University of Virginia Library

ENGAGEMENT AT TOWN CREEK.

Town Creek enters the Cape Fear river from the west about
six miles above Fort Anderson and on the same side of the river.
The upper and lower bridges had each been previously slightly
fortified by General Hagood, his only communication with Wilmington
being over them, and were held by bridge guards, the
upper by eighty infantry and the lower bridge by twenty. The
Whitworth sent back from Anderson had been directed to stop
at the lower bridge, and had there received a small supply of
ammunition. The creek was forty or fifty yards wide, and was
navigable for craft of four feet draft as far as the upper bridge;
at its mouth, however, was a hard sand bar only one foot under
water at low tide. The two bridges were the only regular crossings,
and at both the high ground was on the southern bank.
From three-quarters of a mile above the lower bridge to the river
were rice fields; above that point were rice fields at intervals, but
not on both sides at once. The swamp was generally half a mile
wide, but there were frequent bluffs where the highland
approached the stream first on one side and then on the other.
Between the lower bridge and the mouth there were bluffs on
the north side with open rice fields and the usual dams to the
highland opposite. The channel of the Cape Fear lay between
Big Island and the east bank; but there were boat landings at
Cowan's and above. It was between nine and ten miles between
the bridges by the road we were obliged to use—about six (6)

miles from the upper bridge to the cross roads at Marks' Branch,
about seven (7) miles to the lower bridge to same points, and four
(4) miles from these cross roads to the pontoon bridge over
Brunswick river. Mallory Creek was between Marks' Cross
Roads and the lower bridge, and two and a quarter miles from
the last. Cowan's landing by the road was about the same distance
from the lower bridge.

At 9:45 a. m., on the 19th, the main column crossed the lower
bridge and went into position—Taylor's regiment, of Hedrick's
brigade, in the entrenchments with three (3) pieces of artillery—
Gantt's Eleventh South Carolina (under Captain Westcoat),
picketing Cowan's—and the balance of Hagood's brigade, under
Simonton and Hedrick's own regiment, the Fortieth North Carolina,
with the balance of the artillery in reserve near the church.
A patrol of twenty men were kept to the front down the Fort
Anderson road. Lipscomb arrived soon after at the upper bridge
and reported himself in position with the balance of the cavalry,
eight infantry and one howitzer.

General Hagood reported by telegraph his arrival to General
Hoke and asked for orders. He received the following reply:
"Future operations will depend on circumstances. Will telegraph
you in the morning."

The enemy appeared in front of lower bridge, at 3:30 p. m.,
and slight skirmishing ensued. At 5:35 p. m., Hagood telegraphed
Hoke: "Thirteen (13) gunboats in the river above Big
Island, and small boats ahead sounding. . . . Town Creek is a
line can be held whenever occupied. I have examined several
miles of it today. From my observation it can be crossed almost
anywhere that sufficient troops are not stationed. Let me know
your views and intentions." In reply the same evening General
Hagood received the following: "Hold Town Creek till you hear
from me." On the next day, the 20th, General Hoke telegraphed,
"You must move your command as you think best; at same time
recollect the importance of your communication with Wilmington.
. . . I leave the matter to your judgment." And again
and finally, on same day, "Dispute their advance at every available
point." Shortly afterwards an officer from the staff of
General Bragg, who had returned from Richmond and resumed
command, was sent to General Hagood to impress upon him the

necessity of delaying the enemy's advance. He stated that a large
number of Federal prisoners, some ten thousand, had been sent
to Wilmington, for delivery in exchange under a convention
entered into between Generals Grant and Lee—that the Federal
commander had been notified of it under a flag about the time
he had commenced his advance; that he had declined to receive
them, alleging some reason—not now remembered—that he was
probably pressing forward in the hope of obtaining possession of
them by recapture; and that time was essential to get these prisoners
off, out of reach, as well as valuable commissary and quartermaster
stores—all of which were being transported slowly
with our imperfect railroad facilities.

These were the orders and instructions under which General
Hagood acted.

When the enemy's skirmishers began to press on the evening
of the 19th, Lieutenant Jeffords with his mounted patrol were
brought in; and the lower bridge thoroughly destroyed. Jeffords'
command was then used until late next day to patrol the north
bank of the stream towards Lipscomb, meeting with Lipscomb's
patrol on that bank. Colonel Lipscomb was also directed to
scout to his front and left on the enemy's flank and rear, and for
that purpose to keep his bridge intact until compelled by the
enemy in large force to destroy it.

