Ostracism ought to be examined by
the rules of politics, and not by those of the civil law; and so far is
this custom from rendering a popular government odious, that it is, on
the contrary, extremely well adapted to prove its lenity. We should be
sensible of this ourselves, if, while banishment is always considered
among us as a penalty, we are able to separate the idea of ostracism
from that of punishment.
Aristotle
[44]
tells us, it is universally allowed, that this
practice has something in it both humane and popular. If in those times
and places where this sentence was executed they found nothing in it
that appeared odious; is it for us who see things at such a distance to
think otherwise than the accuser, the judges and the accused themselves?
And if we consider that this judgment of the people loaded the
person with glory on whom it was passed; that when at Athens it fell
upon a man without merit,
[45]
from that very moment they ceased to use
it;
[46]
we shall find that numbers of people have obtained a false idea
of it; for it was an admirable law that could prevent the ill
consequences which the glory of a citizen might produce by loading him
with new glory.
