 | A treatise of human nature |  |
Notes Book III.
One might think It were entirely superfluous to prove this, if a late author [William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature
Delineated (London !722)], who has had the good fortune to obtain some reputation, had not seriously affirmed, that such a
falshood is the foundation of all guilt and moral deformity. That we may discover the fallacy of his hypothesis, we need only
consider, that a false conclusion is drawn from an action, only by means of an obscurity of natural principles, which makes a
cause be secretly interrupted In its operation, by contrary causes, and renders the connexion betwixt two objects uncertain
and variable. Now, as a like uncertainty and variety of causes take place, even in natural objects, and produce a like error in
our judgment, if that tendency to produce error were the very essence of vice and immorality, it shou'd follow, that even
inanimate objects might be vicious and immoral.
`Tis in vain to urge, that inanimate objects act without liberty and choice. For as liberty and choice are not necessary to
make an action produce in us an erroneous conclusion, they can be, in no respect, essential to morality; and I do not readily
perceive, upon this system, how they can ever come to be regarded by it. If the tendency to cause error be the origin of
immorality, that tendency and immorality wou'd in every case be inseparable.
Add to this, that if I had used the precaution of shutting the windows, while I indulg'd myself in those liberties with my
neighbour's wife, I should have been guilty of no immorality; and that because my action, being perfectly conceal'd, would
have had no tendency to produce any false conclusion.
For the same reason, a thief, who steals In by a ladder at a window, and takes all imaginable care to cause no disturbance, is
in no respect criminal. For either he will not be perceiv'd, or if he be, `tis impossible he can produce any error, nor will any
one, from these circumstances, take him to be other than what he really is.
`Tis well known, that those who are squint-sighted, do very readily cause mistakes in others, and that we Imagine they salute
or are talking to one person, while they address themselves to anther. Are they therefore, upon that account, immoral?
Besides, we may easily observe, that in all those arguments there is an evident reasoning in a circle. A person who takes
possession of another's goods, and uses them as his own, in a manner declares them to be his own; and this falshood is the
source of the immorality of injustice. But is property, or right, or obligation, intelligible, without an antecedent morality?
A man that is ungrateful to his benefactor, in a manner affirms, that he never received any favours from him. But in what
manner? Is it because `tis his duty to be grateful? But this supposes, that there is some antecedent rule of duty and morals. Is
it because human nature is generally grateful, and makes us conclude, that a man who does any harm never received any
favour from the person he harm'd? But human nature is not so generally grateful, as to justify such a conclusion. Or if it
were, is an exception to a general rule in every case criminal, for no other reason than because it is an exception?
But what may suffice entirely to destroy this whimsical system is, that it leaves us under the same difficulty to give a reason
why truth is virtuous and falshood vicious, as to account for the merit or turpitude of any other action. I shall allow, if you
please, that all immorality is derived from this supposed falshood in action, provided you can give me any plausible reason,
why such a falshood is immoral. If you consider rightly of the matter, you will find yourself in the same difficulty as at the
beginning.
This last argument is very conclusive; because, if there be not an evident merit or turpitude annex'd to this species of truth or
falahood, It can never have any influence upon our actions. For, who ever thought of forbearing any action, because others
might possibly draw false conclusions from it? Or, who ever perform'd any, that he might give rise to true conclusions?
As a proof, how confus'd our way of thinking on this subject commonly is, we may observe, that those who assert, that morality is demonstrable, do not say, that morality lies in the relations, and that the relations are distinguishable by reason. They only say, that reason can discover such an action, In such relations, to be virtuous, and such another vicious. It seems they thought it sufficient, if they cou'd bring the word, Relation, into the proposition, without troubling themselves whether it was to the purpose or not. But here, I think, is plain argument. Demonstrative reason discovers only relations. But that reason, according to this hypothesis, discovers also vice and virtue. These moral qualities, therefore, must be relations. When we blame any action, in any situation, the whole complicated object, of action and situation, must form certain relations, wherein the essence of vice consists. This hypothesis is not otherwise intelligible. For what does reason discover, when it pronounces any action vicious? Does it discover a relation or a matter of fact? These questions are decisive, and must not be eluded.
In the following discourse natural is also opposed sometimes to civil, sometimes to moral. The opposition will always discover the sense, in which it is taken.