At daylight, on the 20th, the enemy were in large force in front
of lower bridge; he got a battery of Parrotts into position and
pushed forward skirmishers. The fire of artillery and rifles was
at this point brisk throughout the day. He seemed also to be
feeling right and left for a crossing. No demonstration was made
on Lipscomb.

About 11:30 a. m., the Twenty-first South Carolina was sent to
relieve the Eleventh South Carolina at Cowan's. Shortly after
it started a dispatch was received from Captain Westcoat, commanding
Eleventh, that the enemy were landing at Cowan's.
Major Wilds, commanding Twenty-first, was immediately
directed by courier to retain the Eleventh and engage the enemy.
At 12:40 p. m., he reported the enemy in force and driving him.
Colonel Simonton, commanding Hagood's brigade, was directed
to take the Twenty-fifth and Twenty-seventh regiments with him
and, assuming command, take position at the first fork of the road

coming from Cowan's and hold it. At 2:10 p. m., he reported from
a point on the south road short of this fork, "The enemy are in
my front and appear to be extending on the north road. From
my position I cannot guard both roads. No demonstration since
Major Wilds reported." General Hagood had previously ordered
two pieces of artillery to Colonel Simonton. He immediately
went in person and found Colonel Simonton skirmishing sharply
with the enemy, his reserves and two pieces of artillery on
south road (at point marked X—see Map at p. 476), and his
skirmish line not reaching the north road. The enemy were
endeavoring to overlap him on both flanks. A reconnaisance
satisfied General Hagood that the enemy had landed in sufficient
force on this flank to render the position on Town Creek insecure,[42]
and with the crossing on the bar at the mouth of the creek
now in his possession and the point covered by the guns of his
fleet, it was evident he could fling across the bulk of his forces
whenever he pleased. Considering the overwhelming number
opposed to him, General Hagood determined at once to withdraw
from Town Creek. His small force, however, from the necessity
of his position, had been scattered over twelve (12) miles, with
the line of retreat behind the left flank, the one that had been
turned. It was necessary, therefore, that resistance should be
obstinately made by Colonel Simonton in order to give time to
concentrate.

The colonel was accordingly directed to extend his line of
skirmishers to the left (so as to cover both roads), to put a reserve
behind each flank (one on each road), to keep one piece of artillery
with each reserve (on the south road), and to fall back
making an obstinate skirmish fight, until his reserves reached the
telegraph road: then to close his reserves together at the point
marked Y, where General Hagood promised himself to place the
other piece and to retire down the road (YZ)—making that his
direction.

Having made these dispositions and given these directions,
General Hagood returned rapidly to his headquarters at the
Church, and dispatched Colonel Lipscomb immediately to withdraw
with his whole force to Marks' Cross Roads; called in Lieutenant
Jeffords with his mounted men and sent him to Colonel

Simonton to keep up the connection between his two reserves;
sent Lieutenant Moffett, A. A. G., to the point G to bring word
when Simonton should be driven to within 200 yards of the Telegraph
road; ordered the trains which had previously been stationed
at Marks Cross Roads into Wilmington and sent with
them his sick and wounded and two of his field pieces that had
been disabled; and placed the Seventh South Carolina and the
Fortieth North Carolina, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel
Rion of the Seventh, in line of battle on the Wilmington road
(at the points K to Z). Two men were sent to burn the bridges
at McElhaney's mill and cut the sluices to prevent the enemy's
use of the telegraph road to intercept the retreat to Wilmington.
Mr. Young, signal operator, with George Addison, courier at
brigade headquarters, was sent on this duty.

Colonel Lipscomb was absent from his command examining
the creek above his position when the courier reached the upper
bridge, and the officer next in command most improperly delayed
to execute the order till Colonel Lipscomb could be found—thus
losing two hours in his movement.

Judging from the firing that Simonton was hard pressed, General
Hagood gave the order to Colonel Hedrick, commanding at
the lower bridge, to commence withdrawing at 3 p. m. He was
instructed to leave a strong rear guard in the work till he was
fairly off. Lieutenant Moffett arrived before the order was fully
executed and reported Simonton near the telegraph road. When
Hedrick's column was within half a mile approaching Colonel
Rion's lines (of the point Z), Captain Stoney was dispatched
with a courier accompanying him at speed (down the road Z Y)
to order Simonton to fall back rapidly, and to guide him. Stoney
found on the left (of the road Z Y) a body of skirmishers very
slightly engaged, and Simonton on the right (of this road and
in the telegraph road) with one piece of artillery and in a line of
battle (extending to the left and backward towards the skirmishers—thus
making his line oblique to the road Z Y and
thrown forward towards the enemy on his right). The enemy
were advanced with a heavy line of battle, and Simonton firing
rapidly upon them both with his artillery and rifles. Captain
Stoney delivered his order, and Simonton ordered his piece limbered
up and his line of battle to move to the left towards the

skirmishers (and the road Z Y), but the enemy pressing him
again, he revoked the order and sent Stoney to say he was too
heavily engaged to withdraw. Captain Stoney was immediately
returned to Colonel Simonton at the full speed of his horse to tell
him "he must come; to throw away his artillery and make a run
for it; that a line of battle was formed in his rear to protect him."

