6. Non-Being. The concept of Non-Being (τὸ μή ὄν)
occurs freely in Parmenides, and is probably due to
him. By an unimpeachable report in Aristotle's
Meta-
physica (985 b4)—which is reinforced by a historical
analysis in
De generatione et corruptione (325 a2;
Guthrie, 2, 392-94)—the Atomists Leucippus and
Democritus (fifth century B.C.), from their approach,
made Non-Being into an appellation for space, to al-
ternate with, or be a replacement for
kenon. They
viewed the relation between material atoms and their
spatial setting as a contrast between the full and the
void (
τὸ πλη̃ρες καὶ τὸ κενόν), and expressed it as a
duality between Being (
τὸ ὄν) and Non-Being.
This duality, in a different outlook, had been created
by Parmenides. His Being, in fusion with Oneness and
Thought, constituted a universe of ontology. This uni-
verse, however ontological, was somehow also en-
dowed with physical attributes of a uniform finite
sphere (σψαι̃ρα), and as such it was continuous, indi-
visible, unchangeable, and ungenerated and imper-
ishable; whereas the Non-Being of Parmenides was only
an obverse of Being, vacuous of determination, a sham
polarity as it were. Now, the atomists heavily
emphasized the physical aspects of this Being. In their
atomistic conception, the evenly distributed Being was
shrunk from continuity to discreteness and had become
concentrated in discretely distributed atoms; and, by
the same token, Non-Being was metaphysically ele-
vated to the all-important role of a spatial setting for
the atoms, without which the activities of the atoms
cannot be imagined.
The splendidly unchangeable ontological universe of
Parmenides the philosopher had of course nothing
whatsoever to do with the very changeable common
universe of Parmenides the citizen, which constantly
exhibited changes of day-and-night, light-and-dark,
hot-and-cold, dry-and-moist, etc. Parmenides the
philosopher knew this. But what he did not know was
that philosophically he need not, and must not concern
himself with the vulgar universe of Parmenides the
citizen, but that he ought to leave it in care of more
practical (scientific) experts who knew something about
such “vulgarities.” Instead, Parmenides the philosopher
considered himself “duty bound” to construct a
“model” of the other universe too, calling it, quite
unrealistically, the universe of mere “appearance”
(doxa, δόξα); which of course was the opposite of what
it really was. As could be foretold, the construction
turned out to be quite banal (Kirk and Raven, pp.
284-85), and late tradition has, mercifully, transmitted
but few original fragments of its description.
Even Leucippus and Democritus, great scientists
though they were, could not quite resist the tempta-
tions of having opinions on matters which others un-
derstood better. After having described, magnificently,
the workings of the “laboratory space” of their “atomic
physics,” and also the creation of the corresponding
“galactic space” of cosmogony (Diogenes Laërtius,
Book IX, Chs. 30-33; Loeb edition, 2, 438ff.), they felt
“duty bound” to discourse also on the astronomy of
the planetary system. About this they had nothing to
say that was in the least interesting (Kirk and Raven,
p. 412); and modern commentators since around 1900
have not ceased to point this out, gratuitously.
