3. III.
In ten minutes the Federal troops had formed line of battle
in front of the Headquarters, and a thin line of Confederate
infantry manned the badly-constructed works on the Cox road.
If the Federal line of battle—now visible in huge mass—had
advanced at once, they would have found opposed to them only
two small brigades, which would not have been a good mouthful.
The amusing thing was to hear the “ragged rebels”—
and they were very ragged—laughing as they looked at the
heavy line apparently about to charge them, and crying: “Let
'em come on! we'll give 'em—!” Gordon was mean while
thundering on the left of Petersburg, and holding his lines with
difficulty, and at night one point at least was gained. The
surrender would not take place there. Where it would be was
not yet decided.
Before morning the army had been moved to the northern
bank of the Appomattox; the glare and roar of the blown-up
magazines succeeded; and accompanied by the unwieldy trains,
loaded with the miserable rubbish of winter quarters, the
troops commenced their march up the Appomattox, toward the
upper bridges.
General Lee was on his gray horse, leading his army in person;
there were no longer any lines to defend, any earthworks
to hold; the army was afloat, and instead of being depressed,
they seemed in excellent spirits. But the drama had only commenced.
The great game of chess between Grant and Lee commenced
on the morning of the 3d of April; the one aiming if possible
to extricate his army, the other to cut off and capture, or destroy
it.
The relative numbers of the opposing forces can only be
stated in round numbers. I understood afterwards that General
Meade stated the Federal force to amount to about one hundred
and forty thousand men. That of General Lee did not exceed,
if it reached, forty thousand. So great had been the drain
upon this historic army from the casualties of the past year,
from absence with and without leave, and other causes, that
—deprived of all reinforcements—it was now weaker than it
had probably ever been before. General Meade, it is said, expressed
extreme astonishment to General Lee when informed
of his small numbers, declaring that if General Grant had suspected
this weakness, he would have long before broken through
the Confederate lines. The statement was natural, and General
Meade doubtless believed in the ability of the Federal army
to have done so; but it is certain that General Grant made persistent
and desperate attempts to accomplish this very object,
in which his adversary, by rapid movements of his small force
from point to point, and obstinate fighting, had invariably
foiled him.
To return to the retreat. The Southern army had been so
long cooped up in its hovels and casemates—moving only by
stealth along “covered-ways”—that any movement anywhere
was a relief. In addition to this, the troops had not yet had
time to reflect. The sensation of being driven from their earthworks—now
like home to them—was stunning: and the men
did not at once realize the tremendous change which had all at
once taken place in the aspect of affairs. No man seemed yet
to have persuaded himself of the fact that “General Lee's
Army,” which only yesterday had held the long lines, in defiance
of all comers, was to-day in full retreat, and bent first of
all upon
escaping from the enemy they had so often defeated.
Gradually, however, the unhappy condition of affairs began
to dawn upon the troops; and all at once they looked the terrible
fact in the face. General Lee was retreating from Virginia—most
depressing of events!—and it was even a matter
of very extreme doubt whether he could accomplish even that
much. No troops were ever better informed upon military
affairs than those of the South; and the private soldier discussed
the chances with a topographical knowledge which could
not have been surpassed by a general officer with a map before
him. I heard one brave tatterdemalion, evidently from the
backwoods, say, “Grant is trying to cut off old Uncle Robert
at Burkesville Junction;” and another replied, “Grant can
get there first.” There, in a few words, was the essence of the
“situation.”
General Grant held the Southside Railroad, and was pouring
forward troops under Sheridan toward the Danville Railroad,
to which he had a straight cut without a particle of obstruction,
except a small force of cavalry—less than two thousand effective
men—under General Fitz Lee. General Lee, on the contrary,
was moving by a circuitous route on the north bank of the Appomattox,
encumbered by a huge wagon-train, and having in
front of him a swollen river, which proved a terrible delay to
him at the moment when every instant counted. So great were
the obstacles, that General Grant could have intercepted the
Southern column, had he made extraordinary exertions, even at
Amelia Court-House. General Lee did not succeed in reaching
that point until Wednesday, the 5th—the bridges over the
Appomattox being swept away or rendered useless by the
freshet which had covered the low grounds and prevented
access to them. The troops finally crossed on pontoons at
two or three places; and, although suffering seriously from
want of rations, pushed forward in good spirits to Amelia Court-House.