No questions in philosophy are more difficult, than when a number of causes present themselves for the same
phaenomenon, to determine which is the principal and predominant. There seldom is any very precise argument to fix our
choice, and men must be contented to be guided by a kind of taste or fancy, arising from analogy, and a comparison of
familiar instances. Thus, in the present case, there are, no doubt, motives of public interest for most of the rules, which
determine property; but still I suspect, that these rules are principally fix'd by the imagination, or the more frivolous
properties of our thought and conception. I shall continue to explain these causes, leaving it to the reader's choice, whether
he will prefer those deriv'd from publick utility, or those deriv'd from the imagination. We shall begin with the right of the
present possessor.
`Tis a quality, which I have already observ'd in human nature, that when two objects appear in a close relation to each other,
the mind is apt to ascribe to them any additional relation, in order to compleat the union; and this inclination is so strong, as
often to make us run into errors (such as that of the conjunction of thought and matter) if we find that they can serve to that
purpose. Many of our impressions are incapable of place or local position; and yet those very impressions we suppose to
have a local conjunction with the impressions of sight and touch, merely because they are conjoin'd by causation, and are
already united in the imagination. Since, therefore, we can feign a new relation, and even an absurd one, in order to
compleat any union, `twill easily be imagin'd, that if there be any relations, which depend on the mind, `twill readily conjoin
them to any preceding relation, and unite, by a new bond, such objects as have already an union in the fancy. Thus for
instance, we never fail, in our arrangement of bodies, to place those which are resembling in contiguity to each other, or at
least in correspondent points of view; because we feel a satisfaction in joining the relation of contiguity to that of
resemblance, or the resemblance of situation to that of qualities. And this is easily accounted for from the known properties
of human nature. When the mind is determin'd to join certain objects, but undetermin'd in its choice of the particular objects,
It naturally turns its eye to such as are related together. They are already united in the mind: They present themselves at the
same time to the conception; and instead of requiring any new reason for their conjunction, it wou'd require a very powerful
reason to make us over-look this natural affinity. This we shall have occasion to explain more fully afterwards, when we
come to treat of beauty. In the mean time, we may content ourselves with observing, that the same love of order and
uniformity, which arranges the books in a library, and the chairs in a parlour, contribute to the formation of society, and to
the well-being of mankind, by modifying the general rule concerning the stability of possession. And as property forms a
relation betwixt a person and an object, `tis natural to found it on some preceding relation; and as property Is nothing but a
constant possession, secur'd by the laws of society, `tis natural to add it to the present possession, which is a relation that
resembles it. For this also has its influence. If it be natural to conjoin all sorts of relations, `tis more so, to conjoin such
relations as are resembling, and are related together.
Some philosophers account for the right of occupation, by saying, that every one has a property in his own labour; and when he joins that labour to any thing, it gives him the property of the whole: But, 1. There are several kinds of occupation, where we cannot be said to join our labour to the object we acquire: As when we possess a meadow by graxing our cattle upon it. 2. This accounts for the matter by means of accession; which is taking a needless circuit. 3. We cannot be said to join our labour to any thing but in a figurative sense. Properly speaking. we only make an alteration on it by our labour. This forms a relation betwixt us and the object; and thence arises the property, according to the preceding principles.
If we seek a solution of these difficulties in reason and public interest, we never shall find satisfaction; and If we look for
it in the imagination, `tis evident, that the qualities, which operate upon that faculty, run so insensibly and gradually into each
other, that `tis impossible to give them any precise bounds or termination. The difficulties on this head must encrease, when
we consider, that our judgment alters very sensibly, according to the subject, and that the same power and proximity will be
deem'd possession in one case, which is not esteem'd such in another. A person, who has hunted a hare to the last degree of
weariness, wou'd look upon it as an injustice for another to rush in before him, and seize his prey. But the same person
advancing to pluck an apple, that hangs within his reach, has no reason to complain, if another, more alert, passes him, and
takes possession. What is the reason of this difference, but that immobility, not being natural to the hare, but the effect of
industry, forms in that case a strong relation with the hunter, which is wanting in the other?
Here then it appears, that a certain and infallible power of enjoyment, without touch or some other sensible relation, often
produces not property: And I farther observe, that a sensible relation, without any present power, is sometimes sufficient to
give a title to any object. The sight of a thing is seldom a considerable relation, and is only regarded as such, when the object
is hidden, or very obscure; in which case we find, that the view alone conveys a property; according to that maxim, that even
a whole continent belongs to the nation, which first discover'd it. `Tis however remarkable that both in the case of discovery
and that of possession, the first discoverer and possessor must join to the relation an intention of rendering himself
proprietor, otherwise the relation will not have Its effect; and that because the connexion in our fancy betwixt the property
and the relation is not so great, but that it requires to be help'd by such an intention.
