupters, even before they are corrupted, that gives
a value to trifles, and debases things of importance: a commerce, in
fine, that makes people act entirely by the maxims of ridicule, in which
the women are so perfectly skilled.
7.9. 9. Of the Condition or State of Women in different Governments.
In monarchies women are subject to very little restraint, because as
the distinction of ranks calls them to court, there they assume a spirit
of liberty, which is almost the only one tolerated in that place. Each
courtier avails himself of their charms and passions, in order to
advance his fortune: and as their weakness admits not of pride, but of
vanity, luxury constantly attends them.
In despotic governments women do not introduce, but are themselves
an object of, luxury. They must be in a state of the most rigorous
servitude. Every one follows the spirit of the government, and adopts in
his own family the customs he sees elsewhere established. As the laws
are very severe and executed on the spot, they are afraid lest the
liberty of women should expose them to danger. Their quarrels,
indiscretions, repugnancies, jealousies, piques, and that art, in fine,
which little souls have of interesting great ones, would be attended
there with fatal consequences.
Besides, as princes in those countries make a sport of human nature,
they allow themselves a multitude of women; and a thousand
considerations oblige them to keep those women in close confinement.
In republics women are free by the laws and restrained by manners;
luxury is banished thence, and with it corruption and vice.
In the cities of Greece, where they were not under the restraint of
a religion which declares that even amongst men regularity of manners is
a part of virtue; where a blind passion triumphed with a boundless
insolence, and love appeared only in a shape which we dare not mention,
while marriage was considered as nothing more than simple
friendship;
[18]
such was the virtue, simplicity, and chastity of women
in those cities, that in this respect hardly any people were ever known
to have had a better and wiser polity.
[19]
Footnotes
[18]
"In respect to true love," says Plutarch, "the women have
nothing to say to it." In his "Treatise of Love," p. 600. He spoke in the
style of his time. See Xenophon in the dialogue intitled Hiero.
[19]
At Athens there was a particular magistrate who inspected the
conduct of women.
7.10. 10. Of the domestic Tribunal among the Romans.
The Romans had no particular magistrates, like the Greeks, to
inspect the conduct of women. The censors had not an eye over them, as
over the rest of the republic.
The institution of the domestic tribunal
[20]
supplied the magistracy established among the Greeks.
[21]
The husband summoned the wife's relatives, and tried her in their
presence.
[22]
This tribunal preserved the manners of the republic; and
at the same time those very manners maintained this tribunal. For it
decided not only in respect to the violation of the laws, but also of
manners: now, in order to judge of the violation of the latter, manners
are requisite. The penalties inflicted by this tribunal ought to be, and
actually were, arbitrary: for all that relates to manners, and to the
rules of modesty, can hardly be comprised under one code of laws. It is
easy indeed to regulate by laws what we owe to others; but it is very
difficult of comprise all we owe to ourselves.
The domestic tribunal inspected the general conduct of women: but
there was one crime which, beside the animadversion of this tribunal,
was likewise subject to a public accusation. This was adultery; whether
that in a republic so great a depravation of manners interested the
government; or whether the wife's immorality might render the husband
suspected; or whether, in fine, they were afraid lest even honest people
might choose that this crime should rather be concealed than punished.
Footnotes
[20]
Romulus instituted this tribunal, as appears from Dionysius
Halicarnassus, ii, p. 96.
[21]
See in Livy, xxxix, the use that was made of this tribunal at
the time of the conspiracy of the Bacchanalians (they gave the name of
conspiracy against the republic to assemblies in which the morals of
women and young people were debauched.)
[22]
It appears from Dionysius Halicarnassus, ii, that Romulus's
institution was that in ordinary cases the husband should sit as judge
in the presence of the wife's relatives, but that in heinous crimes he
should determine in conjunction with five of them. Hence Ulpian, tit. 6,
9, 12, 13, distinguishes in respect to the different judgments of
manners between those which he calls important, and those which are less
so: mores, graviores, leviores.
7.11. 11. In what Manner the Institutions changed at Rome,
together with the Government.
As manners were supported by the domestic tribunal, they were also
supported by the public accusation; and hence it is that these two
things fell together with the public manners, and ended with the
republic.
[23]
The establishing of perpetual questions, that is, the division of
jurisdiction among the prætors, and the custom gradually introduced of
the prætors determining all causes themselves,
[24]
weakened the use of the domestic tribunal. This appears by the surprise of historians, who
look upon the decisions which Tiberius caused to be given by this
tribunal as singular facts, and as a renewal of the ancient course of
pleading.
