2. The Valuation of Studies.
—The theory of educational values involves not only an account of
the nature of appreciation as fixing the measure of subsequent
valuations, but an account of the specific directions in which these
valuations occur. To value means primarily to prize, to esteem; but
secondarily it means to apprise, to estimate. It means, that is, the
act of cherishing something, holding it dear, and also the act of
passing judgment upon the nature and amount of its value as compared
with something else. To value in the latter sense is to valuate or
evaluate. The distinction coincides with that sometimes made between
intrinsic and instrumental values. Intrinsic values are not objects of
judgment, they cannot (as intrinsic) be compared, or regarded as greater
and less, better or worse. They are invaluable; and if a thing is
invaluable, it is neither more nor less so than any other invaluable.
But occasions present themselves when it is necessary to choose, when we
must let one thing go in order to take another. This establishes an
order of preference, a greater and less, better and worse. Things
judged or passed upon have to be estimated in relation to some third
thing, some further end. With respect to that, they are means, or
instrumental values.
We may imagine a man who at one time thoroughly enjoys converse with his
friends, at another the hearing of a symphony; at another the eating of
his meals; at another the reading of a book; at another the earning of
money, and so on. As an appreciative realization, each of these is an
intrinsic value. It occupies a particular place in life; it serves its
own end, which cannot be supplied by a substitute. There is no question
of comparative value, and hence none of valuation. Each is the specific
good which it is, and that is all that can be said. In its own place,
none is a means to anything beyond itself. But there may arise a
situation in which they compete or conflict, in which a choice has to be
made. Now comparison comes in. Since a choice has to be made, we want
to know the respective claims of each competitor. What is to be said
for it? What does it offer in comparison with, as balanced over against,
some other possibility? Raising these questions means that a particular
good is no longer an end in itself, an intrinsic good. For if it were,
its claims would be incomparable, imperative. The question is now as to
its status as a means of realizing something else, which is then the
invaluable of that situation. If a man has just eaten, or if he is well
fed generally and the opportunity to hear music is a rarity, he will
probably prefer the music to eating. In the given situation that will
render the greater contribution. If he is starving, or if he is
satiated with music for the time being, he will naturally judge food to
have the greater worth. In the abstract or at large, apart from the
needs of a particular situation in which choice has to be made, there is
no such thing as degrees or order of value.
Certain conclusions follow with respect to educational values. We
cannot establish a hierarchy of values among studies. It is futile to
attempt to arrange them in an order, beginning with one having least
worth and going on to that of maximum value. In so far as any study has
a unique or irreplaceable function in experience, in so far as it marks
a characteristic enrichment of life, its worth is intrinsic or
incomparable. Since education is not a means to living, but is
identical with the operation of living a life which is fruitful and
inherently significant, the only ultimate value which can be set up is
just the process of living itself. And this is not an end to which
studies and activities are subordinate means; it is the whole of which
they are ingredients. And what has been said about appreciation means
that every study in one of its aspects ought to have just such ultimate
significance. It is true of arithmetic as it is of poetry that in some
place and at some time it ought to be a good to be appreciated on its
own account—just as an enjoyable experience, in short. If it is
not, then when the time and place come for it to be used as a means or
instrumentality, it will be in just that much handicapped. Never having
been realized or appreciated for itself, one will miss something of its
capacity as a resource for other ends.
It equally follows that when we compare studies as to their values, that
is, treat them as means to something beyond themselves, that which
controls their proper valuation is found in the specific situation in
which they are to be used. The way to enable a student to apprehend the
instrumental value of arithmetic is not to lecture him upon the benefit
it will be to him in some remote and uncertain future, but to let him
discover that success in something he is interested in doing depends
upon ability to use number.