From all these circumstances, `tis easy to see how perplex'd many questions may become concerning the acquisition of
property by occupation; and the least effort of thought may present us with instances, which are not susceptible of any
reasonable decision. If we prefer examples, which are real, to such as are feign'd, we may consider the following one, which
is to be met with In almost every writer, that has treated of the laws of nature. Two Grecian colonies, leaving their native
country, in search of new feats, were inform'd that a city near them was deserted by its inhabitants. To know the truth of
this report, they dispatch'd at once two messengers, one from each colony; who finding on their approach, that their
information was true, begun a race together with an intention to take possession of the city, each of them for his
countrymen. One of these messengers, finding that he was not an equal match for the other, launch'd his spear at the gates of
the city, and was so fortunate as to fix it there before the arrival of his companion. This produc'd a dispute betwixt the two
colonies, which of them was the proprietor of the empty city and this dispute still subsists among philosophers. For my part I
find the dispute impossible to be decided, and that because the whole question hangs upon the fancy, which in this case is
not possess'd of any precise or determinate standard, upon which it can give sentence. To make this evident, let us consider,
that if these two persons had been simply members of the colonies, and not messengers or deputies, their actions wou'd not
have been of any consequence; since in that case their relation to the colonies wou'd have been but feeble and imperfect. Add
to this, that nothing determin'd them to run to the gates rather than the walls, or any other part of the city, but that the gates,
being the most obvious and remarkable part, satisfy the fancy best in taking them for the whole; as we find by the poets, who
frequently draw their images and metaphors from them. Besides we may consider, that the touch or contact of the one
messenger is not properly possession, no more than the piercing the gates with a spear; but only forms a relation; and there
is a relation, in the other case, equally obvious, tho' not, perhaps, of equal force. Which of these relations, then, conveys a
right and property, or whether any of them be sufficient for that effect, I leave to the decision of such as are wiser than
myself.
Present possession is plainly a relation betwixt a person and an object; but is not sufficient to counter-ballance the relation of first possession, unless the former be long and uninterrupted: In which case the relation is encreas'd on the side of the present possession, by the extent of time, and dlminish'd on that of first possession, by the distance, This change in the relation produces a consequent change in the property.
This source of property can never be explain'd but from the imaginations; and one may affirm, that the causes are here
unmix'd. We shall proceed to explain them more particularly, and illustrate them by examples from common life and
experience. It has been observed above, that the mind has a natural propensity to join relations, especially resembling ones, and finds a
hind of fitness and uniformity in such an union. From this propensity are deriv'd these laws of nature, that upon the first
formation of society, property always follows the present possession; and afterwards, that it arises from first or from long
possession. Now we may easily observe, that relation is not confin'd merely to one degree; but that from an object, that is
related to us, we acquire a relation to every other object, which is related to it, and so on, till the thought loses the chain by
too long a progress, However the relation may weaken by each remove, `tis not immediately destroy'd; but frequently
connects two objects by means of an intermediate one, which is related to both. And this principle is of such force as to give
rise to the right of accession, and causes us to acquire the property not only of such objects as we are immediately possess'd
of; but also of such as are closely connected with them.
