By several memorials it appears, that there
were local customs, as early as the first and second race. We find
mention made of the custom of the place,
[61]
of the ancient usage,
[62]
of custom,
[63]
of laws,
[64]
and of customs. It has
been the opinion of some authors that what went by the name of customs
were the laws of the barbarous nations, and what had the appellation of
law were the Roman institutes. This cannot possibly be. King Pepin
ordained
[65]
that wherever there should happen to be no law, custom
should be complied with; but that it should never be preferred to the
law. Now, to pretend that the Roman law was preferred to the codes of
the laws of the Barbarians is subverting all memorials of antiquity, and
especially those codes of Barbarian laws, which constantly affirm the
contrary.
So far were the laws of the barbarous nations from being those
customs, that it was these very laws, as personal institutions, which
introduced them. The Salic law, for instance, was a personal law; but
generally, or almost generally, in places inhabited by the Salian
Franks, this Salic law, how personal soever, became, in respect to those
Salian Franks, a territorial institution, and was personal only in
regard to those Franks who lived elsewhere. Now if several Burgundians,
Alemans, or even Romans should happen to have frequent disputes, in a
place where the Salic law was territorial, they must have been
determined by the laws of those people; and a great number of decisions
agreeable to some of those laws must have introduced new customs into
the country. This explains the constitution of Pepin. It was natural
that those customs should affect even the Franks who lived on the spot,
in cases not decided by the Salic law; but it was not natural that they
should prevail over the Salic law itself.
Thus there were in each place an established law and received
customs which served as a supplement to that law when they did not
contradict it.
They might even happen to supply a law that was in no way
territorial; and to continue the same example, if a Burgundian was
judged by the law of his own nation, in a place where the Salic law was
territorial, and the case happened not to be explicitly mentioned in the
very text of this law, there is no manner of doubt but that judgment
would have been passed upon him according to the custom of the place.
In the reign of King Pepin, the customs then established had not the
same force as the laws; but it was not long before the laws gave way to
the customs. And as new regulations are generally remedies that imply a
present evil, it may well be imagined that as early as Pepin's time,
they began to prefer the customs to the established laws.
What has been said sufficiently explains the manner in which the
Roman law began so very early to become territorial, as may be seen in
the edict of Pistes; and how the Gothic law continued still in force, as
appears by the synod of Troyes above-mentioned.
[66]
The Roman had become
the general personal law, and the Gothic the particular personal law;
consequently the Roman law was territorial. But how came it, some will
ask, that the personal laws of the Barbarians fell everywhere into
disuse, while the Roman law was continued as a territorial institution
in the Visigoth and Burgundian provinces? I answer that even the Roman
law had very nearly the same fate as the other personal institutions;
otherwise we would still have the Theodosian code in those provinces
where the Roman law was territorial, whereas we have the institutes of
Justinian. Those provinces retained scarcely anything more than the name
of the country under the Roman, or written law, than the natural
affection which people have for their own institutions, especially when
they consider them as privileges, and a few regulations of the Roman law
which were not yet forgotten. This was, however, sufficient to produce
such an effect that, when Justinian's compilation appeared, it was
received in the provinces of the Gothic and Burgundian demesne as a
written law, whereas it was admitted only as written reason in the
ancient demesne of the Franks.
