 | Memoirs of the war of secession |  |
OPERATIONS ON THE FORT ANDERSON LINES.
Up to the 11th February, operations had been confined on the
left bank to skirmishing and occasional shelling from the sea,
long range between Fort Anderson and a monitor and a gunboat
from the fleet. The fort used generally a 12 dr. Whitworth taken
from a field battery. Against the monitor it was of little use,
but against the gunboat it was effective.
The Confederate fighting strength of all arms was about 4,000
men on the left bank, and 2,300 on the right bank. Of these
there was one regiment of cavalry, Colonel Lipscomb's Second
South Carolina; the infantry was Hoke's division, and part of
the heavy artillerists of the recently abandoned forts converted
into infantry. The remaining part of these garrisons manned
the heavy guns remaining in position, and there were three or
four very good light batteries.
The enemy, on the 11th February, had a fleet in the river of
1 monitor, 15 gunboats, 1 flagship, 1 armed blockade runner, 16
transports and 5 tugs. The armament of these vessels appeared
to be 11- and 15-inch shell guns and Parrotts. Outside, the fleet
was also large. At Smithville our scouts reported 500 infantry,
and at Battery Lamb some two or three hundred. On the other
side their force was probably 9,500 land troops (of which a few
cavalry), with ability to throw on shore two thousand sailors and
marines. Of the enemy's land troops two thousand or twenty-five
hundred had recently arrived.
The enemy were reported massing a large force at New Berne
to strike at the road from Wilmington towards Petersburg. The
telegraph reported that Sherman had the South Carolina railroad
from Branchville to Williston, and, while moving on Columbia,
was demonstrating at once upon Charleston and Augusta.
Bragg had gone to Richmond temporarily and left Hoke in
command of the department of North Carolina.
Brigadier-General Hagood, having, on his return from South
Carolina, relieved Brigadier-General Hèbart, commanded in person
on the Fort Anderson lines. His force was his own brigade,
about 925 enlisted for duty, and the fragments of the garrisons,
before alluded to, converted into infantry, and brigaded under
Colonel Hedrick, Fortieth North Carolina. These numbered 805
enlisted for duty. In addition, there was Moseley's and Bradham's
light batteries, together 132 enlisted for duty, and 152
enlisted mounted men of the Second South Carolina cavalry.
over 2,000, and his force, including officers, about 2,300.
On the 15th of February, the enemy made a reconnaisance in
force from Smithville as far as White Spring Branch, where the
road from Smithville to Wilmington forks, one going straight on
up the river by Fort Anderson, the other turning westward and
leading around Orton Pond. This party was met and skirmished
with by Hagood's mounted force, and retired at night-fall without
pressing vigorously.
On the 16th February, the enemy passed over from Battery
Buchanan to Smithville five large transports with troops, and at
dark a considerable force were still visible at the wharf at
Buchanan, apparently waiting transportation. Subsequent events
showed that these troops were the Twenty-third Army Corps,
General Scofield commanding,[40]
recently arrived before Wilmington
from Tennessee. It was accompanied by field artillery, a
small force (probably two hundred) of cavalry, and a brigade
(Abbott's) of Terry's command. General Hagood had on the
15th asked for, and on the 18th received, some fifty additional
mounted men. Colonel Lipscomb was at the same time sent over
to take command of this arm. This re-enforcement raised the
Confederate force to 2,350 men, with which to confront fully
20,000.
General Hagood now massed all his mounted forces upon right
flank at the head of Orton Pond, keeping but twenty to act as a
patrol in his front, and endeavoring to remedy the want of
mounted men here by doubling his infantry picket and pushing
them further out, say a mile and a quarter.
On the 17th, the enemy advanced in force from Smithville and
halted for the night in front of Hagood's infantry picket. The
mounted patrol and the infantry picket skirmished with them,
and the monitor with seven (7) gunboats engaged the fort at long
range. The monitor engaged at 1,000 yards, and the gunboats
out of range of our 32 drs. Firing commenced at 1:30 p. m. and
continued till sunset; 170 shell were thrown into the fort; one
man was wounded, and no damage done to the work. Forty-seven
(47) shot were thrown by the fort at the monitor, of which
dr. threw a few shot at the gunboats, when its ammunition
became exhausted, and it was sent back at night to the Lower
Town Creek bridge to await a supply of ammunition telegraphed
for to Wilmington. But thirty rounds could be obtained, and
these arrived too late for any subsequent operations on the Fort
Anderson lines.