Stoney arrived in time to see the overwhelming lines of the
enemy sweep over Simonton—the artillery firing till the enemy
got within a few feet of it, and the infantry standing by the gun
and resisting till overpowered hand to hand. He did not get to
Simonton, and, his own horse being shot, he became involved in the
mèleè. The body of skirmishers, before alluded to, coming out
and straggling from the right and informing Hagood of the state
of affairs, he now took position behind Mallory creek, keeping
out a strong skirmish line (across the road between K and Z)
and the squad of cavalry under Jeffords patrolling towards the
Church direct straggling in.

This position he held till after dark, when stragglers ceasing
to come in and Colonel Lipscomb reporting with his mounted
men, his infantry and artillery being in march on the Georgetown
road approaching Marks's Cross Roads, General Hagood ordered
a retreat. One-half of Lipscomb's mounted men formed a rear
guard at the distance of a mile, and the other half was sent forward
to hold the position of McElhaney's mill. The infantry and
artillery were passed over the pontoon bridge across Brunswick
river, and by steam ferry over the Cape Fear by 12 o'clock at
night; and the former marched to report to Hoke who upon the
left bank had fallen back to near Wilmington. The cavalry, after
burning the pontoons and the railroad bridge over Brunswick
river and leaving the picket on Eagle Island, crossed into Wilmington
about daylight on the 21st.

In this engagement the loss was two pieces disabled and
brought off, two pieces captured by the enemy, and 461 men and
officers killed, wounded, and missing—all of whom were from
four regiments of Hagood's brigade. Colonel Simonton carried
into action six hundred men and officers. His fault was in allowing
his greatly inferior force to become engaged in a line of battle
behind obstructions rapidly thrown up, when the occasion required
him, and he had been directed, to make an obstinate skirmish

fight.[43] Again, when ordered to withdraw, instead of facing the
rear and withdrawing directly from the approaching enemy at a
double quick, if necessary, he endeavored to make a flank march
along the enemy's front, with, it is presumed, a view to getting a
road down which to retire in column. The country was an open
pine forest. His troops behaved with their accustomed gallantry,
and to their obstinate defense of the flank, which had been turned,
was due the safety of the whole command that day. The thing
would have been completed had they themselves not been sacrificed
in the discharge of the duty. Colonel Simonton, however,
was inexperienced in the command of troops in the field and his
errors certainly leaned to virtue's side.

Of the missing, mentioned above, Colonel Simonton subsequently
reported 330 men and officers, including wounded captured
by the enemy. Twenty killed upon the field is a very large
estimate, and this would leave over a hundred men and officers,
who, coming out of the rout and not finding the brigade that
night, straggled off to South Carolina, and were no more, with
very few exceptions, heard of in the war. Captain Stoney himself,
included among the missing above reported, with fifty-two
men and officers came out of the rout and did not find the brigade
that night. These men, misinformed on reaching the Lumberton
railroad of affairs in Wilmington, took the cars to Lumberton
to rejoin the brigade via Fayetteville (this, however, they never
did). Captain Stoney separated from them and rejoined his
command at Rockfish creek some days later.

In all these operations Hagood's command fell back for four
days before a force of ten to his one, taking this time to go a
distance of eighteen miles and crossing two rivers. Everything
that was movable was brought off, and the loss in battle was
inconsiderable, when the circumstances of fighting to delay so
superior a force is regarded, and especially the powerful aid the
enemy derived from his navy. Without this he could not with
such facility have turned the Town Creek position. The propriety
of making the obstinate stand at Town Creek at all rests
with the direction of affairs. It delayed the evacuation of Wilmington
but little and was a hazardous venture. Had the junction
been made at Wilmington on the night of the 19th, the

enemy would have got into position on the 20th near the pontoon
bridge, and would at most have shelled the town with field artillery.
The nearest point of the town to the Brunswick shore being
two and a quarter miles, this would have been a mere bagatelle.
Did humanity forbid exposing non-combatants to this, we would
have had to evacuate the town only one day sooner. As it was, a
large number of prisoners could not be got off by railroad, and
were marched ahead of us to a point on the railroad beyond the
Northeast river where they were placed on the cars next day for
further transportation.