University of Virginia Library

1. I.

General Lee's retreat from Petersburg will rank among the
most remarkable events of history. As every circumstance
connected with it will prove interesting hereafter, when the
full history of this period comes to be written, I propose to
record some particulars which came under my observation;
and especially to describe the bearing of the illustrious Commander-in-Chief
of the Confederate forces while passing through
this tremendous ordeal.

An adequate record of this brief and fiery drama—played
from the first to the last scene in a few April days—would
involve the question of General Lee's soldiership. This question
I have neither time nor space to discuss; but I am much
mistaken if a simple statement will not set at rest for ever
those imputations which have been cast, since the surrender,
upon Lee's military judgment, by ignorant or stupid persons
throughout the country. The facts ought to be placed on
record. If General Lee continued, of his own choice, to occupy
a position at Petersburg from which, as events soon showed,
he could not extricate his army, it will go far to rob him of
that renown which he had previously won; and if General
Grant out-manœuvred and caught his great adversary by simple
superiority of soldiership, he is the greater general of the two.
The truth of the whole matter is that Lee was not surprised;
that he foresaw clearly what was coming; and acted from

first to last under orders against which his military judgment
revolted.

Orders were given by General Lee for the evacuation of
Petersburg, and, consequently, of the State of Virginia, at
least six weeks before General Grant broke through the Confederate
lines. The military necessity for this movement was
perfectly plain to all well-informed and intelligent persons, in
the army and out of it. It was only the ignorant or the hopelessly
stupid who cherished the hallucination that Lee could
continue to hold his works around Petersburg against Grant's
enormous force. Nevertheless there were a plenty who did
think so, and who looked upon things there as a sort of
“permanent arrangement.” Lee, in the estimation of these
persons, was the spoiled child of good fortune, greater than
fate, and the Army of Northern Virginia could not be whipped.
The Southern lines were to be held en permanence, and Grant
was to “keep pegging away” until the crack of doom. Such
was the fond delusion of all the “outside” class; those who
were accurately informed, and took the “inside” view, knew
better; and especially did General Lee know that unless he
was speedily reinforced, he could not continue to hold his
lines against the large and steady reinforcements sent to
General Grant. “More men; give me more men!” was the
burden of his despatches to the government. He had nearly
fifty miles of earthworks to defend against three or four times
his own numbers; and a child might have understood that if
Grant continued to receive heavy reinforcements, and Lee
none, while his army continued to diminish from casualties,
the time would soon come when retreat or surrender would be
the only alternatives. The reinforcements did not come,
however. The Army of Northern Virginia went on dwindling,
and Grant continued to increase his strength, until at the end
of winter the result of the coming campaign no longer admitted
of a doubt. The crisis had evidently come, and it was
perfectly plain that Lee must evacuate Virginia. All his
prominent Generals shared his views. One of them said: “If
Grant once breaks through our lines, we might as well go

back to Father Abraham, and say, `Father, we have sinned.' ”
If anything was plain it was this: that if the immense line of
Lee's works was broken anywhere, he was lost.

It is certainly nothing very remarkable that under these circumstances
General Lee should make an attempt to save his
army—the only hope of the Confederacy. There was only one
way to do it, and the opportunity of embracing that sole means
was rapidly slipping away. General Lee must move, if he
moved at all, on the line of the Southside Railroad toward
Danville, and he must move at once; for General Grant, who
knew perfectly well the necessities of his adversary, was pouring
heavy columns toward Hatcher's Run, to intercept him if he
made the attempt. The Federal army was kept ready day
and night, with rations cooked and in haversacks, for instant
pursuit; and each of the great opponents understood completely
his adversary's design. General Grant knew that General Lee
ought to retreat, and he had learned the important maxim that
it is always best to give your enemy credit for intending to do
what he ought to do. If Lee moved promptly toward Danville,
every effort would be made to come up with and destroy him;
if he did not retreat, time would be allowed the Federal army
to gradually fight its way to the Southside road. Once lodged
upon that great artery of the Southern army, Grant had checkmated
his opponent.

Upon this obvious view of the situation, General Lee, in
February, issued orders for the removal of all the stores of the
army to Amelia Court-House, on the road to Danville. A
movement of this sort is, of course, impossible of concealment,
and the whole army soon knew that something was “in the
wind.” Government cotton and tobacco was hauled away from
Petersburg; hundreds of the inhabitants left the place; all the
surplus artillery was sent to Amelia Court-House, and even the
reserve ordnance train of the army was ordered to the same
point. Then suddenly, in the midst of all, the movement
stopped. The authorities at Richmond had said, “Hold your
position.” Lee countermanded his orders and awaited his fate.

I say awaited his fate, because I am perfectly well convinced

that from that moment he regarded the event as a mere question
of time. No reinforcements reached him, while Grant grew
stronger every day by reinforcements from Washington and
Sherman's army—two corps from the latter—and soon he had
at his command Sheridan's excellent force of 12,000 or 15,000
cavalry. He was pushing heavy columns, one after another,
toward the Southside road, and at any moment a general attack
might be expected all along the lines, while the élite of the
Federal force was thrown against Lee's right. Such an assault,
in his enfeebled condition, was more than General Lee could
sustain, unless he stripped his works elsewhere of all their
defenders; but a brave effort was made to prepare for the coming
storm, and Lee evidently determined to stand at bay and
fight to the last. The expected attack soon came. Grant
rapidly concentrated his army (amounting, General Meade
stated at Appomattox Court-House, to about 140,000 men) on
Lee's right, near Burgess' Mill; his most efficient corps of infantry
and cavalry were thrown forward, and a desperate attack
was made upon the Confederate works on the White-oak road.
A bloody repulse awaited the first assault, but the second was
successful. At the same time the lines near Petersburg were
broken by a great force, and the affair was decided. The Confederate
army was cut in two; the enemy held the Southside
Railroad, intercepting the line of retreat; and what Lee's clear
military judgment had foreseen had come to pass. Between
his 40,000 men and Danville were the 140,000 men of Grant.