Colonel Simonton, Twenty-fifth regiment, was placed in immediate
command of Hagood's brigade for all purposes of military
movement. This officer had a few days before been returned to
the brigade, having been detached since June, 1864, and Colonel
Graham, the senior colonel, was on recruiting service in South
Carolina.
On the 8th of February, a communication from General Bragg
had directed that "except in an extreme case, involving the safety
of the command, the present position should not be abandoned."
The chief danger apparently apprehended by the department
commander, as exhibited in this communication, was the passage
by the fort of the fleet, and he went on to say, "A point for communication
across the river has been selected from the mouth of
Town Creek on the west to the old State Salt Works landing on
the east. By this route re-enforcements can be sent to and from
both detachments of the command until the fort is passed. Thus
any land attack can be met."
It is well to remark in passing that this route of communication
was never established.
On Saturday morning, the 18th of February, the monitor took
position within 800 yards of the fort, and the fleet of wooden
gunboats anchored just beyond the ascertained range of our
smooth bore 32 drs., the rifled 32 drs. could not be brought to bear
upon the position of the wooden fleet. At 6:30 a. m., the bombardment
commenced, and continued till 6 p. m. Twenty-seven
hundred and twenty-three shell were thrown at the fort, nearly
all of which struck the work or exploded within it. The fort
fired fifty-three shot and shell, twenty of which were fired from
the rifled guns at the monitor. Of these, seven struck without
doing apparent damage. The smooth bores were fired at intervals,
more in defiance than in the hope of injuring the enemy. The
land forces of the Federals pressing our advanced skirmish line
hold its position. General Hagood, about 9 a. m., directed this
whole line to fall back upon a second line which he had
entrenched in rifle pits some 250 yards in front of his entrenchments;
and sent the Second cavalry, hitherto acting as a patrol
on their front, to re-enforce the right flank at the head of Orton
Pond. The enemy now advanced, taking position in the skirt of
woods some 600 yards in our front, and sharpshooting commenced
and continued during the day. The two light batteries of Moseley
and Bradham shelled the woods in our front during the same
time. The enemy developed no field pieces.
Colonel Lipscomb reported today with the re-enforcement of
fifty mounted men, before alluded to, and was sent with them to
the right and directed to take command. Entrenching tools
(some 20) had on the previous evening been sent the officer then
in command, and he had been instructed to strengthen his position
by such available means as were practicable. These mounted
troops were simply mounted infantry; their arms were the short
range cavalry carbine intermixed with Enfields.
Shortly after Colonel Lipscomb arrived at his post, the enemy,
who had previously appeared on his front, advanced. Sharp
skirmishing ensued, and by nightfall he was pressed back a mile
or more. Lieutenant Jones, of Bradham's battery, was sent to his
assistance and with one howitzer. Lipscomb's position was now
directly across from Orton Pond to Allen Creek, covering the
road leading into Fort Anderson and Wilmington road, and about
four (4) miles from this last, the force in his front being thus
on the right rear of the Fort Anderson position, and at that distance
from its sole line of communication.
The casualties in the fort, which was held by Hedrick's men,
from the bombardment were slight; one officer (Lieutenant Vans,
Fortieth North Carolina,) being killed and six men wounded.
And in this connection it is worthy of mention that not a man of
the garrison took shelter in the bomb-proof, confirming the previous
observation of experience that traverses and parapets are
sufficient protection, when the garrison is not too numerous,
against anything but the heaviest mortar fire. The damage to the
earthwork was considerable. The wooden revetment had gradually
given way; the epaulement was much torn up; in fact, in
the traverses knocked out of shape. No gun, however, was dismounted,
nor its working injured beyond repair during the night.
The casualties in the infantry today did not exceed half a
dozen.