Suppose a German, a Frenchman, and a Spaniard to come into a room, where there are plac'd upon the table three bottles of
wine, Rhenish, Burgundy and Port; and suppose they shou'd fall a quarrelling about the division of them; a person, who was
chosen for umpire wou'd naturally, to shew his impartiality, give every one the product of his own country: And this from a
principle, which, in some measure, is the source of those laws of nature, that ascribe property to occupation, prescription
and accession. In all these Cases, and particularly that of accession, there is first a natural union betwixt the Idea of the person and that of
the object, and afterwards a new and moral union produc'd by that right or property, which we ascribe to the person. But
here there occurs a difficulty, which merits our attention, and may afford us an opportunity of putting to tryal that singular
method of reasoning, which has been employ'd on the present subject. I have already observ'd that the imagination passes
with greater facility from little to great, than from great to littie, and that the transition of ideas is always easier and
smoother in the former case than in the latter. Now as the right of accession arises from the easy transition of ideas, by
which related objects are connected together, it shou'd naturally be imagin'd, that the right of accession must encrease in
strength, in proportion as the transition of ideas is perform'd with greater facility. It may, therefore, be thought, that when
we have acquir'd the property of any small object, we shall readily consider any great object related to it as an accession, and
as belonging to the proprietor of the small one; since the transition is in that case very easy from the small object to the great
one, and shou'd connect them together in the closest manner. But In fact the case is always found to be otherwise, The
empire of Great Britain seems to draw along with it the dominion of the Orkneys, the Hebrides, the isle of Man, and the Isle
of Wight; but the authority over those lesser islands does not naturally imply any title to Great Britain. In short, a small
object naturally follows a great one as its accession; but a great one Is never suppos'd to belong to the proprietor of a small
one related to it, merely on account of that property and relation. Yet in this latter case the transition of ideas is smoother
from the proprietor to the small object, which is his property, and from the small object to the great one, than in the former
case from the proprietor to the great object, and from the great one to the small. It may therefore be thought, that these
phaenomena are objections to the foregoing hypothesis, that the ascribing of property to accession is nothing but an affect
of the relations of ideas, and of the smooth transition of the imagination.
`Twill be easy to solve this objection, if we consider the agility and unsteadiness of the imagination, with the different views,
in which it is continually placing its objects. When we attribute to a person a property in two objects, we do not always pass
from the person to one object, and from that to the other related to it. The objects being here to be consider'd as the
property of the person, we are apt to join them together, and place them in the same light. Suppose, therefore, a great and a
small object to be related together; if a person be strongly related to the great object, he will likewise be strongly related to
both the objects, consider'd together, because he Is related to the most considerable part. On the contrary, if he be only
related to the small object, he will not be strongly related to both, consider'd together, since his relation lies only with the
most trivial part, which is not apt to strike us in any great degree, when we consider the whole. And this Is the reason, why
small objects become accessions to great ones, and not great to small.
`Tis the general opinion of philosophers and civilians, that the sea is incapable of becoming the property of any nation; and
that because `tis impossible to take possession of it, or form any such distinct relation with it, as may be the foundation of
property. Where this reason ceases, property immediately takes place. Thus the most strenuous advocates for the liberty of
the seas universally allow, that friths and hays naturally belong as an accession to the proprietors of the surrounding
continent. These have properly no more bond or union with the land, than the pacific ocean wou'd have; but having an union
in the fancy, and being at the same time inferior, they are of course regarded as an accession.
The property of rivers, by the laws of most nations, and by the natural turn of our thought, Is attributed to the proprietors of
their banks, excepting such vast rivers as the Rhine or the Danube, which seem too large to the imagination to follow as an
accession the property of the neighbouring fields. Yet even these rivers are consider'd as the property of that nation, thro'
whose dominions they run; the idea of a nation being of a suitable bulk to correspond with them, and bear them such a
relation in the fancy. The accessions, which are made to lands bordering upon rivers, follow the land, say the civilians, provided it be made by
what they call alluvion, that is, Insensibly and Imperceptibly; which are circumstances that mightily assist the imagination in
the conjunction. Where there Is any considerable portion torn at once from one bank, and join'd to another, it becomes not
his property, whose land it falls on, till it unite with the land, and till the trees or plants have spread their roots into both.
Before that, the imagination does not sufficiently join them.
There are other cases, which somewhat resemble this of accession, but which, at the bottom, are considerably different, and
merit our attention. Of this kind Is the conjunction of the properties of different persons, after such a manner as not to admit
of separation. The question is, to whom the united mass must belong.