The establishment of monarchy and the change of manners put likewise
an end to public accusations. It might be apprehended lest a dishonest
man, affronted at the slight shown him by a woman, vexed at her refusal,
and irritated even by her virtue, should form a design to destroy her.
The Julian law ordained that a woman should not be accused of adultery
till after her husband had been charged with favouring her
irregularities; which limited greatly, and annihilated, as it were, this
sort of accusation.
[25]
Sextus Quintus seemed to have been desirous of
reviving the public accusations.
[26]
But there needs very little reflection to see that this law would be more
improper in such a monarchy as his than in any other.
Footnotes
[23]
Judicio de moribus (quod antea quidem in antiquis legibus
positum erat, non autem frequentabatur) penitus abolito. Leg. 11. "Cod.
de repud."
[24]
Judicia extraordinaria.
[25]
It was entirely abolished by Constantine: "It is a shame," said
he, "that settled marriages should be disturbed by the presumption of
strangers."
[26]
Sextus Quintus ordained, that if a husband did not come and make
his complaint to him of his wife's infidelity, he should be put to
death. See Leti, Life of Sextus V.
7.12. 12. Of the Guardianship of Women among the Romans.
The Roman laws subjected women to a perpetual guardianship, except
they were under cover and subject to the authority of a husband.
[27]
This guardianship was given to the nearest of the male relatives; and by
a vulgar expression
[28]
it appears they were very much confined. This
was proper for a republic, but not at all necessary in a monarchy.
[29]
That the women among the ancient Germans were likewise under a
perpetual tutelage appears from the different codes of the Laws of the
Barbarians.
[30]
This custom was communicated to the monarchies founded
by those people; but was not of long duration.
Footnotes
[27]
Nisi convenissent in manum viri.
[28]
Ne sis mihi patruus oro.
[29]
The Papian law ordained, under Augustus, that women who had
borne three children should be exempt from this tutelage.
[30]
This tutelage was by the Germans called Mundeburdium.
7.13. 13. Of the Punishments decreed by the Emperors against the
Incontinence of Women.
The Julian law ordained a punishment against adultery. But so far
was this law, any more than those afterwards made on the same account,
from being a mark of regularity of manners, that on the contrary it was
a proof of their depravity.
The whole political system in respect to women received a change in
the monarchical state. The question was no longer to oblige them to a
regularity of manners, but to punish their crimes. That new laws were
made to punish their crimes was owing to their leaving those
transgressions unpunished which were not of so criminal a nature.
The frightful dissolution of manners obliged indeed the emperors to
enact laws in order to put some stop to lewdness; but it was not their
intention to establish a general reformation. Of this the positive facts
related by historians are a much stronger proof than all these laws can
be of the contrary. We may see in Dio the conduct of Augustus on this
occasion, and in what manner he eluded, both in his prætorian and
censorian office, the repeated instances that were made him
[31]
for that purpose.
It is true that we find in historians very rigid sentences, passed
in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, against the lewdness of some
Roman ladies: but by showing us the spirit of those reigns, at the same
time they demonstrate the spirit of those decisions.
The principal design of Augustus and Tiberius was to punish the
dissoluteness of their relatives. It was not their immorality they
punished, but a particular crime of impiety or high treason
[32]
of their own invention, which served to promote a respect for majesty, and
answered their private revenge. Hence it is that the Roman historians
inveigh so bitterly against this tyranny.
The penalty of the Julian law was small.
[33]
The emperors insisted that in passing sentence the judges should increase the penalty of the
law. This was the subject of the invectives of historians. They did not
examine whether the women were deserving of punishment, but whether they
had violated the law, in order to punish them.
One of the most tyrannical proceedings of Tiberius
[34]
was the abuse he made of the ancient laws. When he wanted to extend the punishment of
a Roman lady beyond that inflicted by the Julian law, he revived the
domestic tribunal.
[35]
These regulations in respect to women concerned only senatorial
families, not the common people. Pretences were wanted to accuse the
great, which were constantly furnished by the dissolute behaviour of the
ladies.
In fine, what I have above observed, namely, that regularity of
manners is not the principle of monarchy, was never better verified than
under those first emperors; and whoever doubts it need only read
Tacitus, Suetonius, Juvenal, or Martial.
Footnotes
[31]
Upon their bringing before him a young man who had married a
woman with whom he had before carried on an illicit commerce, he
hesitated a long while, not daring to approve or to punish these things.