Up to this time there had been very few stragglers, the Virginia
troops turning their backs upon their homes without
complaint, and satisfied to follow “Old Uncle Robert”
wherever he led them. The statement that desertions of Virginians
had taken place is untrue. They marched with their
brethren from the Gulf States cheerfully; and it was only
afterward, when broken down by starvation, that they dropped
out of the ranks. That some, seeing the sure fate before them
—surrender, and, as they supposed, long incarceration in a
Northern prison—left their ranks during the last hours of the
retreat, is also true; but, a few hours after they thus left their
colours, it was the general officers who looked out for avenues
of exit through the Federal
cordon closing around, to avoid
the inevitable surrender; and who said to their men, “Save
yourselves in any way you can.”
The scene at Amelia Court-House on Wednesday was a
curious one. The huge army trains were encamped in the
suburbs of the pretty little village, and the travel-worn troops
bivouacked in the fields. They were still in good spirits, and
plainly had an abiding confidence in their great commander.
The brigades, though thinned by their heavy losses at Petersburg,
still presented a defiant front; and the long lines of veterans
with bristling bayonets, led by Longstreet, Gordon, and
Mahone, advanced as proudly as they had done in the hard
conflicts of the past. The troops were still in excellent morale,
and had never been readier for desperate fighting than at that
moment. Men and officers were tired and hungry, but laughing;
and nowhere could be seen a particle of gloom, or shrinking,
or ill-humour—sure symptoms in the human animal of a
want of “heart of hope.” I will add that I saw little of it to
the end.
The unavoidable delay in crossing the Appomattox had given
General Grant time to mass a heavy force—as General Meade's
report shows—at Burkesville Junction; and if it was General
Lee's intention to advance on the east side of the Danville road,
he gave it up. I believe, however, that such was never his
design. His trains were directed to move through Cumberland,
Prince Edward, and Campbell, toward Pittsylvania; and
the army would naturally keep near enough to protect them,
moving southward between the Junction and Framville. While
the troops were resting at Amelia Court-House, and waiting
for the rear to come up, the Federal commander must have
pushed forward with great rapidity. His cavalry was already
scouring the country far in advance of the Confederate column,
and the numbers and excellence of this branch of their service
gave them a fatal advantage. The reserve train, containing
nearly all the ammunition of the Southern army, was attacked
and burned near Paynesville, and the fate awaiting other portions
of the army train was foreseen. Its unwieldy size and
slow movement made it an easy prey; and it was incessantly
attacked, and large sections carried off or destroyed. So numerous
were these captures, that nearly the whole subsistence
of the army was lost; and from this time commenced the really
distressing scenes of the march. The men were without rations,
and had marched almost day and night since leaving Petersburg;
their strength was slowly drained from them; and despondency,
like a black and poisonous mist, began to invade
the hearts before so tough and buoyant.
The tendency of military life is to make man an animal, and
to subject his mind in a great measure to his body. Feed a
soldier well, and let him sleep sufficiently, and he will fight
gaily. Starve him, and break him down with want of sleep
and fatigue, and he will despond. He will fight still, but not
gaily; and unless thorough discipline is preserved, he will
“straggle” off to houses by the road for food and sleep. Desertion
is not in his mind, but the result is the same. The man
who lags or sleeps while his column is retreating, close pressed
by the enemy, never rejoins it. Such is the explanation of the
phenomena exhibited on this retreat; and now why were the
troops thus left without rations, and compelled to scatter over
the country in search of enough food to preserve them from
starvation?
The reply to that question is, that rations for his army were
ordered to be sent to Amelia Court-House by General Lee;
that trains containing the supplies were dispatched from Danville;
and that these trains were ordered, by telegraph from
Richmond, to come on to Richmond, and did so, when the
bread and meat was thrown in the gutter, to make way for the
rubbish of the Departments. The rubbish was preserved for
subsequent capture, and the Army of Northern Virginia staggered
on, and starved, and surrendered.
If any one demands the proof of this assertion, I will give it.