Where this conjunction is of such a nature as to admit of division, but not of separation, the decision is natural and easy. The
whole mass must be suppos'd to be common betwixt the proprietors of the several parts, and afterwards must be divided
according to the proportions of these parts. But here I cannot forbear taking notice of a remarkable subtilty of the Roman
law, in distinguishing betwixt confusion and commixtion. Confusion is an union of two bodies, such as different liquors,
where the parts become entirely undistinguishable. Commixtion is the blending of two bodies, such as two bushels of corn,
where the parts remain separate in an obvious and visible manner. As in the latter case the imagination discovers not so
entire an union as in the former, but is able to trace and preserve a distinct idea of the property of each; this is the reason,
why the civil law, tho' it establish'd an entire community in the case of confusion, and after that a proportional division, yet
in the case of commixtion, supposes each of the proprietors to maintain a distinct right; however necessity may at last force
them to submit to the same division.Quod si frumentum Titii frumento tuo mistum fuerit: siquidem ex voluntate vestra, commune est: quia singula corpora, id
est, singula grana, quae cujusque pro pria fuerunt, ex consensu vestro communicata sunt. Quod si casu id mistum fuerit,
vel Titius id miscuerit sine tua volunt ate, non videtur id commune esse; quia singula corpora in sua substantia durant. Sed
nec magis istis casibus commune sit frumentum quam grex intelligitur esse corn munis, si pecora Titii tuis pecoribus mista
fuerint. Sed si ab alterutro vestrum totum id frumentum retineatur, in rem quidem actio pro modo frumenti cujusque corn
petit. Arbitrio autem judicis, ut ipse aestimet quale cujusque frumentum fuerit. Inst. Lib. IL Tit. i. § 28.
(In the case that your grain was mixed with that of Titius, if it was done voluntarily on the part of both of you, it is common
property, inasmuch as the individual items, i.e., the single grains, which were the peculiar property of either of you, were
combined with your joint consent. If, however, the mixture was accidental, or if Titius mixed it without your consent, it does
not appear that it is common property, Inasmuch as the several components retain their original identity. Rather, in
circumstances of this sort the grain does not become common property, any more than a herd of cattle is regarded as
common property, If Titius beasts should have become mixed up with yours.
However, if all of the aforesaid corn is kept by either of you, this gives rise to a suit to determine the ownership of property,
in respect of the amount of corn belonging to each. It is in the discretion of the judge to determine which is the corn
belonging to either party.]
Where the properties of two persons are united after such a manner as neither to admit of division nor separation, as when
one builds a house on another's ground, in that case, the whole must belong to one of the proprietors: And here I assert, that
it naturally is conceiv'd to belong to the proprietor of the most considerable part. For however the compound object may
have a relation to two different persons, and carry our view at once to both of them, yet as the most considerable part
principally engages our attention, and by the strict union draws the inferior along it; for this reason, the whole bears a
relation to the proprietor of that part, and is regarded as his property. The only difficulty is, what we shall be pleas'd to call
the most considerable part, and most attractive to the imagination.
This quality depends on several different circumstances, which have little connexion with each other. One part of a
compound object may become more considerable than another, either because it is more constant and durable; because it is
of greater value; because it is more obvious and remarkable; because it is of greater extent; or because its existence is more
separate and independent. `Twill be easy to conceive, that, as these circumstances may be conjoin'd and oppos'd in all the
different ways, and according to all the different degrees, which can be imagin'd, there will result many cases, where the
reasons on both sides are so equally ballanc'd, that `tis impossible for us to give any satisfactory decision. Here then is the
proper business of municipal laws, to fix what the principles of human nature have left undetermin'd.
The superficies yields to the soil, says the civil law: The writing to the paper: The canvas to the picture. These decisions do
not well agree together, and are a proof of the contrariety of those principles, from which they are deriv'd.
But of all the questions of this kind the most curious is that, which for so many ages divided the disciples of Proculus and
Sabinus. Suppose a person shou'd make a cup from the metal of another, or a ship from his wood, and suppose the
proprietor of the metal or wood shou'd demand his goods, the question is, whether he acquires a title to the cup or ship.
Sabinus maintain'd the affirmative, and asserted that the substance or matter is the foundation of all the qualities; that it is
incorruptible and immortal, and therefore superior to the form, which is casual and dependent. On the other hand, Proculus
observ'd, that the form is the most obvious and remarkable part, and that from it bodies are denominated of this or that
particular species. To which he might have added, that the matter or substance is in most bodies so fluctuating and
uncertain, that `tis utterly impossible to trace it in all its changes. For my part, I know not from what principles such a
controversy can be certainly determin'd. I shall therefore content my self with observing, that the decision of Trebonian
seems to me pretty ingenious; that the cup belongs to the proprietor of the metal, because it can be brought back to its first
form: But that the ship belongs to the author of its form for a contrary reason. But however ingenious this reason may seem,
it plainly depends upon the fancy, which by the possibility of such a reduction, finds a closer connexion and relation betwixt
a cup and the proprietor of its metal, than betwixt a ship and the proprietor of its wood, where the substance is more fix'd
and unalterable.