It also follows that the attempt to distribute distinct sorts of value
among different studies is a misguided one, in spite of the amount of
time recently devoted to the undertaking. Science for example may have
any kind of value, depending upon the situation into which it enters as
a means. To some the value of science may be military; it may be an
instrument in strengthening means of offense or defense; it may be
technological, a tool for engineering; or it may be commercial—an
aid in the successful conduct of business; under other conditions, its
worth may be philanthropic—the service it renders in relieving
human suffering; or again it may be quite conventional—of value in
establishing one's social status as an "educated" person. As matter of
fact, science serves all these purposes, and it would be an arbitrary
task to try to fix upon one of them as its "real" end. All that we can
be sure of educationally is that science should be taught so as to be an
end in itself in the lives of students—something worth while on
account of its own unique intrinsic contribution to the experience of
life. Primarily it must have "appreciation value." If we take something
which seems to be at the opposite pole, like poetry, the same sort of
statement applies. It may be that, at the present time, its chief value
is the contribution it makes to the enjoyment of leisure. But that may
represent a degenerate condition rather than anything necessary. Poetry
has historically been allied with religion and morals; it has served the
purpose of penetrating the mysterious depths of things. It has had an
enormous patriotic value. Homer to the Greeks was a Bible, a textbook
of morals, a history, and a national inspiration. In any case, it may
be said that an education which does not succeed in making poetry a
resource in the business of life as well as in its leisure, has
something the matter with it—or else the poetry is artificial
poetry.
The same considerations apply to the value of a study or a topic of a
study with reference to its motivating force. Those responsible for
planning and teaching the course of study should have grounds for
thinking that the studies and topics included furnish both direct
increments to the enriching of lives of the pupils and also materials
which they can put to use in other concerns of direct interest. Since
the curriculum is always getting loaded down with purely inherited
traditional matter and with subjects which represent mainly the energy
of some influential person or group of persons in behalf of something
dear to them, it requires constant inspection, criticism, and revision
to make sure it is accomplishing its purpose. Then there is always the
probability that it represents the values of adults rather than those of
children and youth, or those of pupils a generation ago rather than
those of the present day. Hence a further need for a critical outlook
and survey. But these considerations do not mean that for a subject to
have motivating value to a pupil (whether intrinsic or instrumental) is
the same thing as for him to be aware of the value, or to be able to
tell what the study is good for.
In the first place, as long as any topic makes an immediate appeal, it
is not necessary to ask what it is good for. This is a question which
can be asked only about instrumental values. Some goods are not good
for anything; they are just goods. Any other notion leads to an
absurdity. For we cannot stop asking the question about an instrumental
good, one whose value lies in its being good for something, unless
there is at some point something intrinsically good, good for itself. To
a hungry, healthy child, food is a good of the situation; we do not have
to bring him to consciousness of the ends subserved by food in order to
supply a motive to eat. The food in connection with his appetite is
a motive. The same thing holds of mentally eager pupils with respect to
many topics. Neither they nor the teacher could possibly foretell with
any exactness the purposes learning is to accomplish in the future; nor
as long as the eagerness continues is it advisable to try to specify
particular goods which are to come of it. The proof of a good is found
in the fact that the pupil responds; his response is use. His
response to the material shows that the subject functions in his life.
It is unsound to urge that, say, Latin has a value per se in the
abstract, just as a study, as a sufficient justification for teaching it.
But it is equally absurd to argue that unless teacher or pupil can point
out some definite assignable future use to which it is to be put, it
lacks justifying value. When pupils are genuinely concerned in learning
Latin, that is of itself proof that it possesses value. The most which
one is entitled to ask in such cases is whether in view of the shortness
of time, there are not other things of intrinsic value which in addition
have greater instrumental value.
This brings us to the matter of instrumental values—topics studied
because of some end beyond themselves. If a child is ill and his
appetite does not lead him to eat when food is presented, or if his
appetite is perverted so that he prefers candy to meat and vegetables,
conscious reference to results is indicated. He needs to be made
conscious of consequences as a justification of the positive or negative
value of certain objects. Or the state of things may be normal enough,
and yet an individual not be moved by some matter because he does not
grasp how his attainment of some intrinsic good depends upon active
concern with what is presented. In such cases, it is obviously the part
of wisdom to establish consciousness of connection. In general what is
desirable is that a topic be presented in such a way that it either have
an immediate value, and require no justification, or else be perceived
to be a means of achieving something of intrinsic value. An
instrumental value then has the intrinsic value of being a means to an
end.
It may be questioned whether some of the present pedagogical interest in
the matter of values of studies is not either excessive or else too
narrow. Sometimes it appears to be a labored effort to furnish an
apologetic for topics which no longer operate to any purpose, direct or
indirect, in the lives of pupils. At other times, the reaction against
useless lumber seems to have gone to the extent of supposing that no
subject or topic should be taught unless some quite definite future
utility can be pointed out by those making the course of study or by the
pupil himself, unmindful of the fact that life is its own excuse for
being; and that definite utilities which can be pointed out are
themselves justified only because they increase the experienced content
of life itself.
