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From Agobard's letter to Louis the Debonnaire, it might be inferred that the custom of judicial combats was not established among the Franks; for having represented to that prince the abuses of the law of Gundebald, he desires that private disputes should be decided in Burgundy by the law of the Franks. But as it is well known from other quarters that the trial by combat prevailed at that time in France, this has been the cause of some perplexity. However, the difficulty may be solved by what I have said; the law of the Salian Franks did not allow of this kind of trial and that of the Ripuarian Franks did. [91]

But, notwithstanding the clamours of the clergy, the custom of judicial combats gained ground continually in France; and I shall presently make it appear that the clergy themselves were in a great measure the occasion of it.

It is the law of the Lombards that furnishes us with this proof. "There has been long since a detestable custom introduced," says the preamble to the constitution of Otho II: [92] "this is, that if the title to an estate was said to be false, the person who claimed under that title made oath upon the Gospel that it was genuine; and without any preceding judgment he took possession of the estate; so that they who would perjure themselves were sure of gaining their point." The Emperor Otho I having caused himself to be crowned at Rome [93] at the very time that a council was there under Pope John XII, all the lords of Italy represented to that prince the necessity of enacting a law to reform this horrible abuse. [94] The Pope and the Emperor were of opinion that the affair should be referred to the council which was to be shortly held at Ravenna. [95] There the lords made the same demands, and redoubled their complaints; but the affair was put off once more, under pretence of the absence of particular persons. When Otho II and Conrad, King of Burgundy, arrived in Italy, [96] they had a conference at Verona [97] with the Italian lords, [98] and at their repeated solicitations, the Emperor, with their unanimous consent, made a law, that whenever there happened any disputes about inheritances, while one of the parties insisted upon the legality of his title and the other maintained its being false, the affair should be decided by combat; that the same rule should be observed in contests relating to fiefs; and that the clergy should be subject to the same law, but should fight by their champions. Here we see that the nobility insisted on the trial by combat because of the inconvenience of the proof introduced by the clergy; that notwithstanding the clamours of the nobility, the notoriousness of the abuse which called out loudly for redress, and the authority of Otho who came into Italy to speak and act as master, still the clergy held out in two councils; in fine, that the joint concurrence of the nobility and princes having obliged the clergy to submit, the custom of judicial combats must have been considered as a privilege of the nobility, as a barrier against injustice and as a security of property, and from that very moment this custom must have gained ground. And this was effected at a time when the power of the Emperors was great, and that of the popes inconsiderable; at a time when the Othos came to revive the dignity of the empire in Italy.

I shall make one reflection which will corroborate what has been above said, namely, that the institution of negative proofs entailed that of judicial combats. The abuse complained of to the Othos was, that a person who was charged with having a false title to an estate, defended himself by a negative proof, declaring upon the Gospels it was not false. What was done to reform the abuse of a law which had been mutilated? The custom of combat was revived.

I hastened to speak of the constitution of Otho II, in order to give a clear idea of the disputes between the clergy and the laity of those times. There had been indeed a constitution of Lotharius I [99] of an earlier date, a sovereign who, upon the same complaints and disputes, being desirous of securing the just possession of property, had ordained that the notary should make oath that the deed or title was not forged; and if the notary should happen to die, the witnesses should be sworn who had signed it. The evil, however, still continued, till they were obliged at length to have recourse to the remedy above-mentioned.

Before that time I find that, in the general assemblies held by Charlemagne, the nation represented to him [100] that in the actual state of things it was extremely difficult for either the accuser or the accused to avoid perjuring themselves, and that for this reason it was much better to revive the judicial combat, which was accordingly done.

The usage of judicial combats gained ground among the Burgundians, and that of an oath was limited. Theodoric, King of Italy, suppressed the single combat among the Ostrogoths; [101] and the laws of Chaindasuinthus and Recessuinthus seemed as if they would abolish the very idea of it. But these laws were so little respected in Narbonne Gaul, that they looked upon the legal duel as a privilege of the Goths. [102]

The Lombards who conquered Italy after the Ostrogoths had been destroyed by the Greeks, introduced the custom of judicial combat into that country, but their first laws gave a check to it. [103] Charlemagne, [104] Louis the Debonnaire, and the Othos made divers general constitutions, which we find inserted in the laws of the Lombards and added to the Salic laws, whereby the practice of legal duels, at first in criminal, and afterwards in civil cases, obtained a greater extent. They knew not what to do. The negative proof by oath had its inconveniences; that of legal duels had its inconveniences also; hence they often changed, according as the one or the other affected them most.

On the one hand, the clergy were pleased to see that in all secular affairs people were obliged to have recourse to the altar, [105] and, on the other, a haughty nobility were fond of maintaining their rights by the sword.

I would not have it inferred that it was the clergy who introduced the custom so much complained of by the nobility. This custom was derived from the spirit of the Barbarian laws, and from the establishment of negative proofs. But a practice that contributed to the impunity of such a number of criminals, having given some people reason to think it was proper to make use of the sanctity of the churches in order to strike terror into the guilty, and to intimidate perjurers, the clergy maintained this usage and the practice which attended it: for in other respects they were absolutely averse to negative proofs. We find in Beaumanoir [106] that this kind of proof was never allowed in ecclesiastic courts, which contributed greatly, without doubt, to its suppression, and to weaken in this respect the regulation of the codes of the Barbarian laws.

This will convince us more strongly of the connection between the usage of negative proofs and that of judicial combats, of which I have said so much. The lay tribunals admitted of both, and both were rejected by the ecclesiastic courts.

In choosing the trial by duel the nation followed its military spirit; for while this was established as a divine decision, the trials by the cross, by cold or boiling waters, which had been also regarded in the same lights, were abolished.

Charlemagne ordained that, if any difference should arise between his children, it should be terminated by the judgment of the cross. Louis the Debonnaire [107] limited this judgment to ecclesiastic affairs; his son Lotharius abolished it in all cases; nay, he suppressed even the trial by cold water. [108]

I do not pretend to say that, at a time when so few usages were universally received, these trials were not revived in some churches, especially as they are mentioned in a charter of Philip Augustus, [109] but I affirm that they were very seldom practised. Beaumanoir, [110] who lived at the time of St. Louis and a little after, enumerating the different kinds of trial, mentions that of judicial combat, but not a word of the others.