At length recollecting himself, "Seditions," says he, "have been the
cause of very great evils; let us forget them." Dio, liv. 16. The senate
having desired him to give them some regulations in respect to women's
morals, he evaded their petition by telling them that they should
chastise their wives in the same manner as he did his; upon which they
desired him to tell them how he behaved to his wife. (I think a very
indiscreet question.)
[32]
Tacitus, "Annals," iii. 24.
[33]
This law is given in the Digest, but without mentioning the
penalty. It is supposed it was only relegatio, because that of incest
was only deportatio. Leg., si quis viduam, ff. de qæust.
[34]
Tacitus, "Annals," iv. 19.
7.14. 14. Sumptuary Laws among the Romans.
We have spoken of public incontinence because it is the inseparable
companion of luxury. If we leave the motions of the heart at liberty,
how shall we be able to restrain the weaknesses of the mind?
At Rome, besides the general institutions, the censors prevailed on
the magistrates to enact several particular laws for maintaining the
frugality of women. This was the design of the Fannian, Licinian, and
Oppian laws. We may see in Livy
[36]
the great ferment the senate was in
when the women insisted upon the revocation of the Oppian law. The
abrogation of this law is fixed upon by Valerius Maximus as the period
whence we may date the luxury of the Romans.
Footnotes
7.15. 15. Of Dowries and Nuptial Advantages in different Constitutions.
Dowries ought to be considerable in monarchies, in order to enable
husbands to support their rank and the established luxury. In republics,
where luxury should never reign,
[37]
they ought to be moderate; but there should be hardly any at all in despotic
governments, where women are in some measure slaves.
The community of goods introduced by the French laws between man and
wife is extremely well adapted to a monarchical government; because the
women are thereby interested in domestic affairs, and compelled, as it
were, to take care of their family. It is less so in a republic, where
women are possessed of more virtue. But it would be quite absurd in
despotic governments, where the women themselves generally constitute a
part of the master's property.
As women are in a state that furnishes sufficient inducements to
marriage, the advantages which the law gives them over the husband's
property are of no service to society. But in a republic they would be
extremely prejudicial, because riches are productive of luxury. In
despotic governments the profits accruing from marriage ought to be mere
subsistence, and no more.
Footnotes
[37]
Marseilles was the wisest of all the republics in its time; here
it was ordained that dowries should not exceed one hundred crowns in
money, and five in clothes, as Strabo observes, iv.
7.16. 16. An excellent Custom of the Samnites.
The Samnites had a custom which in so small a republic, and
especially in their situation, must have been productive of admirable
effects. The young people were all convened in one place, and their
conduct was examined. He that was declared the best of the whole
assembly had leave given him to take which girl he pleased for his wife;
the second best chose after him; and so on.
[38]
Admirable institution! The only recommendation that young men could have on this occasion was
their virtue and the services done their country. He who had the
greatest share of these endowments chose which girl he liked out of the
whole nation. Love, beauty, chastity, virtue, birth, and even wealth
itself, were all, in some measure, the dowry of virtue. A nobler and
grander recompense, less chargeable to a petty state, and more capable
of influencing both sexes, could scarcely be imagined.
The Samnites were descended from the Lacedmonians; and Plato, whose
institutes are only an improvement of those of Lycurgus, enacted nearly
the same law.
[39]
Footnotes
[38]
"Fragment of Nicolaus Damascenus," taken from Stobæus in the
collection of Constantine Porphyrogenitus.
[39]
He even permits them to have a more frequent interview with one
another.
7.17. 17. Of Female Administration.
It is contrary to reason and nature that women should reign in
families, as was customary among the Egyptians; but not that they should
govern an empire. In the former case the state of their natural
weakness does not permit them to have the pre-eminence; in the latter
their very weakness generally gives them more lenity and moderation,
qualifications fitter for a good administration than roughness and
severity.
In the Indies they are very easy under a female government; and it
is settled that if the male issue be not of a mother of the same blood,
the females born of a mother of the blood-royal must succeed.
[40]
And then they have a certain number of persons who assist them to bear the
weight of the government. According to Mr. Smith,
[41]
they are very easy in Africa under female administration. If to this we add the example of
England and Russia, we shall find that they succeed alike both in
moderate and despotic governments.
Footnotes
[40]
"Edifying Letters," coll. xiv.
[41]
"Voyage to Guinea," part the second, p. 165, of the kingdom of
Angola, on the Golden Coast.
