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Dictionary of the History of Ideas

Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas
  
  

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The History of Form E (A Priori Form). The fifth
concept of form was created by Kant. He described
form as a property of mind which compels us to expe-
rience things in a particular “form.” This Kantian form
(here called form E) is the a priori sense of form; we
find it in objects only because it is imposed upon them
by the subject. Thanks to its subjective origin, form
E is endowed with the unusual attributes of universality
and necessity.

(1) Did Kant have any precursors? Was his concept
of form known to anyone before? The Marburg School
attributed this concept to Plato, claiming that his a
priori
approach was similar to Kant's, and that Plato
understood “ideas” as forms of the mind. Plato's
Theaetetus appears to confirm this interpretation;
however, a more ontological conception dominated his
works.

Nicholas of Cusa (Cusanus), an early Renaissance
thinker and follower of Plato, reflected over the nature
of form in art: “Forms originate only through human
art.... An artist does not imitate shapes of natural
objects; he only renders matter capable of accepting
the form of art”; and further: “Every visible form will
constitute the likeness and image of the true and in-
visible form existing in the mind” (Cusanus, p. 219).
This formulation in the pre-Kantian theory of art is
probably closest to the Kantian meaning of form.

(2) Kant himself prepares a surprise for us. In his
Critique of Pure Reason he discovered the a priori
forms of knowledge in the mind: forms of space and
time and categories like substance and causality. When
later he embarked upon the critique of aesthetic valu-
ation in his Critique of Judgment (1790), one might
have expected that he would have also discovered in
the mind permanent, universal, and necessary forms.
But surprisingly enough, he did not detect in aesthetics
any a priori forms analogous to those he found in the
theory of knowledge. He did not think that beauty was
determined by permanent forms of mind but by unique
gifts of artistic talent. Essential forms (form E) of
beauty do not exist, for Kant; beauty has been, and
always will be, created anew by geniuses. In short, in
aesthetics a priori forms (D) play no role.

(3) The successors of Kant who developed his theo-
ries in the nineteenth century also failed to detect any
a priori forms in aesthetics. However, such forms were
discovered in the last quarter of the century, in 1887,
by Konrad Fiedler, a thinker who was not a Kantian;
in philosophy he followed J. F. Herbart. Vision had
for him its universal form, just as knowledge had its
a priori form for Kant. Fiedler admitted that men may
lose the right form of vision; however, artists preserve
it in their work. Artistic vision and visual arts are not
results of free play of the imagination, as Kant thought:
they are governed by the laws and forms of vision.

Fiedler's understanding of the forms of vision was
still vague. A clearer definition was given by his disci-
ples and successors: the sculptor A. von Hildebrand,
two art historians, A. Riegl and H. Wölfflin, and the
philosopher A. Riehl. Hildebrand's Problem der Form
(1893) was an important turning point. He made a
distinction between two forms of visual images: the
nearby (Nahbild) and the distant (Fernbild). A clear
image can be seen only from a distance; only then does
a distinct and consolidated form appear which the
work of art requires and which can provide aesthetic
satisfaction.

The rapidity of changes in artistic trends, especially
during the nineteenth century, could not but produce
skeptical feelings about any single form of artistic
vision; there must be more than one such form; in the
history of art a variety of forms succeed one another
in coming to the fore. As a result a pluralistic concep-
tion of the a priori form E of art came into existence,
and became characteristic of art theories in the first
half of the twentieth century, particularly in Central
Europe. Consequently, form E has many alternative
forms; they are not timeless, permanent as in Fiedler,
but correspond to, and change with, the times. This
conception is best known in Wölfflin's formulation. He
illustrated the alternative variety of forms in the tran-
sition from the Renaissance to the baroque, from the
linear to the plastic form, from the closed to the open
form. The Austrian school, under A. Riegl's leadership,
demonstrated the fluctuations of art between the
optical and haptic (tactile or kinesthetic) forms. J.
Schlosser, close to this school, contrasted crystalline
form with organic form; W. Worringer, abstract with
empathetic form (Abstraction und Einfühling); W.
Deonna, primitive with classical form. Though they
differed they accepted form E in its pluralism.