After 6 p. m. the fire of the fleet on the fort averaged one in
five minutes, until 11 p. m., when it was reduced to a shot every
half hour till 2 p. m. For the rest of the night it was increased
to a shot every ten minutes. Working parties were kept diligently
employed all night repairing damages, and an obstruction
was made to the sally port of the fort on the river side in view of
an infantry assault up the beach.
About 10 p. m., written dispatches from Colonel Lipscomb and
the report of Captain Barnes, Fortieth North Carolina, acting as
scout, together with the examination of prisoners and deserters,
satisfying General Hagood that the force on his right and rear
was large and of the three arms, and that Lipscomb's force was
entirely too few to check it, he became satisfied that an evacuation
was necessary to save his command. As he was, however, in telegraphic
communication with his division commander, General
Hoke, and the facts as learned had been laid before him, General
Hagood awaited orders and continued diligently preparing to
fight the position next day.
About 1 a. m., on the 19th, after sending over a staff officer to
confer with General Hagood, General Hoke invited the expression
of General Hagood's opinion upon the propriety of withdrawing
from the Fort Anderson lines. It was given by telegraph as follows:
"1. The enemy are on my right and rear, in point of time less
than three (3) hours' march. Their force is certainly, from data
heretofore sent you, one-half to two-thirds of my whole strength.[41]
It will take me three-quarters of an hour to hear of their advance,
which reduces the time to two and a quarter hours. It is impossible
for me to strengthen the small force opposed to them. You
know its strength.
"2. I have a very much larger force than my own 600 yards in
co-operate. Therefore, when the force on my right rear moves,
I must abandon this position, or sacrifice my command.
"3. I have two defiles in my rear (the bridges and causeways
just behind me) to move through, and two and a quarter hours in
which to extend the order, execute it, and confront the enemy on
my right rear. Even at night there is a possibility of having to
do this pursued by the force in my front. In the daytime it is
certain, and then I can use but one bridge, on account of the fire
of the fleet. Could I re-enforce my right sufficiently to hold the
turning force in check, the case presented would be different."
To this General Hoke replied: "Dispatch received. . . .
What do you think best?" General Hagood replied: "I think
this place ought to be evacuated and the movement commenced in
half an hour." This last dispatch was sent at 2:05 a. m., and at
2:48 a. m. the reply was received from General Hoke ordering the
evacuation and the taking up of a line behind Town Creek.
The movement was immediately commenced. The quartermaster
and commissary train had in the beginning of the fight
been placed behind Allen Creek. It was ordered to Lower Town
Creek bridge. The field batteries, ordnance wagons and ambulances
were sent across Orton causeway, and there the infantry
commenced to withdraw. When the infantry began to move, a
dispatch was sent Lipscomb directing him to fall back quietly
towards Anderson till he reached the road leading from Anderson
to Wilmington via Upper Town Creek bridge, and then taking
that road act as a flanking column to the main column which
would move on the road to the Lower bridge. As soon as the
infantry and heavy artillerists had crossed the Orton canal,
orders were sent the infantry pickets in the pits ahead of the
entrenchments to withdraw. It was in the early dawn when this
last move was commenced, and almost simultaneously with it the
enemy advanced with a heavy skirmish line at double quick,
followed closely by a line of battle. The picket retired at a run,
and fifty or sixty were captured. The enemy most probably had
prepared for an assault at daybreak, and their advance was in
pursuance of this preparation. The sluices of Orton Pond were
cut, and the bridges of the canal burned. This checked pursuit,
and the fleet kept back till the torpedoes opposite the fort could
force in front of Lipscomb coming down between Orton Pond
and Allen Creek struck the lower road upon which the main
column had retreated an hour after the rear had passed. It
proved to have been a larger force than Lipscomb thought. It
was probably two divisions of the Twenty-third Corps, while the
other division had been in our front. (See pencilled note 469.)
No effort was made to blow up the magazine of the fort or to
destroy its armament, because of the shortness of the time till
daylight after the order of evacuation was received; and because
General Hoke had requested by telegraph that the magazine
should not be exploded before 6:30 a. m., which was later than
General Hagood designed to hold the fort.
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