2. To the Greeks, the benefits to be obtained by
means of the State were of paramount importance and
such as fully to justify its power. Greek political expe-
rience, at least in the classic age, was summed up, as
we said, in the polis, the city-state: a small territorial
unit leading a precarious existence among a number
of rival cities and increasingly threatened by the ap-
pearance of new and larger types of States. Yet, in the
Greek view of life, this small and exclusive concern
was the very embodiment of perfection. Aristotle sums
up that view when he says that in it, and in it alone,
can man realize the “good life” and achieve the fulfill-
ment of his nature. More pessimistic views about poli
tics were certainly not lacking among Greek writers.
The importance of force was not overlooked: might
indeed seems at times to be conceived as equivalent
to right, especially in what we now call “international
relations.” Thus doubt could arise about the origin of
political power: however great the benefits which the
existence of the State entailed, how could this existence
be explained? Was it grounded on reason or force, on
nature or convention? The question, which the Sophists
asked, simply could not be raised so long as the State
was conceived (as it was by Plato and Aristotle) as the
necessary complement of man. As the bearer of the
highest values, the State stood in no need of any further
legitimation.
Turning from the Greeks to the Romans, we find
the restricted vision of the city-state gradually
broadening out into that of a universal empire. We
also find a new and quite different emphasis on law
as the constituent element of the State. Last, we find
that the State itself is no longer a bearer of ultimate
values. It is, rather, nothing but a means for obtaining
certain ends. Cicero's treatment of the problem in his
De re publica is particularly significant in this respect.
The accent is here shifted from the goal to the structure
of the State: it is partnership in law (consensus iuris)
and not common interest alone (utilitatis communio)
that makes a people into a State (res publica). There
exists, in any political community, a supreme power
(summa potestas) from which law emanates. In turn,
this “positive” law is subordinate to, and conditioned
by, the respect for a higher or “natural” law which
expresses the supreme values of justice and does not
vary from city to city, but remains “eternal and un-
changeable... valid for all nations and for all times.”
The idea of law was thus definitely inserted in the
idea of the State—from which it was not to be dissoci-
ated again for many centuries. Indeed, the Roman
lawyers of the Imperial Age developed still further the
legal theory of the State by singling out, among the
innumerable rules that determine human conduct,
those particular rules which define the use and the
distribution of power in the community. They gave
these rules a name, public law (ius publicum). These
rules expressed, in their view, the very essence of the
State—the status rei publicae. Yet on the other hand,
while contributing so decisively to the analysis of
power, the Roman lawyers bear witness to the radical
change that had occurred in the general view of life
and of the role which political institutions play in it.
The contrast between nature and convention has now
become the basic assumption of political theory. And
the State, like law itself and all other institutions that
contradict or limit the “natural” equality and liberty
of men, had to be justified either by explaining its origin
or by making it an instrument for the attainment of
particular values. Both philosophy and religion were
at hand to provide the necessary ingredients. The State
would appear for many long centuries during the Mid-
dle Ages as a consequence of and a remedy for sin.
