22. Argumentum adjudicium.
IV. The fourth alone advances us in knowledge and judgment. The fourth is the
using of proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge or probability. This I call argumentum
adjudicium. This alone, of all the four, brings true instruction with it, and advances us in our way to knowledge.
For, 1. It argues not another man's opinion to be right, because I, out of respect, or any other consideration but that
of conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It proves not another man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take
the same with him, because I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another man is in the right way because
he has shown me that I am in the wrong. I may be modest, and therefore not oppose another man's persuasion: I
may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better: I may be in an error, and another may show me that I am so.
This may dispose me, perhaps, for the reception of truth, but helps me not to it: that must come from proofs and
arguments, and light arising from the nature of things themselves, and not from my shamefacedness, ignorance, or
error.