. In examining the different titles to authority in government, we shall meet with many reasons to convince us, that the right of succession depends, in a great measure on the imagination. Mean while I shall rest contented with observing one example, which belongs to the present subject. Suppose that a person die without children, and that a dispute arises among his relations concerning his inheritance; `tis evident, that if his riches be deriv'd partly from his father, partly from his mother, the most natural way of determining such a dispute, is, to divide his possessions, and assign each part to the family, from whence it is deriv'd. Now as the person is suppos'd to have been once the full and entire proprietor of those goods; I ask, what is it makes us find a certain equity and natural reason in this partition, except it be the imagination? His affection to these families does not depend upon his possessions; for which reason his consent can never be presum'd precisely for such a partition. And as to the public interest, it seems not to be in the least concern'd on the one side or the other.
. Were morality discoverable by reason, and not by sentiment, `twou'd be still more evident, that promises cou'd make no alteration upon it. Morality is suppos'd to consist in relation. Every new imposition of morality, therefore, must arise from some new relation of objects; and consequently the will coud not produce immediately any change in morals, but cou'd have that effect only by producing a change upon the objects. But as the moral obligation of a promise is the pure effect of the will, without the least change in any part of the universe; it follows, that promises have no natural obligation. Shou'd it be said, that this act of the will being in effect a new object, produces new relations and new duties; I wou'd answer, that this is a pure sophism, which may be detected by a very moderate share of accuracy and exactness. To will a new obligation, is to will a new relation of objects; and therefore, if this new relation of objects were form'd by the volition itself, we should in effect will the volition; which is plainly absurd and impossible. The will has here no object to which it cou'd tend; but must return upon itself in infinitum. The new obligation depends upon new relations. The new relations depend upon a new volition. The new volition has for object a new obligation, and consequently new relations, and consequently a new volition; which volition again has in view a new obligation, relation and volition, without any termination. `Tis impossible, therefore, we cou'd ever will a new obligation; and consequently `tis impossible the will cou'd ever accompany a promise, or produce a new obligation of morality.
. I mean so far, as holy orders are suppos'd to produce the indelible character. In other respects they are only a legal qualification.
. This proposition must hold strictly true, with regard to every quality, that is determin'd merely by sentiment. In what sense we can talk either of a right or a wrong taste in morals, eloquence, or beauty, shall be considerd afterwards. In the mean time, it may be observ'd, that there is such an uniformity in the general sentiments of mankind, as to render such questions of but small importance.
. It is not here asserted, that present possession or con quest are sufficient to give a title against long possession and positive laws But only that they have some force, and will be able to call the ballance where the titles are otherwise equal, and will even be sufficient sometimes to sanctify the weaker title. What degree of force they have is difficult to determine. I believe all moderate men will allow, that they have great force in all disputes concerning the rights of princes.
. To prevent mistakes I must observe, that this case of succession is not the same with that of hereditary monarchies, where custom has fix'd the right of succession. These depend upon the principle of long possession above explain'd.
. Decentior equus cujus astricta sunt ilia; sed idem velocior. Pulcher aspectu sit athieta, cujus lacertos exercitatio expressit; idem certamini paratior. Nunquam vero species ab utilitate dividitur. Sed hoc quidem discernere, modici judicii est. Quinct. lib. 8. [A horse with narrow flanks looks more comely; It also moves faster. An athlete whose muscles have been developed by training presents a handsome appearance; he is also better prepared for the contest. Attractive appearance is invariably associated with efficient functioning. Yet it takes no outstanding powers of judgement to wake this distinction.]
. Book II. Part II. Sect. VIII.
Suave mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis
E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem;
Non quia vexari quenquam eat jucunda voluptas,
Sed quibus ipse malls caress qula cernere sauv' eat. Lucret,
I were really on the shore, and saw a ship at a distance,
[There is something pleasant in watching, from dry land, the great difficulties another man is undergoing out on the high sea,
with the winds lashing the waters. This is not because one derives delight from any man's distress, but because it is
pleasurable to perceive from what troubles one is oneself free.]
. Love and esteem are at the bottom the same passions, and arise from like causes. The qualities, that produce both, are agreeable, and give pleasure. But where this pleasure is severe and serious; or where its object is great, and makes a strong impression; or where it produces any degree of humility and awe: In all these cases, the passion, which arises from the pleasure, is more properly denominated esteem than love. Benevolence attends both: But is connected with love in a more eminent degree.
| A treatise of human nature | |