There are criminals whom the magistrate punishes,
there are others whom he reproves. The former are subject to the power
of the law, the latter to his authority: those are cut off from society;
these they oblige to live according to the rules of society.
In the exercise of the Police, it is rather the magistrate who
punishes, than the law; in the sentence passed on crimes, it is rather
the law which punishes, than the magistrate. The business of the Police
consists in affairs which arise every instant, and are commonly of a
trifling nature: there is then but little need of formalities. The
actions of the Police are quick; they are exercised over things which
return every day: it would be therefore improper for it to inflict
severe punishments. It is continually employed about minute particulars;
great examples are therefore not designed for its purpose. It is
governed rather by regulations than laws; those who are subject to its
jurisdiction are incessantly under the eye of the magistrate: it is
therefore his fault if they fall into excess. Thus we ought not to
confound a flagrant violation of the laws, with a simple breach of the
Police; these things are of a different order.
Hence it follows, that the laws of an Italian republic,
[53]
where bearing fire-arms is punished as a capital crime and where it is not
more fatal to make an ill use of them than to carry them, is not
agreeable to the nature of things.
It follows, moreover, that the applauded action of that emperor who
caused a baker to be impaled whom he found guilty of a fraud, was the
action of a sultan who knew not how to be just without committing an
outrage on justice.
