Footnotes
[6]
"Discourse on the First Decade of Livy," Book i., 7.
[7]
This is well explained in Cicero's oration "Pro Cæcina," towards the
end, 100.
[8]
This was the law at Athens, as appears by Demosthenes. Socrates
refused to make use of it.
[9]
Demosthenes, "De Corona," p. 494, Frankfort, 1604.
[10]
See Philostratus, "Lives of the Sophists," Book i., "Life of Æschines."
[11]
Plato does not think it right that kings, who, as he says, are
priests, should preside at trials where people are condemned to death,
to exile, or to imprisonment.
[12]
See the account of the trial of the Duke de la Valette. It is
printed in the "Memoirs of Montresor," tome ii, p. 62.
[13]
It was afterwards revoked. See the same account, ii. p. 236. It
was ordinarily a right of the peerage that a peer criminally accused
should be judged by the king, as Francis II in the trial of the Prince
of Cond, and Charles VII in the case of the Duc d'Alenon. To-day, the
presence of the king at the trial of a peer, in order to condemn him
would seem an act of tyranny. — Voltaire.
[17]
The same disorder happened under Theodosius the younger.
