15. What probabilities naturally determine the assent.
But yet there is some end of it; and a man having carefully
inquired into all the grounds of probability and unlikeliness; done his utmost to inform himself in all particulars
fairly, and cast up the sum total on both sides; may, in most cases, come to acknowledge, upon the whole matter,
on which side the probability rests: wherein some proofs in matter of reason, being suppositions upon universal
experience, are so cogent and clear, and some testimonies in matter of fact so universal, that he cannot refuse his
assent. So that I think we may conclude, that, in propositions, where though the proofs in view are of most
moment, yet there are sufficient grounds to suspect that there is either fallacy in words, or certain proofs as
considerable to be produced on the contrary side; there assent, suspense, or dissent, are often voluntary actions.
But where the proofs are such as make it highly probable, and there is not sufficient ground to suspect that there is
either fallacy of words (which sober and serious consideration may discover) nor equally valid proofs yet
undiscovered, latent on the other side (which also the nature of the thing may, in some cases, make plain to a
considerate man); there, I think, a man who has weighed them can scarce refuse his assent to the side on which
the greater probability appears. Whether it be probable that a promiscuous jumble of printing letters should often
fall into a method and order, which should stamp on paper a coherent discourse; or that a blind fortuitous
concourse of atoms, not guided by an understanding agent, should frequently constitute the bodies of any species
of animals: in these and the like cases, I think, nobody that considers them can be one jot at a stand which side to
take, nor at all waver in his assent. Lastly, when there can be no supposition (the thing in its own nature
indifferent, and wholly depending upon the testimony of witnesses) that there is as fair testimony against, as for
the matter of fact attested; which by inquiry is to be learned, v.g. whether there was one thousand seven hundred
years ago such a man at Rome as Julius Caesar: in all such cases, I say, I think it is not in any rational man's
power to refuse his assent; but that it necessarily follows, and closes with such probabilities. In other less clear
cases, I think it is in man's power to suspend his assent; and perhaps content himself with the proofs he has, if
they favour the opinion that suits with his inclination or interest, and so stop from further search. But that a man
should afford his assent to that side on which the less probability appears to him, seems to me utterly
impracticable, and as impossible as it is to believe the same thing probable and improbable at the same time.
