28.33
The
men were then dismissed with orders to make their preparations for the next
day's departure. Ten days after leaving New Carthage he reached the Ebro,
and within four days of his passage of the river he came within view of the
enemy. In front of his camp there was a level stretch of ground shut in on
either side by mountains. Scipio ordered some cattle taken mostly from the
enemy's fields to be driven towards the hostile camp in order to rouse the
savagery of the barbarians. Laelius was instructed to remain with his cavalry
in concealment behind a projecting mountain spur, and when the light
infantry who went to guard the cattle had drawn the enemy into a skirmish
he was to charge from his hiding-place. The battle soon began, the Spaniards
on catching sight of the cattle rushed out to secure them, and the skirmishers
attacked them while occupied with their plunder. At first the two sides
harassed one another with missiles, then they discharged light darts, which
are more likely to provoke than to decide a battle, and at last they drew their
swords. It would have been a steady hand-to-hand fight if the cavalry had
not come up. They not only made a frontal attack, riding down all in their
way, but some galloped round the foot of the mountain so as to cut off the
retreat of the enemy. There was more slaughter than usually occurs in
skirmishes of this kind, and the barbarians were infuriated rather than
disheartened at their want of success.
In order, therefore, to show that they were not defeated, they
marched out to battle the next morning at daybreak. There was not room for
them all in the narrow valley, described above; two divisions of their infantry
and the whole of their cavalry occupied the plain and the rest of their infantry
were posted on the slope of a hill. Scipio saw that the confined space would
give him an advantage. Fighting on a narrow front was more adapted to
Roman than to Spanish tactics, and as the enemy had brought his line into a
position where he could not employ all his strength, Scipio adopted a novel
stratagem. As there was no room for him to outflank the enemy with his own
cavalry, and as the enemy's cavalry which was massed with the infantry
would be useless where it was, he gave Laelius orders to make a detour
along the hills, escaping observation as far as possible, and keep the cavalry
action distinct from the infantry battle. Scipio led the whole of his infantry
against the enemy with a front of four cohorts, as it was impossible to extend
further. He did not lose a moment in beginning the fight, for he hoped that in
the heat of battle his cavalry might execute their maneuver unnoticed. Nor
were the enemy aware of their movements till they heard the sounds of battle
in their rear. So two separate contests were going on through the whole
length of the valley, one between the infantry and the other between the
cavalry, and the narrow width of the valley prevented the two armies from
assisting each other or acting in concert. The Spanish infantry, who had gone
into action trusting to the support of their cavalry, were cut to pieces and the
cavalry, unable to stand the attack of the Roman infantry after their own had
all fallen, and taken in rear by Laelius and his cavalry, closed up and for a
time stood their ground and kept up their resistance, but at last all were
killed to a man. Not a single combatant out of the cavalry and infantry which
fought in the valley remained alive. The third division which had been
standing on the mountain side, looking on in safety instead of participating in
the fight, had room and time enough to make good their retreat. Amongst
them were the two chieftains, who escaped in the confusion before the entire
army was surrounded.