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1. Causes of error, or how men come to give assent contrary to probability.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
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1. Causes of error, or how men come to give assent contrary to probability.

Knowledge being to be had only of visible and certain truth, error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment giving assent to that which is not true.

But if assent be grounded on likelihood, if the proper object and motive of our assent be probability, and that probability consists in what is laid down in the foregoing chapters, it will be demanded how men come to give their assents contrary to probability. For there is nothing more common than contrariety of opinions; nothing more obvious than that one man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of, and a third stedfastly believes and firmly adheres to.

The reasons whereof, though they may be very various, yet, I suppose may all be reduced to these four:

I. Want of proofs.

II. Want of ability to use them.

III. Want of will to see them.

IV. Wrong measures of probability.